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Value-at-Risk (VaR) is the primary measure used to estimate the potential losses for a bank 
portfolio due to market movements. It has three key roles: internal risk management; risk reporting; 
determination of market risk regulatory capital for banks with approval for their proprietary 
regulatory VaR model. These three roles exalt VaR to a position of significant influence. It 
influences risk allocation and control through the internal risk management role. It influences 
market perception of a bank’s risk-taking through its reporting role. Through its regulatory capital 
role, it affects an opportunity cost. VaR has been central to the measurement and management of 
market risk for banks since its technical development by RiskMetrics in the 1990’s. Having 
emerged from practice in JP Morgan, it has an atypical genesis as a reporting measure, and unusual 
longevity not wholly dependent on regulatory imperatives. VaR’s internal control function, its 
reporting role, and its use in determining market risk regulatory capital means it has the potential 
to influence risk-taking behaviour of banks with clear societal implications, embodying the 
interrelationship between accounting and the social (Burchell et al. 1985). 
VaR’s role within the market risk regulatory capital framework led to its emerging as a cynosure 
or centre for attention by financial media and was a source of concern in investigations into the 
events of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
have developed a revised framework for the treatment of market risk, known as the Fundamental 
Review of the Trading Book (FRTB) with implementation due in January 2022(BCBS 2019). This 
framework demotes the role of VaR as the central measure in the determination of market risk 
regulatory capital. The FRTB calculative framework addresses many of the key issues that became 
apparent in the financial crisis, and includes the replacement of VaR by Expected Shortfall (ES), 
a measure heralded for capturing tail risk. However, these changes to the market risk regulatory 
framework do not automatically infer changes to the other roles of VaR. This prompts the need for 
a qualitative evaluation of VaR within the context of its various roles and its sphere of influence 
in banking, together with an evaluation of the potential impact of the regulatory changes on risk 
and portfolio management practice.  
The necessity to evaluate VaR on a contextual basis prompts consideration to view VaR as an 
accounting measure, thereby facilitating the use of sociological evaluation methodologies 
developed for accounting measures. Miller and Power (2013) identify four key roles of accounting 
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measures: territorialising, mediating, adjudicating and subjectivising. This framework has been 
used to evaluate the performative power and accountability of various applications of accounting 
(Vosselman 2014; Pelger 2016) and other economised settings including: sustainability (Markota 
Vukić et al. 2017); environmental impact (Doganova and Karnøe 2015); and marketing knowledge 
(Jacobi et al. 2015). To the best knowledge of the author, it has so far not been applied to 
accounting measures that function in risk management within the financial sector, despite the clear 
societal impact of these technologies. We translate the four key roles of accounting measures 
identified by Miller and Power (2013), to the realm of influence of VaR. Through a series of semi-
structured interviews with relevant actors in the field, we investigate the latent power and 
endurance of VaR as an accounting measure despite its apparent shortcomings and a loosening of 
its regulatory power. We explore its dominance within banking organisations and in financial 
markets (territorialising), how it is communicated (mediating), the control aspect of the device 
(adjudicating) and its propensity to prompt action (subjectivising).   
We find that the territorialising and subjectivising power of accounting measures is revealed in 
how VaR has become embedded in the thinking of users. This “stickiness” of an accounting 
technology may become an impediment to change or may affect the perception of the impending 
change. This case shows the latent power of accounting measures, and the reach they can acquire 
when developed in an under-regulated way. We find that the Miller-Power frame has resonance 
beyond what is considered conventional financial accounting. It highlights the need for awareness 
of the embedded nature of accounting measures when implementing regulatory, organisational, or 
market changes. Hence, we find that VaR, as a useful though inaccurate (Millo and MacKenzie 
2009) risk model may have sustained longevity in its internal risk management role beyond the 
implementation of FRTB.   
We deploy a mixed methods approach whereby we use the findings from a qualitative evaluation 
of VaR and the market risk regulatory framework, to inform and shape a quantitative evaluation 
of the impact of the FRTB calculative framework on risk and portfolio management practice. One 
of the key findings from the qualitative study is the belief by practitioners that the FRTB regulatory 
framework will have limited impact on risk modelling, chiefly entailing a change of metric at the 
end of the risk modelling process (that is, a point estimate at 99% confidence level replaced by an 
average of the tail at 97.5% confidence level). This framed our quantitative analysis to examine 
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the potential impact of the additional criteria introduced under FRTB for the authorised use of 
proprietary risk models (regulatory VaR/ES): P&L attribution test and desk-level backtesting. Our 
quantitative impact study examined the propensity for equity portfolios to pass the P&L attribution 
tests. We found that particular characteristics, inclusion of high market-capitalisation stocks and 
weightings proportional to index-weightings, increased the likelihood of passing the P&L 
attribution test. We also found that the FRTB desk-level backtests had low power to reject poorly 
performing resolution models. We argue that these results infer a change of emphasis from the ex 
post performance of the VaR resolution models to the ex ante role of portfolio management. This 
is important because it has implications for the implementation of the FRTB regulatory framework. 
Banks will find it challenging to meet the additional requirements of the PLA tests to secure 
authorisation for use of their internal models unless they recognise this change of emphasis. The 
difficulty in passing the PLA tests prompts two alternative actions for banks. First, that they adopt 
a full revaluation approach to market risk modelling. This would have significant system 
implications and the computation time would increase significantly. Alternatively, that they 
enhance alignment between the portfolio and the risk factors through the construction of the bank 
portfolio. These options may prove too onerous and costly and may cause banks to reconsider the 
efficacy of pursuing the authorisation of internal models for market risk regulatory capital. The 
widespread adaptation of the standardised approach is contrary to the BCBS philosophy that the 
use of internal models facilitate a level playing field between banks in different jurisdictions.  
A common characteristic in the criticism of VaR is the assumption that the same resolution model 
is used cohesively in each of its roles. Our qualitative study finds that practitioners’ do not perceive 
any conflict between using different VaR models for internal market risk management and 
regulatory capital calculations.  A McKinsey study found that currently 50% of banks use a 
different model for regulatory capital purposes than for internal risk management purposes (Mehta 
et al. 2012). Although FRTB introduces additional desk-level backtests, our quantitative study 
finds that they do not incentivise the use of risk resolution models with strong forecasting ability. 
This is consistent with the findings of Hermsen (2010), who finds that Basel II does not incentivise 
the use of superior market risk forecasting resolution models. Coupling this finding with the 
additional calculative layers of FRTB (asset-specific liquidity horizons, weighted diversified and 
non-diversified ES, calibration on stress period, output floor at 75% of SA), we find that the 
iv 
 
importance of internal models in the calculation of market risk regulatory capital is diminished. 
Thus, FRTB will further detach the internal risk management role of VaR from the mechanism 
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In this thesis, our key objective is to examine Value-at-Risk (VaR) which has been central to the 
measurement and management of market risk for banks since the 1990s (Jorion 2002; Pérignon 
and Smith 2010; Elshandidy et al. 2018). VaR measures the potential loss on a bank’s portfolio 
over a specified risk horizon and at a specified confidence level. This is a particularly interesting 
case for three main reasons. First, VaR was a key measure of market risk that, in failing to prevent 
the financial crisis in 2008, was implicated “The number that killed us” (Triana 2011). A relatively 
simple measure with such significant societal risk is worth exploring in order to discover how it 
became so ubiquitous and powerful. The second motivation in looking at VaR is that, unlike formal 
accounting standards, it developed as a quasi-regulatory accounting measure not from regulators 
but from practice, having emerged from work within JP Morgan. This is an atypical genesis for an 
accounting measure with such influence and societal impact. Thirdly, VaR demonstrates unusual 
longevity in practice that is not wholly dependent on regulatory imperatives. VaR’s internal control 
function, its reporting role, and its use in determining market risk regulatory capital (for banks 
with approval for their internal models) means it has the potential to influence risk-taking 
behaviour of banks with clear societal implications. While this flags the interrelationship between 
accounting and the social (Burchell et al. 1985), VaR was not consciously designed with such 
social imperatives in mind. Despite this, it became dominant as a measure of market risk, with 
primacy enshrined in regulation,1 and appears likely to persist beyond its regulatory period of 
dominance. This case highlights the need for awareness of the embedded nature of accounting 
measures when implementing regulatory, organisational or market changes. 
The global financial crisis 2007-2009 has, according to Crotty (2009), its financial roots in the 
‘New Financial Architecture’ of light regulation and integrated global markets. Central to this 
architecture, Crotty argues, is the management of risk in the commercial banking sector together 
with “inept regulation”. Structured products such as Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) and 
                                                 
1 It will be replaced by Expected Shortfall with the implementation of FRTB in 2022 BCBS (2019) Minimum capital 




Asset Backed Securities (ABS) became central to the mode of funding for commercial and 
investment banks. These structured products were viewed as a means of: achieving yield in a low 
interest environment; translating assets that were traditionally illiquid into something marketable; 
and reducing capital requirements. Originally hailed as a means of dispersing risk away from 
traditional commercial banks (Geithner 2008), the Bank of England (2007) reported concerns that 
UK banks’ balance sheets were expanding rapidly as banks held these structures on-balance-sheet. 
Furthermore, Richardson and Roubini (2009) estimate losses to the US banking sector of $1.8 
Trillion  arising from the crisis, half the overall losses in the US, meaning that risk was still highly 
concentrated in the banking sector. The role of securitised structures in the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis have received considerable attention (Llewellyn 2000; Barnett-Hart 2009; Shin 2009; 
Cordell et al. 2011; Jarrow 2011) where the issues identified include: neglect of liquidity risk; 
questionable dissociation from traditional fixed income; assumed due-diligence in origination; role 
of credit rating agencies; distorted incentives. When weaknesses in securitised structures became 
apparent in what has been dubbed the sub-prime mortgage crisis, confidence in the value of the 
structures quickly diminished, leading to a perceived toxicity of the products and the collapse of 
their values. The extent to which commercial banks were exposed to these products, directly 
through holdings of the equity tranche or indirectly through exposure to investment banks, was a 
surprise to many and lead to the breakdown of the interbank market which had become the primary 
funding source for many commercial banks (Turner 2009). Banks’ inability to access liquidity led 
to further exposures of weaknesses in the banking system highlighting dependency on short-term 
funding on the interbank market, unfettered leverage ratios, and insufficient levels of capital.  
The losses to the commercial banking sector have had a huge impact on society, with significant 
losses to financial institutions being socialised along with other interventions through which 
taxpayers absorbed losses. Furthermore, the role of banks in providing access to credit as a means 
of enabling economic growth was significantly repressed following the crisis. Kay (2009) argues 
that regulation should prioritise the prevention of socialisation of losses from banking institutions. 
Domestic and global banking regulation received significant criticism in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis.  Market risk regulation and VaR in particular received criticism for its role in the 
determination of market risk capital. Crotty (2009) imprecates the VaR measure through his 
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euphemistic description of the VaR mechanics as a ‘statistical exercise’ juxtaposed with the 
magnitude of the power and influence of its various roles. 
VaR is an expression of the potential loss on a portfolio at a specified confidence level for a 
specified risk horizon (Danielsson 2011). VaR’s evolution from its theoretical basis (Markowitz 
1952; Sharpe 1963; Markowitz 1991; Bernstein 1993) to its prevalence within risk modelling is 
predicated on JPMorgan’s development of a firm-wide VaR in the 1990’s  (Guldimann 2000). 
VaR became a reporting requirement under the Securities Exchange Commission in the US in 
1997 and became central to the calculation of market risk (Pillar 1) regulatory capital through the 
1996 amendment to Basel II. It has three key roles: internal market risk management; financial 
Reporting; determination of Pillar 1 market risk capital for banks with approval for the Internal 
Model Approach (IMA).  
The emergence of VaR as a cynosure for the criticism in financial media became highly emotive 
post financial crisis. Headlines like: “The number that killed us” (Triana 2010); “… widespread 
institutional reliance on VaR was a terrible mistake” (Nocera 2009b); “The monster of VaR has 
not gone away” (Heaney 2012). The criticisms hinge on the perceived inability of VaR to curtail 
bank’s risk-taking behaviour and further, that it could not ensure adequate capital buffers to 
prevent the socialisation of risk. Particular VaR modelling characteristics also received media 
attention including: VaR’s inability to forecast the extent of losses beyond the specified confidence 
level; the complacency VaR created; VaR’s game-ability; VaR’s assumption of normality2 and 
that historical performance is an indicator for future performance; VaR’s procyclicality resulting 
in cyclical capital requirements; VaR’s incentivisation of market homogeneity. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) developed a revised framework for the 
treatment of market risk, known as the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB) for 
implementation in January 2022 (BCBS 2019). Yet the implementation of FRTB and succession 
of VaR by Expected Shortfall (ES) as the measure used to determine market risk capital does not 
automatically indicate its imminent demise in the two other roles of reporting and internal risk 
management. This demands an investigation of why VaR has retained primacy in these roles 
despite considerable external criticism. This requires an alternative approach to that taken by 
                                                 
2 Erroneously attributed to all resolution methods. 
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Woods et al. (2004; 2008) who examine both the informational value of VaR disclosures and the 
organisational role of VaR. Lockwood (2015) undertakes a sociological evaluation of VaR, but 
her study scarcely addresses the perspectives of practitioners or the significance of the different 
roles of VaR. We investigate what practitioners think of VaR and thereby rationalise VaR’s 
longevity and apparent usefulness, separating its key roles. The sociology of accounting literatures 
have developed theories that enable the evaluation of accounting devices within their social 
context. Hence, we rationalise the interpretation of VaR as an accounting measure in order to draw 
on these theories to qualitatively evaluate VaR. 
Extensive research demonstrates the influence and interaction of accounting measures or devices 
with organisations, markets, people, culture and society (Muniesa et al. 2007; Orlikowski and Scott 
2008; Miller et al., 2008; Skærbæk and Tryggestad 2010). Separate from the actions of 
accountants, accounting measures themselves may be viewed as shaping devices by which “the 
economization of organizational life becomes elaborated and institutionalized” (Miller and Power 
2013). This perspective highlights both the strength and power of accounting measures, and their 
reductive tendencies. In turn, this flags the need for research that examines the behavioural impact 
of a measure through the experienced realities of users of accounting measures in the field in order 
to explore which aspects are amplified or diminished, and how the measure itself operates and 
influences, beyond the simple calculative effect. Prior work in critical accounting (Burchell et al. 
1980; Hopwood and Miller 1994; Miller and Power 2013)  together with the emergence of the 
sociology of finance literature (Millo and MacKenzie 2009; Svetlova 2012; MacKenzie and Spears 
2014b) has contributed greatly to our understanding of calculative devices that span financial 
markets and reporting, often causing us to question their accepted narrative. Miller and Power 
(2013) identify four key roles of accounting measures: territorialising, mediating, adjudicating and 
subjectivising (Henceforth the Miller-Power frame). We translate these four key roles to the realm 
of influence of VaR through a series of semi-structured interviews with relevant actors in the field, 
and use this as a lens to investigate the latent power of the VaR measure in practice. Of course, 
one of the key roles of VaR is its use in the determination of market risk regulatory capital (for 
banks with approval for their internal model). Therefore, we extend our qualitative evaluation to 
include the regulatory context. 
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Post financial crisis, regulatory bodies, including the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) have been working to develop a more comprehensive approach to managing banks’ 
market risk. The BCBS initially supplemented VaR with a stressed VaR (SVaR) in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis but began the process of developing a revised framework for market risk. 
This regulatory framework, announced in 2016 but with a finalised document published in 2019 
is the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB), which will come into effect January 
2022 (BCBS 2019). The headline change under FRTB is the replacement of VaR with Expected 
Shortfall (ES) as well as an overhaul of the liquidity horizon assumptions. The Basel Committee 
considers FRTB to be the final piece of the Basel III framework which will address key weaknesses 
observed in the financial crisis and ensure the stability of the financial system (BCBS 2016). FRTB 
is considered to be a seismic change in the measurement and management of market risk (Mehta 
et al. 2012). While there is a rich literature evaluating VaR empirically and theoretically within 
the Basel II and Basel II.5 framework, there is limited study within the context of the impending 
revised regulatory framework of FRTB.  
Therefore, the second key objective of this thesis is to evaluate the market risk regulatory context 
of VaR and the impending implementation of FRTB. These combined qualitative perspectives are 
used to inform the third key objective: a quantitative analysis of the potential impact on risk 
management and portfolio management practice due to changes in the market risk capital 
calculative framework under FRTB. 
Our fourth research question asks what we have learned from this combined qualitative and 
quantitative study of the VaR metric in its regulatory context that adds to our understanding of 




1.1 Research questions 
 
The key research questions are: 
RQ1: What is the perception of VaR by different practitioner groups? 
RQ2: What are the practitioners’ perceptions of the market risk regulatory framework and 
impending implementation of FRTB?  
RQ3: What is the impact of FRTB on the practice of market risk management and portfolio 
management? 
RQ4: Can we apply the findings from the study to develop understanding of both traditional 
and non-traditional accounting metrics? 
RQ5: What can the study tell us about the efficacy of the Miller-Power frame to evaluate 
a non-traditional accounting measure? 
The first three research questions arose through considering the critical juncture in market risk 
management, whereby the regulatory changes under FRTB indicate a significant divergence 
between the continued deployment of VaR internally and the calculation of market risk regulatory 
capital. Qualifying banks (IMA banks) currently used their proprietary VaR model to determine 
market risk regulatory capital. Research questions four and five are derived from the application 
of a critical accounting approach to evaluating VaR. Key to this application is the rationalisation 
that VaR can be considered as an accounting metric. We qualify this with the descriptor ‘non-
traditional’ by which we mean unconventional.  In order to address the research questions, we have 
undertaken a particular type of mixed methods approach where we are using the insights from the 
qualitative evaluation to inform the quantitative evaluation of the impact of FRTB on risk 
modelling. Knowledge of the intricacies of the FRTB framework including the proposed 
calculative framework (in which Expected Shortfall (ES) succeeds VaR), the criticisms of the 
current market risk management regime, and the multiple roles of VaR, inform and link both 
studies. Whilst the philosophical positions of each study are discussed later, both studies share a 
commonality in being applied studies. The sociological evaluations, examine the perceptions of 
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practitioners’ who develop or apply the VaR model in their work. We carry out semi-structured 
interviews, informed by the literature and an analysis of the collective contemporary criticism 
around VaR, to develop an understanding of the real rather than the assumed functions of VaR, 
the current regulatory framework and the impending changes to the regulatory framework under 
the implementation of FRTB. The quantitative impact evaluation examines the potential impact of 
the application of the FRTB framework on risk and portfolio management. The insights from the 
qualitative evaluations inform and frame the quantitative impact analysis. The results are then 
combined to yield a depth of insight that would not have been possible under one research method. 
Both studies are of value discretely as well as combined. The simultaneously social and technical 
nature of VaR warrants a mixed method of evaluation. We critically review the insights gained on 
the specific case of the metric VaR and its regulatory context to evaluate their applicability to a 
wider set of accounting metrics. 
1.2 Contributions 
 
The key contributions of the study can be separated into policy, practice, and theoretical 
contributions. 
Policy Contributions 
This study captures insights into the experienced realities of VaR, thereby developing an 
understanding of the real rather than the assumed functions of VaR. This user-focused perspective 
is an emerging area in sociological evaluations of accounting measures. Radcliffe et al. (2018) is 
a key example of this approach. They argue that the work of tax professionals are “socially 
consequential” (Radcliffe et al. 2018, p.46) and therefore their examination of the deployment of 
their technical skills required examination through direct engagement using semi-structured 
interviews. Whilst Woods et al. (2004) examine VaR from an organisational and reporting context, 
studies incorporating experience realities have not previously been applied to VaR. This is 
important because the successful reform of market risk management cannot only address 
modelling shortfalls. There are also behavioural issues that need to be addressed. Furthermore, we 
contrast these experienced realities with the collective external criticism of financial media, 
government inquests and industry representative reports into the events of the 2007-2009 financial 
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crisis. However, (currently) models like VaR do not operate autonomously and therefore have a 
social dimension, whereby the power inferred on these models through social construction should 
not be underestimated. Any reformation of modelling regimes must examine how the accounting 
measure affects behaviour. This is a key contribution to regulatory policy formation (Contribution 
#1 - Policy).  
We examine the practitioners’ perceptions of the changing market risk regulatory framework and 
find broad support for many aspects of the reforms. In contrast, we find a strong belief that the 
changes under FRTB will have limited impact on internal risk management practice or portfolio 
management. This contrast highlights the need to capture practitioners’ perceptions of impact of 
reform to practices, particularly those previously subjectified by existing accounting measures. 
(Contribution #2 - Policy).  
Novel Approach 
The cross-pollination from a qualitative study into a quantitative impact study, where the insights 
gained from the former inform and shape the latter, is a novel approach. This provides useful 
insights for the implementation of regulatory or organisational change. More specifically, this 
collaboration of methods highlights a conflict between the beliefs of practitioners concerning the 
impact of FRTB, and empirically derived potential impacts. (Novel Approach).  
Practice 
The quantitative impact study into the potential impacts of the FRTB framework on risk and 
portfolio management contributes to practice. This study finds a conflict between the beliefs of the 
practitioners examined in the qualitative study and the implications of the quantitative impact 
study. The qualitative study finds that practitioners perceive limited impact of FRTB on risk 
management and portfolio management practice. In contrast, the results of the quantitative impact 
study shows empirically that meeting the additional requirements for internal model authorisation 
requires significant changes to risk management and portfolio management practice. This 
contributes to practice by demonstrating how insights from a quantitative impact study can enable 





The insights from the qualitative evaluation of VaR expands the understanding of the influence 
and interactions of accounting measures more generally; this is an additional contribution to the 
literature. Finally, this study makes a theoretical contribution as it demonstrates the efficacy of the 
Miller-Power frame to yield insights into traditional and non-traditional accounting measures. This 
is direct response to the call by O’Dwyer and Unerman (2016) to enhance robustness through the 
explicit use of theory and, in turn, strengthen the theory (Contribution #4 - Theory).  
1.3 Sequencing 
 
The sequencing of the thesis begins with a broad introduction to the context of the various roles of 
VaR, its resolution methods and replacement measure ES. The contextualisation of the study in 
the Irish and UK banking sector is then explored. We follow with the evolution of the Basel 
regulatory framework and unilateral approaches to model governance. We elucidate the collective 
contemporary external criticism using sources from financial media, government reviews of the 
financial crisis and representative bodies from industry. We then review the literatures in areas 
such as capital-based regulation, regulatory capture, social studies of finance, critical perspectives 
and VaR/ES modelling. The study then rationalises the methodology of the qualitative study 
wherein the work of Miller and Power (2013) acts as a lens to investigate the perceptions of 
practitioners on VaR, and the regulatory context. The insights from the qualitative investigation 
are discussed, and then used to inform the quantitative impact study. The quantitative impact study 









This chapter provides the necessary context and background for the study. We illustrate the 
concept of VaR and introduce its key roles. VaR is not one model but is a statistical measure of a 
forecasted distribution. The resolution model is how this distribution is determined. Understanding 
the key roles of VaR (and how they are interrelated), is important for both the qualitative and 
quantitative components of the study. The over-arching concern of the study is an examination of 
the future prospects for the use of VaR given that, under the implementation of FRTB, ES will 
succeed it as the model used to determine market risk capital for IMA banks. That is, this study is 
concerned with whether this change to VaR’s regulatory role will affect the other roles of VaR.  
We proceed with the contextual backdrop for the study beginning with the evolution of the Irish 
and UK banking system and their approach to regulating their respective financial sector. This is 
important because participants from the Irish and UK banking system form the basis for the 
qualitative study; hence, the commonalities and divergences in technical mechanisms, philosophy 
and culture are significant factors. We trace the evolution of the Basel international regulatory 
framework for banks, including the introduction of VaR as the means of calculating market risk 
regulatory capital for banks with approval for their internal (market risk) models (Internal Model 
Approach, IMA). This is important for the second component of the qualitative study, which 
examines perspectives of participants on the market risk regulatory framework. We include 
contemporaneous criticisms of the Basel regulatory frameworks and specifically the role of VaR 
within this framework. In the aftermath of the financial crisis (2007-2009), a number of central 
banks initiated unilateral approaches to model governance of internal risk models globally. Model 
governance of risk models examines inputs, modelling assumptions, data quality and testing to 
ensure high standards of calculation of capital, comparability and consistency. We provide a brief 
overview of these approaches to model governance to add to the understanding of the context in 
which this research study is situated.  Finally, we explore the collective contemporary criticism 
around VaR, predominantly outside of academic criticisms, to evoke a sense of the collective 
11 
 
reprobation of VaR, contemporaneous to the changes to banking regulation.  In summary, in this 
chapter, we bring some specifics to the nature of the VaR measure and its various roles. We then 
set the scene for the study in terms of the Irish and UK banking sectors, the evolving global bank 
regulatory framework, augmented risk model governance, and contemporary critical commentary 
on VaR. 
 
2.2 What is VaR? 
 
VaR is a “single summary statistical measure of risk” where it estimates losses on a portfolio due 
to market movements (Danielsson 2011, p.76). Taleb (2009) takes exception to the word measure 
in the context of VaR, arguing that the estimation of future risk is unlike a tangible phenomenon 
like temperature that can be measured. However, Power (2007) finds that risk measurement has 
become central to the collective philosophy of risk management specialists. VaR is an expression 
of the potential loss on a portfolio such that there is a probability α of losses exceeding (or 
equalling) VaR over a specified risk horizon. That is, the probability of losses greater than VaR 
occurring over the specified period is α. Under Basel II, which introduced VaR as a measure used 
to determine market risk capital, α is 1% for bank portfolios with a risk horizon of 10 days. VaR 
is a quantile on the distribution of forecasted profit and loss (P&L) or forecasted distribution of 
returns, where VaR is then an expression of a percentage of the portfolio’s current value 
(Alexander 2009). A typical and accessible visualisation of VaR uses the normal distribution as 
the assumed parametric form of the forecasted returns. Although this visualisation aids 
understanding, it is problematic in the misguided inference that all VaR modelling uses this 




Figure 2.1 1% VaR using assumption that forecasted returns follow a Normal distribution mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Although the prescribed parameters for VaR under Basel II required α=1% and a risk horizon of 
10days, for internal risk management purposes a 1-day VaR is more prominent. Reporting 
requirements may require various significance levels (that is, levels of α) and risk horizons. We 
progress our depiction of the study’s context with an examination of the three key roles of VaR: 
determination of regulatory capital (IMA banks), reporting and internal risk management 
(organisational role).  
 
2.3 What is Expected Shortfall? 
 
While VaR is a quantile measure or point estimate, Expected Shortfall (ES) summarises the tail of 
the P&L distribution as a single risk measure. It is sometimes called Expected Tail Loss or 
Conditional VaR with generally the same interpretations. Expected Shortfall is conditional on VaR 
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being exceeded, that is, losses greater than VaR. As the word Expected suggests we take the 
expectation (average) of the losses in the tail. It is a coherent risk measure in the sense of Artzner 
et al. (1999), who prescribe four criteria: subadditivity, translational invariance, homogeneity, and 
monotonicity. The property of subaddivity has received much attention. VaR fails to meet this 
criteria for all portfolios while ES meets each of the coherence criteria. Hence it has long been 
promoted in academia (Danielsson et al. 2001; Frey and McNeil 2002) as an alternative measure 
for regulatory purposes. Another aspect of ES that promotes its use as an alternative to VaR is that 
because it captures all of the tail it is less easily gamed or manipulated when compared to VaR. It 
must be noted that both metrics can be applied to the same underlying forecasting model 
(resolution model). Furthermore, there are concerns about the ability to backtest ES (Chen 2014). 
This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
2.4 Role of VaR 
 
Adair Turner3 refers to the “wide ranging intellectual failure” at the heart of the financial crisis, in 
particular the development and modelling of complex derivatives and securitised products (Turner 
2009). Power (2009, p.849) takes the mantle to focus on the “systems of thought” that underpin 
the way in which organisations manage risk and challenges whether the shareholder value 
dominant philosophy, applied to individual organisations, was also aligned to a system-wide 
management of risk. The “architecture of concepts and assumptions” which propagates 
organisational and systemic ontologies of risk management is not easily visible but warrants 
investigation of the qualitative and behavioural aspects of risk management in the banking system 
(Power 2009, p.849).  
The Value at Risk (VaR) risk metric is charged by the regulators to operationalise prudential risk 
behaviour by individual banks and throughout the financial system (BCBS 2006b). In the case of 
the VaR metric, the underpinning loss forecasting models are recognised as not merely forecasts 
of financial market movements but as having an influence and potentially causing a reaction in 
                                                 
3 Chairman of the UK’s Financial Services Authority (2008-2013) 
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financial markets. VaR’s embeddedness in the regulatory framework institutionalises this 
reactivity. 
VaR entered the financial markets lexicon in the 1990’s when JPMorgan’s RiskMetrics Group 
transformed the portfolio theory of Markowitz (1952) among others into a standardised framework 
capable of capturing the complexities of contemporary financial portfolios (Tunaru 2015). VaR is 
a summary statistical measure for financial risk (Woods et al. 2008) combining risks from different 
instruments, such as bonds, swaps, interest rate futures, foreign currency derivatives, and stock 
portfolios. The data underpinning the calculation of VaR is a combination of portfolio 
characteristics and market data and, as such, its calculation is an accounting technology and VaR 
itself is an accounting measure. Its popularity has been attributed to the relative simplicity of the 
calculations, ease of interpretation and its ease of aggregation for various levels of an entity 
(Brooks and Persand 2000). Beder describes its simplicity as seductive (1995). When Basel II was 
amended to incorporate market risk, the guidance paper recommended measuring market risk 
using a VaR approach (BCBS 2006b). Its use by banks since then has been prolific (Elshandidy et 
al. 2018): internally as a risk control mechanism; as a reported measure of risk; and for regulatory 
capital purposes. Banks require approval for their internal models (IMA banks) in order to use 
VaR to determine market risk regulatory capital. A motivation for this study is that the latest wave 
of bank regulatory reform: the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB) (BCBS 2016). 
FRTB will be implemented in January 2022, and will see VaR succeeded by Expected Shortfall 
(ES) as the central measure for the calculation of market risk capital. This presents a critical 
juncture for the future use of VaR in its internal risk management and reporting roles. We explore 
the realm of VaR through examining its various domains (Regulatory, Reporting and 
Organisational), how they interrelate, influence behaviour, and their significance to society. 
 
2.4.1 Regulatory role of VaR 
 
Under Basel II, VaR became the risk metric to undergird the determination of minimum capital 
requirements for market risk (BCBS 2006b). This was greeted with a thorough critique of the 
metric itself and of the direct linkage between VaR and market risk regulatory capital (Danielsson 
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et al. 2001). Van den Bergh et al. (2001) question the ability of mathematical formulae to capture 
the behaviour of a diverse range of market agents. A primary example of the criticism is the issue 
of procyclicality whereby VaR moves with the cycles because it is primarily driven by market 
variance. VaR’s procyclicality means that VaR increases in volatile markets and therefore bank 
capital requirements (IMA banks) increase. This results in requiring banks to sell assets in stressed 
market conditions (where asset prices may already be deteriorating) to meet their minimum capital 
requirements. As such, the systemic risk attributed to this feature is due to VaR being embedded 
as the approved model for determining capital adequacy levels. The inclusion of the 
countercyclical capital buffer (under Basel III) driven by macro-prudential indicators, partially 
addresses these concerns, which potentially could be levelled at any risk measure used to determine 
regulatory capital (BCBS 2010a). However, Angelidis and Degiannakis argue that it is the internal 
role of VaR of allocating capital, that leads to deleveraging during periods of severe market 
volatility (Angelidis and Degiannakis 2009). This leads us to consider the source of the risk being 
measured, and whether it is exogenous or endogenous to the financial system. Danielsson et al. 
(2011b) uses the illustration of the Millennium bridge in London to explain the nature of 
endogenous risk. Thousands of people had gathered to witness the opening of the new bridge 
spanning the Thames, the first new crossing in 100 years. The bridge had been designed to sway 
gently in the breeze. However, the design did not accommodate large numbers of people walking 
simultaneously. The natural sway of the bridge caused people to collectively adjust their step and 
this synchronised movement augmented the natural oscillation of the bridge causing it to amplify 
and thus sway dangerously. The bridge had to be closed almost immediately. Danielsson et al. 
(2011a) uses this to demonstrate how a shock to the financial system can be amplified within the 
system, particularly if the participants are motivated to react homogeneously. He further argues 
that the ubiquitous use of VaR (through its promotion as a regulatory measure) promotes a 
homogenous response in financial markets, thus amplifying the risk. He further argues that, as 
Basel II standardised models (SA) are not risk-based, they would not incorporate this feedback 
effect (Danielsson et al. 2004). However, Mengle argues that the standardised approach (under 




2.4.2 Reporting role of VaR  
 
Jorion retraces the requirement to make quantitative disclosures about trade (market) risk, citing 
the evolution of reporting requirements of both the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) from strongly recommended use of VaR 
to required (Jorion 2002). Jorion makes the argument that VaR calculations improve the 
governance of derivatives, which were an emerging phenomenon in the late 1990’s. Prior to the 
recommendations to disclose quantitative measures of risk exposure, the published qualitative 
disclosures regarding the use of derivatives were ambiguous about the combined level of risk 
exposure. This ambiguity was feared to belie the degree of speculative trading positions concealed 
under the premise of using derivatives for hedging purposes (Jorion 2002). Woods and Marginson 
(2004) examine disclosures by UK banks in 1999 financial reports following the Accounting 
Standards Board’s (ASB’s) publication of standards FRS 13, ‘Derivatives and other Financial 
Instruments: Disclosures’. They find that, similar to US studies (Roulstone 1999), VaR is the 
preferred metric of disclosure for market risk. However, they find that the interpretability of the 
disclosures does not fulfil the objective of the FRS13 to enable assessment. Looking at the time 
period 1995-1999, Jorion (2002) examines the relationship between VaR disclosures and the 
succeeding variability of trading revenues. His study is limited by the number of commercial banks 
making VaR disclosures during this period. His study finds a predictive relationship between 
disclosed VaR and subsequent variability in trading revenues (Jorion 2002). We can contrast this 
with Pérignon and Smith (2010) whose study finds that VaR, calculated using the Historical 
Simulation resolution method (which they determined to be the most popular method), has no 
predictive power for future variability of trading revenue. Pérignon and Smith (2010) develop a 
VaR disclosure index (VaRDI) to examine the level and quality of disclosure following the SEC 
and BCBS (BCBS 2001, Financial Reporting Release Number 48, SEC 1997) encouragement to 
disclose. Using the time period 1996-2005, they find significant differences in the level of 
disclosure and that the reported VaR figures are excessively conservative. Although they find a 
general trend towards increased disclosure, they find no improvement in quality over the time-
period examined. The objective of BCBS Pillar 3 disclosures is to provide meaningful, consistent 
and comparable information to investors and others to promote market discipline. This component 
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of the Basel III framework has been updated in line with changes to the FRTB market risk capital 
framework, and by January 2022 will include qualitative disclosure of market risk modelling and 
validation, disclosure of market risk capital under the standardised approach (SA), and market risk 
capital under the internal model approach where approval has been given. A comparison between 
the VaR estimates with gain/loss must also be disclosed (BCBS 2018a). The disclosure of market 
risk under the standardised approach is a significant step towards consistency and comparability. 
Note the continued centrality of VaR in the updated BCBS Pillar III disclosures.   
 
2.4.3 Organisational Role of VaR 
 
Preceding the deployment of VaR for regulatory purposes, banks were developing their own VaR 
models for internal risk measurement and risk allocation purposes (Berkowitz et al. 2011). 
Banking portfolios were becoming increasingly globalised and complex and therefore required a 
metric capable of underpinning market risk management. This development gained further 
momentum when JPMorgan allowed public access to their variance and covariance data (Woods 
et al. 2004). This facilitated the calculation of VaR at portfolio level and became the industry 
standard. The organisational role of VaR varies from one institution to the next but typically, it 
became used as a means of risk allocation by way of trading limits at the level of individual trader 
up to entity level, measuring and monitoring end of day market risk. According to Guldimann 
(cited in Woods et al. 2004) VaR has a positive effect in sensitising portfolio managers to risk-
return payoffs resulting in more efficient risk allocation across the trading books. This resonates 
with Power’s rationalisation that VaR’s alignment to shareholder value theory is a key reason for 
its organisational role (2007). The imposition of internal control through the VaR model is 
described as a form of discipline by Jorion: 
“The greatest benefit of VaR lies in the imposition of a structured methodology for critically 
thinking about risk. Institutions that go through the process of computing their VaR are forced to 
confront their exposure to financial risks and to set up a proper risk management function. Thus 
the process of getting to VaR may be as important as the number itself.” 
(Jorion, 1997, pg1). 
18 
 
Jorion’s praise of the disciplinary role of VaR whereby it embeds the analysis and review of 
portfolio market risk, has arguably been assimilated into the routinisation of the organisation in 
order to meet its regulatory capital, reporting, and internal risk management requirements (Power 
2007). Woods and Marginson (2004) express concern about the potential for bias in the choice of 
VaR resolution model leading to misleading results. Note that part of VaR’s internal risk 
management role includes reporting of VaR exposures internally to traders, portfolio managers, 
senior management, and board of directors.  
Having described the various roles of VaR it is clear that they are not mutually exclusive. Power 
argues that risk-based regulation, within which the use of internal models is central, promotes self-
regulation and compliance. Its efficacy, therefore, is dependent on internal control and reporting 
(2007). Together the organisational, reporting and regulatory roles of VaR warrant its evaluation 
as an accounting measure where its sphere of influence is recognised to include inter-
organisational, intra-organisational, financial markets and wider society (Woods et al. 2008). 
Hence, we require a theoretical lens capable of capturing VaR’s multifaceted roles.  
Continuing the development of the contextual setting for this study, we discuss the evolution of 
the Irish and UK banking sectors, their commonality, and the form of regulation deployed in each 
jurisdiction. This is important to address as it characterises the philosophy of their approach to 
banking and regulation, and how this has been shaped by the events of the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis.  
2.5 Irish and UK banking 
 
Ireland and the UK share the Anglo-Saxon banking culture, with a number of the large UK banks 
having a retail operation in Ireland (O'Donnell and Keeney 2010). There is also a high level of 
mobility between the two jurisdictions and institutional and legal similarities. The UK and Ireland 
are the only English common law countries in the EU. Ireland and the UK have a banking presence 
in each other’s markets. There is also a communication synergy between Ireland and the UK. 
Lambkin and Muzellac (2008) find that common cross-border common branding (between 
England and Ireland) allows UK banks with entities in Ireland to benefit from UK communication 
campaigns through common media platforms such as Sky, BBC, ITV and Ch4. Chan-Lau (2010) 
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examines balance-sheet network analysis in global and domestic banking systems and finds that a 
hypothetical default cycle triggered by a credit shock in the UK banking system would have a 1st 
order impact on the Irish banking system. Waysand et al.  (2010) in their investigation of financial 
linkages across the EU find that the UK is the main source of financing and destination of 
investment for Ireland. Buch and Heinrich (2003) study financial integration and banking 
performance across Europe. They find that some economies are more financially open than others, 
and cite the UK and Ireland as most financially open, where banks have foreign assets and 
liabilities that are greater than GDP. They also find that Ireland, the UK and Luxembourg have 
liberal regimes with respect to foreign banks.  
2.5.1 Anglo-Saxon banking culture  
 
Nesvetailova and Palan  (2010) connect the events of the financial crisis with Liberal Market 
Economy capitalism associated with Anglo-Saxon banking cultures. However Konzelmann et al. 
(2010) find that the divergent experiences of countries with this culture defies this conclusion. 
They draw the distinction between the effects of the crisis on the US and the UK compared with 
Canada and Australia as two other major Anglo-Saxon economies. Ireland and New Zealand 
complete their list of Anglo-Saxon economies. They find key differences in the form of 
liberalisation but also in the nature of the regulatory systems between the couplets: US and UK, 
versus Canada and Australia. Kwok and Tadesse (2006) make the conjecture that countries whose 
culture promotes stronger uncertainty avoidance are more likely to have a bank-based financial 
system configuration, as opposed to the markets-based system associated with Anglo-Saxon 
financial systems. Hardie et al. (2013) argue that this distinction is obsolete and that there is no 
longer a simple mapping of financial systems from discrete capitalism modes. 
 
2.5.2 Common Law 
 
La Porta et al. (1997) find that common law countries have greater protection for shareholders and 
creditor than countries with civil law and that this collates with the size and development of their 
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capital markets. Rajan and Zingales (2003) accept that investor protection is significant to 
corporate financing and financial development but dispute the central role of legal origin. Franks 
et al. (2003) dispute the link between investor protection under common law and financial 
development in the UK.  
 
2.5.3 Evolution of the Irish financial system 
 
With the introduction of the Irish Financial Services Centre (IFSC), incentivised and allied to 
global trends in financial liberalisation and innovation, Ireland became financially open and 
exposed to international financial markets. Domestically, the banking sector remained compact, 
with three banks (AIB, BoI and Anglo) representing 80% of the domestic retail market. Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999) find that the majority of historical crises are preceded by financial 
liberalisation. 
Duggar and Mitra (2009) examine whether this increased international openness led to the 
exposure of these Irish domestic banks to contagion risk. They find that the sources of contagion 
risk can be broken down into four key transmissions: Bank deposit runs; wholesale funding 
channels; liquidity and credit risk in interbank markets; unidentified channels. They find balance 
sheet linkages of Irish banks with the UK, through subsidiaries with operations there. 
O’Sullivan and Kennedy (2010) provide an insightful chronology of the Irish banking crisis and 
find that, while the global financial crisis exacerbated issues, it coalesced with a confluence of 
factors including excessive risk-taking by Irish (and recent UK entrants) domestic banks, fuelled 






2.5.4 Evolution of Ireland’s regulatory framework 
 
From a regulatory perspective, Ireland had actively targeted internationalisation in the 
establishment of the IFSC in 1987, but had previously been described as one of the most intensely 
regulated banking system of all developed countries (DKM 1984). The Central Bank and Financial 
Services Authority (CBFSA) Act 2003 created the Irish Financial Services Authority (IFSRA) as 
an “autonomous but not independent” (Honohan et al. 2010) entity though operating within the 
CBSFA. This entity asserted that, beyond its dual mandate of consumer protection and prudential 
supervision, it undertook an additional fiat to “foster an internationally competitive and successful 
financial services industry” (IFSRA 2008). The IMF Country report in 2006 found the IFSC to be 
“one of the largest fund administrator and custody centres in the world”(IMF 2006). 
 
Mr Con Horan, former Prudential Director of the Financial Regulator in his testimony at the 
Oireachtas Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, argued that his attempts to address 
capital issue with high loan-to-value lending were perceived to be counter to principles-based 
regulation (Oireachtas 2015). Honohan (2010) argues that the division of responsibilities in the 
“curious hybrid” (Westrup 2005) CBSFA-IFSRA set-up, presented a hazardous ambiguity of 
responsibility. He also demonstrated that key governance architectural elements of principles-
based regulation were only partially applied from 2003, and opportunities to codify the regulatory 
principles were deferred under industry pressure to be internationally competitive. He 
characterises the inability to take decisive action as showing “deference and diffidence to regulated 
authorities” but denies corrupt regulatory forbearance. The Central Bank Reform Act 2010 
(Oireachtas 2015) enacted a new single entity called the Central Bank of Ireland which merges the 





2.5.5 UK banking regulation 
 
The finance and banking sector in the UK is a significant contributor to GDP where according to 
representative body TheCityUK, the industry drives 10% of UK economic output (TheCityUK 
2018). The ‘City of London’ has long been viewed as an international finance centre of global 
significance, the same industry source presents statistics that place it as the leading global exporter 
of financial services. However, Haldane et al. (2010) challenge the Gross Value-Added metric, 
used by (UK) National Accounts, to measure the contribution of financial intermediation. On the 
one hand, they acknowledge that it is a limited measure as it only captures the direct contribution 
and not indirect factors like productivity growth. However, on the other hand, they conclude by 
arguing that the measure incorporates the increase in the scale and complexity of the financial 
sector but does not segregate contribution to the economy. Dörry (2017) discusses the geo-political 
importance of the City of London in light of the Brexit vote and focuses on the settlement and 
clearing processes in which London is a global leader. Rather philosophically, she eloquently 
surmises that “Money quickly gravitates around money” and that, once disturbed, it will re-pool 
elsewhere. 
However, London’s financial services market was not always assured of its international position. 
Plender (1986) provides an interesting international context for the pressure on financial centres 
to deregulate. The London Financial market was deregulated in what is known as the ‘Big Bang’ 
in 1986. This is when the London Stock Exchange became a private company (Clemons and Weber 
1990).  This lead to an influx of foreign financial firms into the London Financial Market. 
However, British banks suffered from what has become known as The Wimbledon effect 
(Konzelmann et al. 2010). This is where the underwhelming performance of UK banking entities 
within the London Financial Market is likened to British tennis players’ lack of success in the 
famed Wimbledon tennis championship. 
 
The Financial Services Authority was established in 2001 by Gordon Brown (announced in 1997), 
then Chancellor for the Exchequer, and was heralded as the broadest financial regulator in the 
world. Through the Bank of England Act 1998, the Bank of England achieved independence and 
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control over monetary policy  (Rawlings et al. 2014). In 2007, the FSA announced a move away 
from a rules-based supervisory regime to a principles-based approach. This changed the regulatory 
philosophy to an outcomes-based approach that built a relationship with regulatees and facilitated 
self-regulation (FSA 2007). This reform may have arisen from political criticism of the FSA’s 
handling of various crises and was described by then Prime Minister Tony Blair as “… hugely 
inhibiting of efficient business …” (Blair 2005). 
The 2007-2009 financial crisis has prompted significant reform in regulation, oversight and 
structure of the financial system. Adair Turner (Chairman of the FSA from September 2008 until 
is abolition in 2013) was tasked with reviewing the causes of the crisis and making 
recommendations for regulatory reform to ensure enhanced robustness of the banking system 
(Turner 2009). Turner’s review catalogued the events of the crisis from a UK perspective, made 
recommendations for changes in the regulation of the financial sector, identified wider policy 
issues, and identified areas requiring international agreement. The key recommendations on the 
regulation of banking included increasing capital requirements above Basel requirements. He uses 
the phrase “fundamental review of the market risk capital regime” which undoubtedly influenced 
the title used by BCBS in their subsequent documentation on the reform of the market risk capital 
aspect of Basel III (Fundamental review of the trading book). 
One of the most significant changes following the Turner review is the redesign of the oversight 
framework. In 2013 the Financial Services Authority (FSA) was replaced by the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) (Ferran 2014). The PRA is the 
prudential regulator for deposit-taking financial institutions (Banks, Building societies), insurance 
companies and large investment houses. The FCA oversees these entities (and other financial 
services entities) for conduct of business. The also act as prudential regulator for financial services 
entities outside of the remit of the PRA. The Financial Policy Committee within the Bank of 
England has a macro-supervisory directive (Putnis 2012).  
 
Turner (2009) promotes the concept of constrained exposure of commercial banks to proprietary 
trading but suggests that it is not feasible to have a “formal and complete legal” segregation from 
market-based activity. John Kay (2009) presents his rationale for a ‘narrow banking’ approach by 
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arguing that instability and speculative markets cannot be separated, but the real economy must be 
protected from the spill-overs of financial market instability. He argues that the central focus for 
changes in regulation must be to reduce the potential socialisation of losses from financial markets 
via the banking system. He details that a further objective of regulatory reform should be securing 
a reliable and efficient banking service that offers value to customers and promotes economic 
growth. Despite the clear challenge of meeting these two objectives, he argues that they are not 
inconsistent.  
In June 2010, newly appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, announced the 
establishment of the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB). The commission was chaired by 
John Vickers with the reported remit to investigate structural and non-structural reform of the UK 
banking sector with the dual goals of promoting financial stability and enhancing competition 
(Dubbed the ‘Vickers report’) (Edmonds 2013). The resulting Financial Service (Banking Reform) 
Act 2013 directs the most significant change in the structure of the UK banking sector. This reform 
acts on the recommendations from the independent Commission on Banking (ICB) and requires 
the ring-fencing of a bank’s commercial activities from its investment activities with the purpose 
of limiting the ‘real economy’s’ exposure to financial market losses via the banking system. 
Goodhart (2012) argues that this was the key priority for the ICB and not the promotion of stability 
and competition as reported in their opening summary. He also argues that there are potential side 
effects such as a possible increase in the cost of funding for UK investment banks relative to non-
UK investment banks because of the withdrawal of expectation of official support. Wetzer (2019) 
finds that this reform deviates from the premise of the US Glass-Steagall act in that it permits the 
ring-fenced entities to remain part of a holding company that also engages in investment banking. 
He argues that, under UK corporate law, the directors of the ring-fenced bank remain accountable 
to the parent company, which may undermine the integrity of the reformed UK banking structure. 
In summary, we find how the events of the 2007-2009 financial crisis have shaped the banking 
sectors of Ireland and the UK and their respective approaches to regulation. Ireland’s economic 
woes and significant socialisation of banking losses during the crisis have been attributed primarily 
to domestic banking issues, which exposed weaknesses in regulatory oversight. This led to 
significant restructuring of the regulation and central bank functions. The UK have responded to 
their experience of the crisis by implementing a ring-fencing of investment banks from commercial 
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banking activities, thereby limiting direct exposure to the non-banking economy. These reforms 
are important characteristics that may influence bank risk-taking behaviour and colour the 
experiences of practitioners from both jurisdictions. 
However, banking is an inherently global industry, particularly with the prolific use of capital 
market instruments for funding, investment and hedging purposes. In addition, the nature of 
customers’ activities, particularly commercial, is global. This prompts the need for a global 
approach to regulation. Hence, we document the evolution of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision’s market risk regulatory capital framework.  
 
2.6 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
 
2.6.1 History of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was established by the central bank 
governors of the G104 countries in December 1974, following international bank failures. 
Originally called the Basel Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, it 
became the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 1989. Goodhart (2011) identifies a 
European bias in the BCBS arising from its genesis. Seven of the ten member countries were 
European, with Switzerland and Luxembourg being additional members. Whilst the original remit 
of the BCBS was to find agreement on best practice and then advise the G10 governors on their 
adoption, this was usurped by the necessity to determine consensus on bank’s capital adequacy 
requirements following the Latin American debt crisis of 1982. Their remit altered on this basis as 
they evolved into an entity focused on developing regulations to be applied globally to banking 
systems. The juxtaposition of an increasingly global financial market place and the nationalistic 
nature of regulation at that time precipitated the need for a global view on regulation and 
supervision. 
                                                 
4 The member countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States, with the addition of Switzerland (www.stats-oecd.org). 
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The BCBS describes itself as the “… primary global standard setter for the prudential regulation 
of banks …”. It also facilitates collaboration and cooperation on supervisory issues including links 
with non-member jurisdictions and other financial standard setters. Its membership comprises 
central bank and supervision representatives from twenty-eight jurisdictions. Its mandate states the 
aim of improving financial stability through strengthening regulation and supervisory practices. 
The BCBS standards do not have formal legal authority on their own; however, membership 
requires commitment to implement the standards at domestic jurisdictional level. The BCBS 
standards are described as minimum standards, meaning that jurisdictions can go beyond the 
requirements of the standards. BCBS is a member of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), a global 
entity that “… monitors and makes recommendations about the global financial system” (FSB 
2019). The BCBS is hosted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) who also act as the 
secretariat. Similarly, the mission statement of the BIS declares its commitment to facilitating 
international cooperation to promote global monetary policy and ensure financial stability. 
2.6.2 Basel I 
 
The Basel Accord on Banking regulation, or Basel I as it has become known, was established in 
1988 (Consultation paper published in December 1987 and approved by the G10 governors and 
delivered to banks in July 1988). Implementation of the capital requirements of 8% capital to Risk 
Weighted Assets (RWAs) was required by the end of 1992 (Blundell-Wignall et al. 2014). Risk 
Weighted Assets are a bank’s assets or exposures weighted by risk. Different classes of assets were 
assigned different risk weightings under the Basel Accord. The Basel Accord focused on credit 
risk, therefore the risk weightings reflected their perceived credit riskiness. For example, claims 
on corporates were rated 100%, residential mortgages 50%, claims on OECD banks 20% and 
OECD Sovereigns, 0% (Le Leslé and Avramova 2012). Following consultation, in 1996 the Basel 
Accord was amended to include market risk, with implementation due by the end of 1997. 
According to the BCBS historical evolution of banking regulation, banks were allowed at this point 
(under certain conditions) to use their internal models to calculate their market risk capital 
requirements. Herring (2002) identifies the expected benefits as: reducing incentives for regulatory 
arbitrage, allowing flexibility for financial innovation, promote improvements in internal risk 
management and reduce compliance costs. However, he cites concern regarding the erosion of the 
27 
 
boundary between the trading and banking books, increased activity in illiquid instruments and 
credit derivatives. Many representative bodies (including ISDA) lobbied for the extension of this 
internal model approach to be extended to credit risk (Young 2012). 
2.6.3 Basel II 
 
In June 2004, following extensive consultation and significant regulatory arbitrage, a revised 
capital framework was issued which became known as Basel II. This saw the introduction of the 
three-pillar approach. These three pillars focused on minimum capital requirements, supervision, 
and market disclosure. The original Basel II framework focused on the Banking Book. The Banking 
Book is used to refer to assets that it is assumed the bank will hold until maturity whereas the 
Trading Book refers to assets held by a bank that are regularly traded. The different Book 
designations are subject to different accounting treatment as discussed below. Goodhart (2011) 
describes the activities in the trading book as “… akin to, and competitive with, those in investment 
houses”. In conjunction with the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 
the BCBS developed a framework for the treatment of bank’s Trading Book. This was integrated 
with the Basel II document and in June 2006, a comprehensive version was released: Basel II: 
International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards: A revised framework - 
Comprehensive version. As the majority of a bank’s market risk is in the trading book, this is the 
focus of much of the literature on market risk modelling and determination of market risk capital 
using the internal model approach (IMA).  
 
2.6.4 Basel II.5 
 
Basel II.5 is the commonly applied reference to the collection of changes to (market) risk 
regulatory capital calculation following the large losses in the banking sector during the crisis. The 
official BCBS document specifying the changes to market risk capital calculation (BCBS 193) was 
published in December 2010, with an implementation date of 31st December 2011. The key 
measures introduced were the Stressed VaR measure (SVaR), an Incremental Risk Charge (IRC) 
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and a Comprehensive Risk Measure (CRM) (Barth and Miller 2017). The Stressed VaR calculated 
the 99% VaR calibrated on a 12mth period within the span of the financial crisis 2007-2009. A 
weighted average of the normal VaR and the Stressed VaR was used to determine market risk 
regulatory capital. The incremental risk charge was introduced to counteract issues that had 
become problematic during the crisis. These issues include: instruments transferred to the trading 
book because of the incentives of lower capital charges; the market risk impact of a deterioration 
in credit worthiness; the inadequacy of the standard 10-day liquidity horizon. For securitised 
products, capital charges pertaining to the banking book were applied unless banks were permitted 
by their supervisor to recognise correlation-trading activities, which were then subject to the 
Comprehensive Risk Measure. The CRM was required to take account of cumulative risk arising 
from multiple defaults, credit spread risk, volatility of implied correlations, basis risk, recovery 
rate volatility, risk of hedge slippage and cost of hedge rebalancing. 
 
2.6.5 Basel III 
 
The regulatory changes proposed under Basel III address many of key areas of concern that 
attained heightened visibility during the financial crisis 2007-2009. These areas of concern 
include: excessive leverage; procyclical regulatory capital requirements; market and funding 
liquidity, adequate quality and quantity of capital. It is through the lens of financial stability that 
the impact of regulatory measures needs to be assessed. The following table summarises the 
measures introduced in Basel III (BCBS 2010a). However, we note that FRTB is a subsequently 
developed component of Basel III. In addition, further areas of development in Basel III include 
the module on the Output Floor. The output floor limits the benefits achieved under the internal 
model approach relative to the standardised approach. BCBS argue that the output floor will 
strengthen the principle of the level playing field between SA and IMA banks, that it will improve 
the comparability of disclosures and enhance the credibility of capital calculations (BCBS 2017). 
Capital requirements will be calculated as the higher of: (a) capital calculated using the internal 
model approach (where the bank has approval for their use) and (b) 72.5%5 of the capital 
                                                 
5 Graduated introduction of output floor, beginning at 50% in January 2022 and reaching 72.5% by January 2027. 
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The Fundamental Review of the Trading Book is the component of Basel III that overhauls the 
market risk capital framework, replacing the reactionary measures brought in under Basel II.5 (For 
example, Stressed VaR and Incremental Risk Charge). The reforms under Basel III including 
FRTB are so comprehensive that collectively they have been dubbed Basel IV (Koch et al. 2017; 
Nicolaus 2017; PWC 2017). The following table highlights the key changes to the market risk 
capital regulatory framework under FRTB: 
Summary of Changes under FRTB 
ES at 97.5% 
Desk-level approval for internal models 
Desk-level backtests 
P&L attribution tests 
10-day base liquidity and asset-specific horizon 
Calibrated on worst 12mth period of GFC 
Average of Diversified and Non-diversified 
Capital Floor at 72.5% of Standardised approach 
  
Table 2.1 Summary of changes to the market risk capital regulatory framework under FRTB. See Appendix 2 for more details. 
ES at 97.5% 
The headline event of FRTB is the change from VaR at 99% confidence level to ES at 97.5% 
confidence level, and follows a significant literature promoting ES as a superior metric (see 
Danielsson et al. (2001) for an early progenitor of this school of thought and Artzner et al. (1999) 
for criteria of coherent risk measures). These academic insights, coupled with the findings of 
enquiries into risk management failings in the 2007-2009 financial crisis (European Commission 
2009; Turner 2009; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011), are recognised in the Basel III 
reforms (Embrechts et al. 2014).  
Backtesting 
Under FRTB, approval for use of proprietary internal models to determine market risk regulatory 
capital is assessed both at entity level and at desk-level. Backtesting at entity level requires testing 
the internal (proprietary) VaR model at 99% confidence level over 250 days. Backtesting typically 
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examines the occurrence of exceedances. Exceedances occur when the realised loss on the 
portfolio exceeds the forecasted loss using the VaR or ES models. The traffic light zones are shown 
in Appendix 2, with exceedances of 10 or greater in the red zone. Higher numbers of exceedances 
correspond with higher capital multipliers. Incurring exceedance numbers in the red zone may 
result in a bank’s ineligibility to use their internal model. Individual desks must demonstrate that: 
using their proprietary regulatory VaR model at confidence levels 99% and 97.5% over a test 
period of 250 days, their portfolios have an exceedance count less than 12 and 30 respectively. 
Failure to jointly meet these desk-level backtest requirements along with the PLA tests, will mean 
that the desk will not be authorised for use of the internal model approach (IMA) (regulatory 
VaR/ES).  For banks to be eligible to use the internal model approach, a minimum of 10% of 
aggregated market risk capital requirements must be derived from desks with IMA approval. 
P&L attribution tests 
The Profit and Loss attribution tests (PLA tests) are part of a two-set test at trading desk-level that 
form part of the criterion for approved use of a bank’s internal market risk model. Together with 
desk-level backtests, PLA tests are part of the overhaul of internal model governance promised 
under FRTB. Principally, it compares the P&L derived from the risk model (Risk Theoretical 
P&L) to the P&L derived from front office pricing models (Hypothetical P&L), to determine if 
they differ materially. Front office pricing models deploy the full spectrum of information 
available whilst market risk models often map to a set of risk factors and forecast risk exposure on 
that basis. According to a survey by McKinsey and company, 55% of banks use risk factor 
mapping for market risk modelling purposes (Mehta et al. 2012). Mapping to risk factors has the 
benefit of significantly reducing computational time but can also facilitate stress and scenario 
testing (Alexander 2009). 
Asset-specific liquidity horizons (market liquidity) 
Under Basel II, assets held on the trading book were assumed to be of sufficient (and equal) 
liquidity that the position could be unwound or hedged within a ten-day period (BCBS 2013a). 
The FRTB documentation recognises this as a “major flaw” and have defined the liquidity horizon 
as the amount of time required to unwind or hedge a risk position in a stressed market without 
having a material impact on market prices (BCBS 2016). FRTB has introduced five levels of risk 
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horizon from ten-days to one year and risk factors are categorised within these levels. They argue 
that varying liquidity horizons is a key means of factoring market liquidity risk into their risk 
measure and regulatory capital. They also argue that this will reduce the incentive for arbitrage 
between the trading book and banking book. There is a recognition that this will cause issues with 
respect to data requirements for the longer risk horizons and have therefore recommended the use 
of overlapping data. The introduction of asset-specific liquidity horizons recognises the issue of 
market liquidity (much maligned prior to the crisis) by aligning the risk horizon of the risk metric 
to tiered unwind periods reflecting the market liquidity of the asset/liability. Whilst a set of 
prescriptive liquidity horizons will by their nature find some conflict with contemporaneous 
empirical liquidity horizons and thus present opportunities for arbitrage, more dynamic horizons 
would be more easily manipulated. 
A base liquidity horizon of ten-days is specified, which permits scaling from a 10-day valuation 
but not from 1-day to 10-day. There was significant criticism of the permitted use of √ℎ scaling 
rule under Basel II (Diebold et al. 1997; Danielsson et al. 2001). There are a number of empirical 
studies that have reviewed the issue of scaling from 1-day to 10-day (McNeil and Frey 2000; 
Danielsson and Zigrand 2006; Alexander 2009; Wang et al. 2011). They find that the √ℎ scaling 
rule is only appropriate for distributions that are alpha-stable normal and independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.). Its application otherwise results in an underestimation of the h-day 
VaR. There is no explanation proffered for the requirement of the base liquidity horizon under 
FRTB. Interestingly Balter and McNeil (2018) justify the ten-day base horizon on the premise that 
ten-day market risk factor changes can be assumed to follow a Gaussian white noise process, that 
is, independent and identically distributed. Whilst they acknowledge this assumption may be 
unlikely to be true in practice, they justify its use on the basis that it is a less problematic 
assumption for ten-day risk factor changes than for one-day risk factor changes.  
Average of diversified and non-diversified 
ES is calculated at entity level on the basis of a shock to all approved risk factors (at appropriate 
liquidity horizons), then also calculated on the basis of a shock to a subset of risk factors while the 




Revised Standardised Approach and capital floor 
FRTB presents significant changes to the Standardised Approach (SA) while also raising its 
importance by requiring IMA banks to run SA for desks that do not qualify under the IMA but 
also in parallel for IMA qualified desks. It is the fall-back measurement if a desk fails the P&L 
attribution tests; in which case they must use SA for 12 months. Of particular significance is the 
controversial capital floor, a hotly debated mechanism which effectively caps the benefits of 
internal models to 72.5% of SA by 2022 (BCBS 462). The standardised approach has been updated 
to be more risk-sensitive with the main components being the sensitivity-based method (SbM), 
Default Risk Charge (DRC), and Residual Risk Add-On (RRAO) (See Appendix 2 for a full 
outline of the Standardised Approach). An alternative Simplified Sensitivity-based method 
(SSbM) is available to smaller banks. The SSbM approach is designed for banks with small trading 
books, limited infrastructure, that do not write options. It cannot be deployed by Globally 
Systemically Important Banks (G-SIB’s) or Domestically Systemically Important Banks (D-
SIB’s) (BCBS 2013b). SSbM excludes capital requirements for vega and curvature risk, simplifies 





Diagram showing the evolution of BCBS minimum capital requirements for market risk 
 
Figure 2.3 A history of minimum capital requirements for market risk, BIS d457_inbrief 
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This section outlines the evolution of the BCBS market risk regulatory capital framework 
culminating with the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book. As discussed, this comprehensive 
overhaul of the market risk regulatory capital framework came about as a direct response to the 
events of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Contemporaneously, central banks across the world 
developed model governance of risk model initiatives to address concerns about the quality and 
controls around internal risk models. We document a number of these initiatives to further 
characterise the regulatory landscape in which this study is conducted. 
 
2.7 Model Governance of market risk models 
 
Model risk of market risk models has gained huge prominence as an immensely significant issue 
for banking supervisors. There has been a significant drive to improve oversight and governance 
of internal models coalescing with the BCBS’ Fundamental Review of the Trading Book, which 
introduces significant restrictions and qualified use of internal models for calculating regulatory 
capital for the trading book. The European Central Bank (ECB) introduced the Targeted Review 
of Internal Models (TRIM), the role of which is to assess the compliance of internal models with 
regulatory requirements and to ascertain whether they are reliable and comparable. Internal models 
have grown in complexity since their permitted use under Basel II. Benchmarking studies have 
found significant inconsistencies between the outputs of internal models: The European Banking 
Authority (EBA) is mandated under Article 78 of the Capital Requirements Directive to carry out 
this benchmarking exercise. The exercise uses a hypothetical portfolio and tests the variability of 
the outcome for 50 banks across 12 jurisdictions. The 2018 exercise found variability for VaR to 
be lower than for Stressed-VaR, with the latter’s variability reasoned to be due to calibration to 
the individual bank’s choice of stress period. In their investigations using follow-up interviews, 
the EBA found inconsistencies in how some risk factors were being modelled, and that some risks 
were not being captured in the model. These findings may have been a motivating factor for the 
introduction of the P&L attribution test, which assesses the adequacy of the risk factors to capture 
the variation in the portfolio as discussed above. Breuer (2017) argues that the variability of the 
results from the internal models using the EBA hypothetical portfolio violates the Basel II premise 
for allowing the use of internal models in order to create a ‘level playing field’. Haselmann and 
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Wahrenberg (2016) argue that introducing a capital floor to reduce variability of the internal model 
output would not result in improving level playing field competitiveness. In their study they are 
referring to internal credit risk models: Internal Ratings Based (IRB) models. Instead, they find 
that the introduction of capital output floors would result in additional complexity and distortion 
of capital allocation decisions as they would increase the capital required for low risk assets. 
However, Huizinga (2016) finds that the BCBS proposed output floor reduces the facility for 
manipulation of risk weights to minimise capital requirements, though he does not address 
concerns about level playing field competitiveness. Huzinga’s research refers to IRB models also. 
 
2.7.1 Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme  
 
The Basel Committee carried out their own benchmarking exercise called the Regulatory 
Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP), which assessed 15 international banks (BCBS 
2018b). Using the BCBS standardised hypothetical portfolio, this exercise found results with such 
significant variation that the capital requirements under one bank’s model were three times that of 
another. In 1995, Beder applied eight common VaR methodologies to three hypothetical portfolios 
and found results varying by a magnitude of fourteen times (1995). She contextualises this 
“shocking” result by the “breathtaking” power of the VaR model  (Beder 1995, p.12). 
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2.7.2 Key regulatory references to Model Risk Management 
 
Figure 2.4 Key regulatory references on Model Risk Management (source: Deloitte) 
 
2.7.3 SR 11-7 
 
In the US, the Supervisory Guidance on Model Risk Management was formed through a 
collaboration between the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) (OCC 2011-12/SR11-7). Whilst acknowledging that model validation plays a key role in 
model risk management, the SR 11-7 guidelines are designed to augment this with “disciplined 
and knowledgeable development and implementation processes that are consistent with the 
situation and goals of the model user and with bank policy”. As such, the guidelines emphasise the 
need for the model risk management process to include governance and control mechanisms 






2.7.4 Targeted Review of Internal Models  
 
In December 2015, the ECB launched the Targeted Review of Internal Models (TRIM) with the 
key objectives: to reduce unwarranted variability in outputs from banks’ internal models; to ensure 
consistency in the application of regulations and technical guidelines. Underpinning these 
objectives is the principle of maintaining the level playing field. TRIM works in collaboration with 
national competent authorities across the countries in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
to review internal models for credit risk, market risk and counterparty credit risk for significant 
institutions. The TRIM process assesses the measurement of model risk across internal models, 
ensuring the framework includes: model inventory; guidelines for identification and mitigation of 
aspect of measurement uncertainty and deficiencies in modelling; data quality; delineation of roles 
and responsibilities; documented policies, procedure and reporting requirements. Deloitte (2017) 
performed a comparative mapping exercise of TRIM and its US predecessor SR 11-7 and find 
significant similarities. Implicit in both model risk management initiatives’ objectives of 
increasing internal model consistency and ensuring adherence to regulations, is the impetus to 
restore the credibility and instil trust in internal models.  
2.7.5 Prudential Regulatory Authority (UK) Model risk management principles for stress 
testing  
 
In April 2018, the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) in the United Kingdom released their 
Supervisory Statement, SS 3 18, to outline their expectation of the model risk principles for stress 
testing. These principles include: model definition and inventory; model risk governance 
framework, controls, policies and procedures; robust model development and implementation 
process ensuring appropriate use; model validation, performance and review of model 





2.7.6 Model Risk Management collaboration with FRTB 
 
The decision by BCBS to continue to permit the use of internal models through FRTB is 
rationalised as the key means of achieving: risk-sensitive allocation of capital; level playing field 
competition; and the restoration of trust and credibility of internal models (BCBS 2019). The 
European Banking Authority (EBA) in their TRIM guidelines, purport alignment with changes to 
internal risk model regulation under FRTB. FRTB contains an increased focus on: data quality 
(Example: Risk Factor Eligibility Test, Definition and Treatment of Non-Modellable Risk 
Factors); adequacy/risk coverage (Example: P&L attribution test, Enhanced model approval 
process, Graduated Liquidity horizons, Default risk capital); model performance (Example: 
Backtests at desk and entity level);  and governance (Example: Rules on Delineation of Banking 
Book and Trading Book). In addition to the enhanced internal model oversight, Basel III reforms 
including FRTB introduce restrictions designed to limit the reduction of regulatory capital through 
the manipulation of market risk internal models. These restrictions include: Capital output floor; 
limits on diversification benefits through weighting of diversified and non-diversified ES 
calculations; and calibration of ES on stress period6 (BCBS 2019). Hence, FRTB maintains the 
use of internal models as a means of enabling level playing field competition and risk-sensitive 
capital but undergirds their use with significant model risk mitigation and superimposes 
restrictions that inhibit model manipulation and capital minimisation. The European Savings and 
Retail Banking Group, who represent the European locally-focused banking sector, question 
whether sufficient risk sensitivity of capital requirements has been preserved in FRTB to warrant 
the continued use of internal models (ESBG 2018). Indeed, the complexity of the FRTB calculative 
framework with its multiple layers of restrictions results in a less linear progression from market 
risk measure to market risk capital than under Basel II or Basel II.5. 
In summary, this section discussed a number of model governance of risk model initiatives 
undertaken by the ECB, the US Federal Reserve, and the PRA. This shows an additional layer of 
compliance, oversight and complexity for banks who have authorised use of an internal model for 
market risk regulatory capital purposes (regulatory VaR/ES). This helps characterise the 
                                                 
6 Note that this is defined as the 12 month stress period relating to each risk factor. 
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challenging regulatory environment in which these banks operate. We complete the overview of 
the context of the study with a brief synopsis of the collective contemporary criticism of VaR. 
 
2.8 Collective contemporary criticism 
 
The collective contemporary criticism around VaR forms part of the context in which this study is 
pursued. This is an important contextual aspect of the study as it provides the rationale for 
components of both the qualitative and quantitative investigations. We demonstrate that three key 
actor classes (in addition to influential academic studies and commentaries), which have 
significant influence over the dominance of general and/or specialised discourse relevant to 
practitioners involved with VaR, expressed misgivings about the VaR model and its role in the 
financial crisis. These three actor classes are: contemporary financial media; government 
commissioned reports into the financial crisis; and industry representative groups. We have 
focused on the outputs from these actors in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis to 
demonstrate the existence and strength of a collective contemporary criticism around VaR at that 
time. 
 
2.8.1 Contemporary media and VaR 
 
Schifferes and Roberts (2014) argue that media is the means by which both the public and the 
participants understand financial crises. They advance that the framing of the crisis influences both 
the contemporaneous evolution of the crisis and the policy response. They find a common theme 
of moral failure, dispossession of rationality by greed and a perfidy of social norms. Starkman 
(2014) examines a set of influential media articles and raises concerns about the relationship 
between reporters and executives from the financial sector inhibiting their ability to critically 
appraise. Schifferes and Roberts (2014) find that collectively, financial media were positively 
disposed towards deregulation, and therefore failed to question the lack of regulation in certain 
aspects of financial markets (such as over-the-counter derivatives). Skorecki (2003) details 
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correspondence from International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and the Bond 
Market Association (BMA) to the Basel Committee urging them to consider capital treatment of 
repos7 and credit derivatives in a manner reflective of the risk they present. The article merely 
presents the case as promoted by these trade bodies, there is no further critical appraisal offered. 
However, Roush (2014) disputes the belief that journalists failed in their remit and argues that 
attributing power to journalists to oversee powerful financial organisations and hold them to 
account, is not credible. Schifferes and Knowles (2014) discuss how the UK press found greater 
resonance with their readership for tales of banker’s excess rather than regulatory failure. O’Brien 
(2014) finds that, in the Irish contest, as the crisis progressed the strength of criticism of regulation 
increased. The role of risk management quickly came under the financial media spotlight in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis (Pratt and Hutton 2013) with reliance on VaR being one of the 
central concerns. VaR, as discussed previously, had become the dominant risk measure following 
the development of a calculative framework by JPMorgan/RiskMetrics. It was heralded as the 
benchmark measure (Iskander 1996) before the fallout of the financial crisis which led to VaR 
becoming the cynosure of media criticism of bank mismanagement.  
However, there were warnings in financial media about the VaR measure prior to the crisis. Roth 
(1999) argues that the supposed threat of foreign banks undercutting US/European banks via lower 
capital requirements, promoted the facilitation of internal models under the auspices of Basel II’s 
‘level playing field”. Roth further warned that the design of the Basel II framework and the use of 
internal models, provided incentives to conceal trading risk. Graham (1999) identified the role of 
VaR in the collapse of Long Term Capital Management in 1998 yet noted resignation to the 
inevitable Basel Committee authorisation of banks’ proprietary VaR models in regulatory capital 
calculations.  
In 2006 the Financial Times’ LEX column reported concerns raised by the Bank of England and 
the Banque de France about the accuracy of VaR, specifically noting concerns about the liquidity 
horizon assumptions (2006). Tett (2007) documents evidence from the Bank of England Financial 
Stability report warning of the cyclical nature of VaR and how, when calibrated on benign markets, 
it does not capture the potential for losses due to significant increases in volatility. Crovitz (2008) 
                                                 
7 Repurchase agreements which were a popular mode of short term financing at the time of the financial crisis. 
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derides the comfort provided by the 99% confidence level VaR, allowing bank CEOs to sleep at 
night, until the 1% tail became manifest. Jorion, one of the strongest proponents of VaR, discusses 
its role in herding behaviour (2005). Beales and Scholtes (2007) find that over half of global 
financial institutions had not fully captured credit products in their VaR evaluations. Plender 
(2006) and Finger (2008) voice concern about the liquidity horizon deployed, with Plender 
mockingly describing this flaw as “all the fun of the party”. Bradbery (2009) raises concern about 
VaR model’s calibration period and, where calibration is 1 year, the falling off of the crisis period 
in the models’ forecast engine. However, he finds that most banks have already adopted the 
inclusion of stressed VaR in their calculations or have increased their calibration periods. Nocera 
(2009a) tries to understand why people put their faith in the VaR number. He interviewed Till 
Guldimann (one of the original architects of JP Morgan’s firm-wide VaR system and originator of 
RiskMetrics), Nassim Taleb (one of VaR’s strongest critics) and many other risk experts and found 
a common awareness of its limitations but differing perceptions of its usefulness. Croft (2011) 
discusses the dangers of over-reliance on one model. Alloway (2012) and Guerrera (2013) discuss 
the flakiness of VaR using, as an example, the revised methodology deployed by Morgan Stanley 
in 2012 which resulted in a significant reduction in capital requirements.  The FT’s LEX column 
(2012) argued that VaR had reached the point of ‘uselessness’ following losses announced by 
JPMorgan on its credit derivatives trading, catastrophically in excess of its VaR forecasts. Joe 
Nocera8, business columnist with the New York Times, reflects on the sentiment around VaR in 
2009: “Given the calamity that has since occurred, there has been a great deal of talk, even in quant 
circles, that this widespread institutional reliance on VaR was a terrible mistake” (Nocera 2009b). 
Pablo Triana, a former derivatives trader, Financial Times columnist and Professor of Finance at 
Esade, described VaR as: “The number that killed us” and “VaR may have been the single most 
influential metric in the history of finance” in his column in the Financial Times and subsequent 
publication: The Number That Killed Us: A Story of Modern Banking, Flawed Mathematics, and 
a Big Financial Crisis (2011). 
 
                                                 
8 Recipient of three Gerald Loeb Awards for excellence in business journalism, co-author of All the Devils Are Here: 
The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis. 
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2.8.2 Governmental reports on the financial crisis and VaR  
 
At the behest of the Chancellor of the Exchequer (UK), the Turner review was commissioned to 
review the causes of the financial crisis and to make recommendations about the changes necessary 
to ensure a stable banking system. The review identifies dependence on VaR as one of the key 
issues. “Capital required against trading book activities should be increased significantly (e.g. 
several times) and a fundamental review of the market risk capital regime (e.g. reliance on VaR 
measures for regulatory purposes) should be launched.” (Turner 2009, p.7). In the US, the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and 
Recovery Act with the remit to examine the causes of the financial crisis. The commission 
published The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report in January 2011: “We conclude widespread failures 
in financial regulation and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s financial 
markets.”(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, p.xviii). VaR is specifically mentioned, with 
mathematical models collectively being described as “woefully inadequate” (Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission 2011, p.78). The European Central Bank’s bi-annual publication of the 
Financial Stability Review included a section in December 2008 titled: Risk Management lessons 
of the financial turmoil. Here they identify the dependence on VaR at the centre of bank risk 
management as a key weakness: “Risk management should not rely on a single risk methodology, 
taking into account the limitations of models and risk measurement techniques such as the value 
at risk (VaR)” (ECB 2008, p.137). Prior publications of the Financial Stability Review referenced 
VaR’s inadequacy to capture liquidity risk (ECB 2007). 
 
2.8.3 Industry representatives and VaR 
 
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) is a significant trade organisation for 
market participants of Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives. Their correspondence with the 
Financial Crisis Advisory Group does not include specific criticism of VaR but does find that the 
form of financial reporting at the time of the financial crisis was excessively voluminous and 
detailed that “key information and risks are obscured” (ISDA 2009, p.A.4). They also find that the 
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risks of more complex structures were not well understood by financial institutions and/or were 
not well communicated to investors. The Global Financial Markets Association (GFMA) brings 
together three representative entities: Association for Financial Markets in Europe, Asia Securities 
Industry & Financial Markets Association, and Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association. Their aim is to provide a global forum for capital market participants “to develop 
standards to improve the coherence and interaction of cross-border financial regulation” (GFMA 
2019). GFMA argue that the removal of internal models would diminish level playing field 
competition. They further argue that the introduction of capital floors could conceal genuine 
variations in risk leading to mispricing and erroneous allocation of capital. The Global Association 
of Risk Professionals (GARP) does not mince its words regarding VaR: “A further example of 
not-fit-for-purpose risk reporting is the pre-crisis adoption value-at-risk (VaR) for the 
determination of market risk capital requirements” (Grody and Hughes 2016). In its 2009 Global 
Stability report, the IMF recognises the primacy of VaR: “While typical market risk management 
frameworks use a complex set of different techniques, the VaR measure is at the heart of current 
practice in most financial institutions.” They then perform a simulation exercise from which they 
find that VaR-based systems propagate self-reinforcing systems, i.e. feedback loops which are 
considered to exacerbate market volatility (IMF 2007). In 2011, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) acknowledged a number of key weaknesses in using VaR as the basis for 
calculating market risk capital requirements, and introduced Stressed VaR (SVaR) and 
Incremental Risk Charge (IRC) which includes credit migration and default risk. In 2016, they 
highlighted VaR’s inability to capture tail risk and used this as their key rationale for the switch to 
Expected Shortfall (ES) under the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book. Then they further 
explored the weaknesses of the model-based approach: not capturing market liquidity; inability to 
capture credit migration; procyclicality and systemic risk issues. Arguably, these criticisms could 
be levied at any measure assigned with the Basel II market risk measurement remit. Importantly, 
they acknowledge the philosophical mismatch of using a measure designed to capture short-term 
market fluctuations to determine capital to sustain banks in an extreme loss event (BCBS 2016). 
Hence, we can see that the contemporaneous outputs of these three significant groups: financial 
media, government enquiries and reports from industry representative bodies; have an 
overwhelmingly negative perspective on VaR and its continued use at the centre of financial 
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regulation. This causes us to question whether this overwhelmingly critical collective narrative 
around VaR may have influenced its demotion from its role as the metric used to determine market 
risk regulatory capital.  
When we bring together each of these contextual aspects: the various roles of VaR; Irish and UK 
banking; Global regulation through BCBS; Model governance of risk models; Contemporary 
criticism of VaR; it becomes apparent that we are at a juncture in the role of VaR in market risk 
management. VaR and the BCBS market risk regulatory framework have received significant 
criticism post crisis. However, VaR remains central to market risk management practice. This arms 
us with a strong motivation to examine the perspectives of practitioners and to evaluate the 
potential impact of the implementation of FRTB. If we treat VaR as an accounting technology, 
will that help us to understand the influence and embeddedness of VaR? In order to formulate the 
terms and means of our investigation, we first examine the extant literatures. We need to examine 
the effectiveness of banking regulation and the role of VaR within market risk regulation. We want 
to find out about the significance of choice of resolution method on the determination of VaR for 
regulatory capital purposes. We want to examine the rationale for treating VaR as an accounting 
measure and the applicability of the critical accounting literature to the qualitative evaluation of 
VaR.  
2.9 Summation of Background Context 
 
This chapter provides the necessary context for the qualitative and quantitative analysis of VaR in 
its various roles and within the setting of a changing regulatory framework for market risk capital. 
It is important to bring clarity to what is meant by VaR. The term VaR can be ambiguous without 
reference to the underpinning resolution model. Criticism of characteristics and assumptions of 
specific resolution models are often levied at all VaR models. For example, the assumption of 
normality (Sollis 2009) is a criticism often levied at VaR models generally, but is not a shared 
property of all VaR models. Furthermore, it is important for the nature of this study to separate the 
different roles of VaR: reporting, internal risk management and the determination of market risk 
regulatory capital for IMA banks. 
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As the qualitative component of the study focuses on evaluating the perspectives of practitioners 
in Ireland and the UK on VaR and the market risk regulatory framework it is important to review 
banks’ business models and the system of regulation deployed in these jurisdictions, as well as 
developing an appreciation of the relationship between them. This background enables us to 
contextualise practitioner perspectives. 
We detail the evolution of the Basel framework on market risk capital and outline the wider 
changes under Basel III in response to the events of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Again, this is 
important as a context for practitioner perspectives, but it also provides an important backdrop for 
the quantitative study. Different model governance initiatives are outlined. These initiatives 
present a further dimension to the oversight of risk models and contribute to the regulatory 
environment in which practitioners operate. 
We explore contemporary criticism and commentary around VaR, its role within the regulatory 
framework and its apparent failings in the 2007-2009 financial crisis. These sources include 
government and industry reviews of the crisis, and contemporary financial media reports. This 
prompts a number of interesting areas for further exploration. One prominent aspect is the strong 
criticism of VaR presuming it is one specific model, and that the same model performs each of the 
roles (internal risk management, reporting and regulatory capital) cohesively. Furthermore, the 
criticism of VaR’s role in the financial crisis assumes that it had been used for regulatory capital 
purposes by banks in the period leading up to the crisis when it had only been introduced for 
European banks in 2008, and was not yet operational for US banks at that stage (Cannata and 
Quagliariello 2009). With such a strong criticism of VaR in financial media, together with 
significant concerns about its use expressed in government and industry reviews, the need to 
examine practitioners’ perspectives on VaR is paramount. Equipped with this contextual 
knowledge, we proceed to an examination of the literature to further inform and shape the 








Chapter 2 provides a contextual background to the research undertaken in this thesis, including the 
various roles of VaR, the setting of the Irish and UK banking systems, the evolution of the BCBS 
market risk regulatory framework, risk model governance initiatives, and collective contemporary 
criticism of VaR. We recall the purpose of the thesis to examine the perceptions of VaR and the 
evolving regulatory framework by practitioners, and further, to examine the potential impact of 
the impending regulatory changes on risk management and portfolio management practice. The 
research questions require the evaluation of VaR under two lenses: A qualitative evaluation lens 
and a quantitative impact lens. To facilitate this mixed methods approach it is incumbent that the 
research is grounded in the respective literatures. We begin with an exploration of the literature 
examining regulation, its various modes and effectiveness. This includes studies probing the 
philosophical and sociological nature of regulation as well as literatures focused on the technical 
nature of the regulation and the measures used therein. We follow with a review of the literature 
that examines the role of VaR in market risk regulation and relatedly, the VaR candidate model 
literature. This leads to a perusal of the significance of market risk model’s model risk. We 
examine the literatures’ rationale of VaR as accounting measure, which permits us to delve into 
the critical accounting literatures. The relatively recent recognition by sociologists of the 
worthiness and appropriateness to examine accounting measures from a sociological perspective 
has forged connections to the sociology literature (Chapman et al. 2009; O'Dwyer and Unerman 
2016). The wealth of the literature examining the constitutive nature of accounting measures was 
aspirational in the seminal paper by  Burchell et al. (1980). These literatures expand the research 
questions, highlight areas of knowledge deficit and feed directly into the formulation of the 





3.2 Bank Regulation 
 
Over 100 Countries implemented Basel I, which places capital at the centre of bank regulation 
(Barth et al. 2004). Episcopos (2008) finds that bank capital increases stability through 
counteracting banks’ risk-shifting incentives. Conversely, Kim and Santomero (1988) find that 
bank capital is ineffective in bounding bank insolvency and distorts optimum portfolio 
construction. In Chapter 2, we outlined the progression of the BCBS market risk regulatory 
framework, detailing the introduction of VaR as the metric approved to determine market risk 
capital. Cannata and Quagliariello (2009) argue that the timing of Basel II Amendment to include 
market risk (BCBS 2006b) was unfortunate in that its introduction (after a long period of 
incubation) coincided with the events of the financial crisis. They argue that the primary 
determinant of the 2007-2009 financial crisis must be recognised as the shift in banks’ business 
models (described in Chapter 2). They further argue that criticism of the inadequate levels of 
regulatory capital at the time of the financial crisis should consider that capital levels were based 
on a pragmatic approach by the BCBS to ensure adaptation (of the amended Basel II framework) 
and reduce the quantitative impact on the system. This is often overlooked in contemporary 
criticism of Basel II market risk regulation. Banks’ exposure to credit risk typically exceeds their 
exposure to market risk. The authorised use of internal models for credit risk (Internal Rating 
Based models - IRB) superseded the authorised use of internal market risk models (regulatory 
VaR) (BCBS 2003). However, we can derive useful insights for market risk regulation from 
studies that have reviewed the use of IRB for credit risk. Moreover, it is important to note that the 
distinction between market risk and credit risk became blurred with the growth of the credit risk 
transfer market (Example: Credit Default Swaps and Asset-backed Securities) and changes to 
accounting practices. This led to the formation of a task force to study the interaction between 
market and credit risk (IMCR), which was established prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis 
(BCBS 2009a).   
Blundell-Wignall et al. (2014) lament BCBS’s granting of permission for banks to use their 
internal models for determining market risk capital requirements, arguing that this introduces 
moral hazard into the capital calculation framework.  We examine the literature on credit risk 
regulation to learn more about the behavioural impact of permitting banks to adopt an IRB 
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approach (qualified use) for determining credit risk regulatory capital, seeking parallels and 
insights for the case of market risk. Despite significant lobbying for full internal credit risk 
modelling, BCBS found internal credit risk models were not sufficiently reliable or verifiable and 
thus developed a policy which permitted the use of internal ratings within a supervisory credit risk 
model for banks that met specified criteria (Herring 2002). Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) find that 
the existence of choice between the standardised and IRB model approach for credit risk created 
competitive distortions between small and large banks. They argue that the significant costs 
associated with adopting an IRB approach gives larger banks a competitive advantage (as they are 
more likely to be able to absorb the cost of adoption) but incentivises smaller banks to take higher 
investment risks (because they are competing for depositors), resulting in higher aggregate risk 
across the system. Repullo and Suarez (2004) also examine the coexistence of standardised and 
IRB model approaches and find that it incentivises self-selection whereby a low risk entity will 
achieve lower loan rates by borrowing from IRB banks, while a high risk entity will achieve 
optimal rates by borrowing from non-IRB banks. Ruthenberg and Landskroner (2008) also attest 
to this incentivised self-selection or segregation, whereby high quality retail and corporate 
customers will gain the best rates from IRB banks and higher risk customers, both retail and 
corporate will achieve lower rates by moving to non-IRB banks, which are typically smaller 
institutions. Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) also find that the reductions in capital resulting from 
the introduction of IRB models (for determining regulatory capital) destabilises the financial 
system. Beltratti and Paladino (2016) explain the original rationale for the BCBS authorised use 
of IRB models under Basel II, as a means of determining risk weights more closely aligned with 
their true risks, which is referred to as the internal information theory. This alignment was 
perceived to be necessary to achieve the level playing field espoused under Basel II (BCBS 2010b). 
The theme of a level playing field is central to the BCBS multi-jurisdictional approach to banking 
regulation.  Proponents of this approach argue that it reduces cherry picking of regulatory regimes 
when capital is mobile. BCBS argue that it is key to a competitive banking sector and incentivises 
efficient banking models. BCBS rationalise their decision to retain the option of internal models 
for the calculation of market risk regulatory capital on the basis that it is central to facilitating a 
level playing field. 
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Another key criticism of internal model based calculations of market or credit risk regulatory 
capital is that the internal model can be designed in such a way to minimise the resultant capital. 
Principally, capital is calculated on the basis of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA). Behn et al. (2016) 
find differences in how large banks rated loans for RWA purposes compared to pricing. 
Mariathasan and Merrouche (2014) find in their study of 115 banks across 21 OECD countries, 
that banks have manipulated RWAs for the purpose of reducing their capital requirements.  
Furthermore, they find that the phenomenon is stronger immediately after IRB model approval for 
weakly capitalised banks in countries where there are a significant number of IRB banks and where 
there are weak supervisory systems. Beltratti and Paladino (2016) examine what they term RWA-
saving during the financial crisis 2007-2009 and related European Peripheral Crisis 2010-2012. 
They find evidence of RWA-saving during the European peripheral crisis but only for banks 
outside of the peripheral countries (Note: Ireland was one of the peripheral countries). They also 
find that the markets recognised these activities through Pillar III market disclosures. This 
illustrates the importance of the relationship between regulatory capital calculations and reported 
risk metrics. Ferri and Pesic (2017) find that the increased dispersion in RWAs could undermine 
the BCBS supervisory philosophical foundations. In relation to internal models for credit risk, they 
found that banks using the advanced model were more likely to exhibit evidence of RWA 
manipulation. Concerns about significant heterogeneity in RWA since the introduction of Basel II 
has prompted BCBS to initiate the Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program (RCAP).  
Lall (2012) describes how banks view regulatory capital as a form of taxation and the incentives 
to minimise capital requirements include: lower funding costs, ability to increase leverage, and 
increase return on equity. For large institutions, this could yield billions of dollars. The divergence 
in measures used to determine regulatory capital (for credit risk) between the Advanced IRB and 
the standardised approach were shown under the Quantitative Impact Study 2006 QIS-5 to yield 
savings of 26.7% and increased costs of 1.7% respectively (BCBS 2006c). Hence larger 
institutions with the resources to be able to deploy the Advanced IRB approach would gain reduced 
funding costs and increased capacity whereas smaller institutions were faced with increased 
funding costs and a requirement to deleverage. Given that larger banks adopting the Advanced-
IRB approach make up a significant share of the market, adoption was forecast to result in an 
aggregate decrease in regulatory capital in the banking system by 20%. This undermines the BCBS 
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stated objectives of “maintaining capital in the system” and “enhancing competitive equality” 
(BCBS 2003). Benink and Kaufman (2008) find that the introduction of authorised use of internal 
models for the calculation of regulatory capital creates perverse incentives. They argue that 
supervision alone is not capable of countering the incentive for banks to develop innovative 
methods for gaming the Basel II regulatory framework to reduce their capital requirements. Barth 
et al. (2013) conducted three surveys on bank regulation using a panel analysis of 4,050 banks in 
72 countries and find evidence that negatively links tighter restrictions and bank efficiency. 
However, they find evidence of a positive relationship between capital regulation and efficiency. 
Van den Heuvel (2008) examines the relationship between capital requirements and the welfare 
cost. The paper argues that the constraints imposed by capital requirements reduce the ability of 
banks to create liquidity (liquidity transmission). They find that there is a significant welfare gain 
in reducing capital requirements. They use an enhanced standard growth model with data from the 
period 1986 – 2004. Further analysis would be required to determine if the same result would hold 
if based upon data taken from the period including the global financial crisis. Berrospide and Edge 
(2010) suggest only a modest impact of increases in capital requirements on loan growth. They 
find economic conditions and heightened risk perception by banks as stronger explanatory factors.  
Estrella (2004) examines the cyclical nature of optimal bank capital compared to the VaR-based 
minimum requirement and finds that VaR-based capital requirements tend to lag optimal capital 
by a quarter of an economic cycle. Repullo and Suarez (2013) find that the risk-based requirements 
of Basel II perform better than the flat capital requirement of Basel I in welfare terms under the 
assumption that the social cost of bank failure is significant. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) 
find that increased capital requirements can incentivise increased pre-emptive risk-taking. 
Danielsson et al. (2011) find that tightening capital constraints have the effect of increasing a 
bank’s risk aversion. The study by de Roure et al. (2018) find that when banks are constrained by 
additional capital requirements (example used was recapitalisation requirements following 
European Banking Authority stress-tests), Peer-to-Peer lending grows. Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending 
is a growing non-bank phenomenon globally, and their activity in the traditional personal and 
commercial banking arena presents a challenge to traditional banks and regulators alike. They are 
currently subject to minimal supervision in most jurisdictions and P2P is not subject to minimum 
capital requirements of credit institutions with the rationale that they are not funded by customer 
deposits. Borio and Zhu (2012) examine the relationship between regulatory capital, the business 
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cycle and the transmission mechanism. They find that minimum capital standards can affect bank 
behaviour through a threshold effect that examines how they adjust their portfolio to comply safely 
with the minimum requirements, but also through a framework effect, which draws alignment of 
practices. Borio and Zhu (2012) infer that this second component affects the bank’s attitude 
towards risk and its measurement technology. Perspective on the translation of this effect under 
the FRTB market risk regulatory framework warrants inclusion in this study’s sociological 
examination, with an opportunity for further empirical analysis post implementation.  
 
3.3 Regulatory capture? 
 
Reducing moral hazard and systemic risk is perceived as central to the rationale for bank regulation 
(Shehzad and De Haan 2015). Manish and O’Reilly (2019) examine whether banking regulation 
follows a public interest philosophy or an economic theory approach. They conclude, based on 
resultant increased disparity in wealth distribution, that it is the latter. They assert that this form of 
regulation predicates regulatory capture. A broad interpretation of regulatory capture can be 
understood as special interest groups exerting significant influence over regulatory bodies. A more 
narrow interpretation is where regulated entities manipulate the regulatory agencies (Dal Bó 2006). 
Asserting that regulatory capture was at play in the financial crisis belies the complexity of 
developing an international framework of banking regulation. Temporal observation of the 
evolution of the FRTB regulatory framework illustrates the difficulties in making ideals manifest. 
The iterative process of consultation documents, responses, quantitative impact studies, revised 
consultation documents etc. all of which is documented, is the mechanics underlying the 
determination of the BCBS regulatory frameworks. Lall (2012) defines shortfalls in the reach of 
the Basel II remit despite a recognised need to regulate for securitised assets and credit derivatives, 
arguably sowing the seeds for the 2007-2009 crisis.  Investigating the reason for the deviation 
between the original aspirations of Basel II and the resultant regulatory guidelines, Lall finds three 
schools of thought. One approach draws on realist theory, attributing the formulation of Basel II 
to the distribution of power in the financial system. This rationalisation is strongly proposed by 
Wood (2005) who argues that the US used its power position to sponsor the interests of US banks. 
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However, Chaffin and Pretzlik (2003) find significant criticism of the competitive disadvantage of 
US banks created by Basel-led regulation. Lall dismisses the theory of overlapping win-sets of 
international diplomacy, as he considers Basel II not to be a coalition of domestic country interests. 
Instead, Lall (2012) finds greater resonance with the theory of regulatory capture. Mattli and 
Woods (2009) find that the conditions needed for regulatory change that serves the common 
interest to dominate regulatory capture where vested interests are served, include knowledge of 
the “social cost of capture”. However, Young (2012) argues that ‘access translating to influence’ 
by private interest lobby groups to the formation of Basel II policy process was more restricted 
than that implied by regulatory capture. He refers to the “common ideational perspective of 
bankers and members of the BCBS” (p.668) as a social relationship influenced by shared 
contemporary wisdom, which is the context in which the Basel II policies are formulated. Young 
argues that this type of socio-institutional context is a remote causal factor. The existence of 
advocacy and ‘influence by information’ is described as a proximate causal factor. This raises the 
bar with respect to empirical evidence of regulatory capture via the exerted influence of private 
sector financial entities, as these conditions may be necessary but not sufficient for successful 
influence (Young 2012). 
Fontes et al. (2016) study stakeholder perceptions of financial reporting change and recognise that 
practitioner knowledge and values can have a significant influence on organisational change and 
adaptation of new procedures or policies. The absence of homology between practitioner 
knowledge and the changes being implemented can result in lower levels of compliance with the 
new policies or procedures (Albu et al. 2014).  Hanlon (2010) argues that Beck’s Risk Society 
(Beck 1992) underplays the role of politics of expertise and the sociology of knowledge. Hanlon 
posits that Beck defines a disparity between social and scientific rationality, where social 
rationality recognises a problem and demands action whereas scientific rationality attempts to 
determine causality before any action. Hanlon challenges this as naïve segregation and asserts that 
it is more realistic to recognise that lay knowledge is “inter-penetrated with expertise”.  In banking 
regulation, it is difficult to separate the expertise of the regulator from that of the practitioner, as 
the regulatory bodies typically comprise of people with banking experience. We investigate 
whether there is homology between practitioner knowledge and the impending regulatory changes, 
and whether this lay-knowledge is perceived to have been influential in the framing of the changes 
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under FRTB.  Furthermore, we study practitioner’s view on the politicisation of expertise. We 
investigate whether these perceived knowledge inputs have an attitudinal impact on impending 
implementation. 
We investigate whether the permitted use of internal models in the determination of regulatory 
capital for market risk constituted a form of self-regulation. The existence of this autonomous 
choice of measurement mechanism for market risk has prevailed since the Basel II ordination of 
the VaR (Value at Risk) mechanism. Under Basel II, it was argued that, part of the rationale for 
allowing banks (under certain conditions) to use their own internal models allowed for the creation 
of a level playing field amongst jurisdictions with differing risk profiles. Baud and Chiapello 
(2017) argue that the headline neoliberal change to permit the use of internal risk models (for credit 
risk regulatory capital) belied the introduction of a meta-level of control through the qualifying 
criteria and monitoring of performance. They describe this as the “hidden mandatory management 
practices” (Baud and Chiapello 2017)  which Mikes (2011) refers to as “coercive isomorphism”. 
The additional controls and qualifiers (Example: Desk-level approval and P&L attribution testing) 
introduced in the FRTB framework increase the meta-controls for qualified use of internal model 
for market risk regulatory capital calculation. Frumkin and Galaskiewicz (2004) investigate 
differences in institutional isomorphism across three groups: government agencies, commercial 
businesses and not-for-profits. They find an interesting difference in susceptibility to institutional 
forces between government agencies and commercial businesses. They argue that the former has 
less accountability through economic output and therefore attains legitimacy through conforming 
to institutional pressures. This presents an interesting dichotomy for banks who are accountable to 
the market through economic output but must also gain legitimacy through adherence to 
regulation. The latter may coerce institutional change. DiMaggio and Powell (2000) propose three 
forms of isomorphism: normative, mimetic and coercive. They argue that normative is associatied 
with professionalism and mimetic relates to standardised responses to uncertainty, while coercive 
isomorphism arises from political influence and organisational legitimacy. Coercive isomorphism 
reflects the pressures exerted by the regulator but also the pressures of societal expectations.  
Both Power (2007) and Beck (1992) recognise that it is only when a self-regulation system fails 
that it becomes visible to a public who have previously legitimised the system. The 
neoliberalisation of regulation under Basel II for credit risk and subsequently for market risk 
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management, permitting the conditional use of bespoke internal models resonates with the 
regulation of accounting professionals discussed in O’Regan and Killian (2014) where, prior to 
the current wave of increased oversight (of accounting practice), self-regulation was deemed to 
best serve the public interest. Pollak (1995) highlights the dependence of public confidence in 
technology on the perceived effectiveness of the respective watchdog; in this case, financial 
regulators need to be seen to be effective in their oversight of financial institutions. Our research 
aims to examine how bank practitioners perceive the proposed regulatory changes and whether the 
changes under FRTB are perceived to strengthen the efficacy of the regulator. 
 
3.4 Problems with VaR at the centre of market risk regulation 
 
A seminal paper by Danielsson et al. (2001) criticises the Basel II framework (2001) and in 
particular the deployment of banks’ proprietary regulatory VaR models to calculate market risk 
capital requirements. They appealed for the BCBS to “Reconsider before it is too late”. This 
comprehensive theoretical analysis of the Basel II framework prophesied many of the issues that 
were to come to fruition in the financial crisis. They presented five key concerns with the Basel II 
framework: it does not recognise the endogenous nature of market risk; poor quality measures of 
risk have been chosen (i.e. VaR); reliance on credit rating agencies’ rating for credit risk; the 
feasibility and appropriateness of measuring operational risk, exacerbation of regulatory 
procyclicality. We examine three of these concerns (1, 2, and 5) that relate to market risk.  
Firstly, they expressed concern about the assumption that risk is exogenous, i.e. that it is created 
outside the banking system. Taleb (1997; 2009; 2009) and Hoppe (1998) strongly criticise the 
application of mathematical and statistical principles, borrowed from physical sciences and applied 
to financial markets, asserting that they neglect important features of the social world including 
reactivity. Van den Bergh et al. (2001) finds that price patterns in financial markets are effected 
by internal market dynamics rather than purely due the behaviour conformant to the efficient 
market hypothesis. Danieslsson et al. (2001) argue that failing to account for risk’s endogeneity 
would be innocuous in stable periods but that in crisis periods it would lead to homogeneous 
behaviour. This was clearly exhibited in the events of the financial crisis 2007-2009 whereby the 
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interconnectedness, spawned through aspirations of diversification and demand for higher yield, 
became the foible of the financial system. The fundamental principle of efficient markets, namely 
heterogeneous market participants, was undermined by Basel II regulatory capital requirements 
that decreed deleveraging concurrent with economic contraction. The ‘frozen’ interbank market, 
upon which the funding modus operandi depended, promoted liquidity issues to solvency issues 
(Adrian and Shin 2010). Krug et al. (2015) define endogenous risk as the build-up of systemic risk 
through financial sector imbalances. Bisias et al. (2012) provide a comprehensive taxonomy of the 
measures introduced in the US to address systemic risk. They term the 31 measures as ‘an 
embarrassment of riches’ which Hansen (2012) denounces as a disconcerting abundance. Aware 
that this multitude does not guarantee protection, Bisias et al. (2012) use the evocative analogy to 
a ‘Maginot’ strategy where blind spots become the weakness of the defensive system. This 
conjures the image of a multitude of defences creating a fallacy of security. This echoes the ‘fallacy 
of composition’ denounced by Danielsson et al. (2011a) and the false certainty lamented by Woods 
and Marginson (2004). In a similar vein, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) describe a volatility 
paradox between exogenous risk and market behaviour, whereby low exogenous risk can lead to 
increased leverage (based on endogenous consumption decisions) leading to higher maximal 
values of endogenous risk. They find that low exogenous volatility can lead to “self-generated 
systemic risk” through increased leverage. They argue that the amplification dynamics within the 
system are dependent on whether the system is in a steady state or in a crisis regime. They assert 
that it is this amplification mechanism that gives rise to increased endogenous risk. Brunnermeier 
and Sannikov (2014) argue that regulations that encourage earnings retention may reduce the 
impact of procyclicality.  
The second issue of concern raised by Danielsson et al. (2001) is the “poor quality measures of 
risk” aspect which refers to the choice of VaR as the measure to underpin the market risk regulatory 
framework. Particular attention is given to the issue of subadditivity which has become a topic of 
much debate since this seminal publication (For example: Frey and McNeil 2002; Danielsson et 
al. 2005; Dowd and Blake 2006; Daníelsson et al. 2013). The property of subadditivity is 
recognised as a desirable quality in a risk measure by Artzner et al. (1999) who specified four 




Subadditivity is consistent with the property of diversification that has become the mainstay of 
portfolio construction. The subadditivity characteristic is viewed as analogous to Markowitz’ 
portfolio diversification principle, whereby the risk of the combined portfolio is less than the sum 
of the risks of the constituent parts. Embrechts et al. (2013) demonstrates how VaR violates this 
principal and for some portfolios is super-additive. Tunaru’s (2015) discussion on coherent 
distortion risk measures, finds that subadditivity is not always preserved for concave distortion 
risk measures including VaR. Brooks and Persand (2000) assert that the benefits of diversification 
are over-stated and can evaporate in stressful periods. Danielsson et al. (2005) acknowledge the 
false sense of security generated if subadditivity violations are not recognised but demonstrate 
theoretically that these violations should not be observed for fat-tailed distributions provided they 
are not super-fat (See Ibragimov and Walden 2007) or at probability levels in the interior of the 
distribution. Studies on the stylised fact of fat tails in asset returns include Mandelbrot (2001) and 
Jansen and de Vries (1991), with the clear implication that the level of ‘fat-tail-ness’ will have an 
impact on the VaR measure.  Danielsson et al. (2013) find that if asset returns are multivariate 
regularly varying, then the portfolio VaR measure is subadditive. This assumes that the tails 
approximately follow a multivariate power law (e.g. Pareto distribution). However, they find that 
this outcome is dependent on the sample size used and the resolution method deployed. The 
historical simulation resolution method, in particular, is identified as vulnerable to exhibiting 
violations in subadditivity. Rootzen and Klüppelberg (1999) argue against the use of just one 
number for risk measurement, using as their basis Pareto mathematics and the occurrence of 
catastrophes. They also find the inclusion of the subadditivity criteria as unnecessary from the 
perspective of joint probabilities of catastrophe. They suggest that taking a range of quantiles with 
different risk horizons would be more informative.  
ES adheres to the principles of a coherence risk measure outlined by Artzner et al. (1999) including 
subadditivity, the criteria upon which VaR fails for specific portfolio types. However, Chen (2014) 
discusses the dichotomy of mathematical integrity of capturing diversification effects through 
subadditivity and the reliability of backtesting results presupposed on the principle of elicitability. 
An intuitive explanation of ES failure of the elicitability principle is that ES purports to capture 
losses in the tail of a distribution including those losses that are possible but not observed during 
the test period. A technical explanation is provided in Gneiting (2011). 
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In reviewing the quality of the VaR risk measure, it is incumbent to review the key parameters 
associated with the VaR expression. The two parameters inherent to the VaR statement (potential 
loss over specified risk horizon at a specified confidence level) are the risk horizon and confidence 
level. These parameters are central to the interpretation of the VaR figure and are not subject to 
the choice of resolution method. The determination of the appropriate risk horizon and confidence 
level is directed by regulatory requirements. Under Basel II, the risk horizon for market risk 
measurement has been set at 10 days and the confidence level set at 99%. This risk horizon was 
chosen to reflect an expected period over which the position could be liquidated (Alexander 2009). 
The issue of the choice of significance level is a compromise between the ability of the data to 
support the statistical precision of a high confidence level (and therefore low significance level) 
and the perception of modelling to the extreme parts of the tail. Basel II does not prescribe the 
length of calibration period for the VaR model9 (BCBS 2009b), which has become a hotly debated 
topic (Angelidis et al. 2004; Alexander 2009; Turner 2009). Brooks and Persand rationalise both 
the argument for longer data sets, whereby more data statistically leads to better forecasts, but also 
that “old vintages” may not have any relevance to future forecasts (Brooks and Persand 2002). 
Verifying statistical robustness has not been a requirement under Basel II. The general 
recommendations for 3-4yrs of data for Historical VaR, typically results in 1000 daily data points. 
This translates to 10 data points in the tail at the 99% confidence level which offers little statistical 
robustness (Danielsson 2011). Basel II does specify the confidence level of 99%. Brooks and 
Persand concur that the 99% level is more appropriate than the 95% level, signifying that the latter 
would lead to insufficient capital. However, they show empirically that VaR at 95% has lower 
standard error than VaR at 99% rationalised as due to fewer observations in the 1% tail compared 
to 5%. They derive a means of scaling from 95%VaR to 99% VaR which gave rise to a similar 
VaR amount but with less variability (Brooks and Persand 2002). 
Other key criticisms of the quality of the VaR measure are specific to the resolution method used. 
For example, the assumption of normality is a frequent criticism of VaR (Sollis 2009). This 
assumption is specific to parametric models such as Normal Linear VaR and may be specified as 
the underlying asset distribution in a Monte Carlo VaR model but is not common to all resolution 
methods. Another criticism is that VaR assumes historical price movements are indicators of future 
                                                 
9 Basel II recommended 3-5yrs of data for historical simulation and 1yr for parametric models 
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price movements (Nocera 2009b). Whist all resolution models use historical data as an input, only 
historical simulation translates historical prices directly into their forecasts for future losses. 
Normal Linear VaR derives parametric characteristics from historical data, but Monte Carlo VaR 
has the ability to include forward-looking as well as backward-looking information into their risk 
forecasts. We discuss this further below. 
Another key issue with the “measure of risk” VaR is that it is a point estimate in the tail10 but does 
not incorporate information beyond that point in the distribution (Artzner et al. 1999; Yamai and 
Yoshiba 2002; Yamai and Yoshiba 2005). This allows it to be more easily manipulated (Woods et 
al. 2008; Danielsson and Zhou 2016b). The inability of VaR to quantify the potential loss should 
the VaR level be exceeded (the tail loss) is seen as one of the major failings with VaR. Taleb refers 
to VaR as like “an air bag that works all the time, except when you have a car accident” (Taleb 
2007 cited in Nocera 2009b). The infamous ‘debate’ between Jorion (Jorion 1997) and Taleb 
(Taleb and Jorion 1997) as advocate and opponent of VaR respectively brought some drama to the 
opposing positions and underline the ‘beyond academic’ nature of the model’s timbre. Taleb’s 
scepticism about VaR as the incumbent risk measurement model, was central to his rationale for 
the failures of financial risk management that led to the financial crisis 2007-2009 (Nassim N 
Taleb 2009). Taleb’s symbolic donning of a tie (uncharacteristic for Taleb) to present his testimony 
to the US Congressional sub-committee charged with investigating the events of the financial 
crisis, is a physical illustration of his perceived vindication. The issue that VaR does not give an 
indication of the size of the potential losses should an extreme event occur, is part of the rationale 
for the proposed adoption of Expected Shortfall (ES) as an alternative measure. ES estimates the 
average (expected) loss in the tail should a predefined threshold (VaR) be exceeded.  
Addressing the third issue relevant to market risk measurement under Basel II raised by Danielsson 
et al. (2001): procyclicality; Danielsson et al. (2011c) take the stance that markets actions are 
dependent on perceived risk with the actions taken, resulting in the realised volatility. They argue 
that their model, predicated on a constrained balance sheet, provides evidence of a dependency 
between preferences and beliefs, demonstrating that market participants behave in a more risk-
averse manner in periods of financial distress. They identify the key constraints on the bank as the 
                                                 
10 Left tail of the distribution of returns or P&L, where the losses are captured. 
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bank’s capacity to bear risk that motivates the bank’s change in preferences. This capacity is 
cyclical due to the volatility-driven nature of the VaR risk measure and therefore the regulatory 
requirements.  
A related dynamic also associated with the phenomenon of procyclical capital requirements, is the 
accounting treatment of the Banking Book and the Trading Book. Pillar 1 market capital 
requirements under Basel II focused on assets and liabilities in the Trading Book. Under Basel II, 
assets and liabilities held on the trading book were subject to fair-value accounting under 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and US Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) with lower capital requirements than banking book assets. The lower capital 
requirements for assets on the trading book provided an incentive to transfer assets from the 
banking book to the trading book, a phenomenon that is considered to have contributed to the 
financial crisis (Scandizzo 2016). Plantin et al. (2008) discuss the procyclicality of fair value 
accounting whereby large impairment charges amplified the procyclicality of bank asset prices. 
However, Barth and Landsman (2010) dispute that fair value cccounting contributed to the 
financial crisis and that instead lack of transparency in the reporting disclosures inhibited the 
assessment of risk. They cite a Laux and Leuz (2010) report that at least half of the assets in their 
study set of US banks (2004 -2006) comprised of loans and leases which are generally banking 
book assets and therefore not typically subject to fair value accounting. 
Clearly, the issues raised by Danielsson et al. (2001) of exogenous treatment of risk, poor choice 
of risk measure and procyclicality, became manifest in the events of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
The inadequacies in the market risk regulation and, in particular, the calculation of capital using 
internal models prompted a quantitative assessment (Regulatory Consistency Assessment 
Programme) of internal models using a hypothetical portfolio (See discussion on model 
governance). Prior to that, Beder (1995) found variations in the results on a hypothetical portfolio 
to vary by a magnitude of 14. This magnitude of variability validates the implementation of model 
governance initiatives such as the Targeted Review of Internal Models (TRIM). This prompts 
questions about what characterises the optimal VaR resolution model and whether banks are 
incentivised to implement the best performing resolution model. There is a rich literature that 
examines the performance of candidate resolution models (Giot and Laurent 2003; Angelidis et al. 
2004; Giot and Laurent 2004; Angelidis and Degiannakis 2006; Rossignolo et al. 2012). However, 
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a McKinsey report on the choice of resolution models finds a preference for simpler models (Mehta 
et al. 2012). Hermsen (2010) examines empirically the conflict between improved model 
performance and minimising capital requirements. He finds that banks are not incentivised to 
deploy better models under the Basel II framework. It is interesting for us to consider whether the 
FRTB market risk regulatory framework changes those incentivises and affects the choice of 
resolution model.  
Some of the issues raised in the literature with respect to the use of VaR at the centre of market 
risk regulatory capital calculations are addressed in changes made under Basel III. Basel III 
introduces measures that extend beyond the singularity of capital-based regulation. FRTB is the 
market risk capital component of Basel III. We examine the literatures that assess the efficacy of 
the measures introduced under Basel III. This gives us a good insight into how these measures are 
evaluated and what aspects require additional analysis. 
 
3.5 Basel III and FRTB measures 
 
The armoury of measures introduced under Basel III include both microprudential and 
macropudential measures. Microprudential measures refer to oversight at institutional level where 
macroprudential measures look at the risk to the system as a whole. This is a philosophical shift in 
the Basel frameworks, which previously focused on microprudential measures. The exposition of 
the ‘fallacy of composition’ mode of Basel I and II was most apparent in the dysfunction of the 
interbank market: institutionally optimal decisions were not optimal for the system.  What remains 
untested is the joint manifestation of these measures and whether they can motivate behaviours 
optimal to both the system and the individual institutions. 
There are a number of studies that provide an in-depth review of one or more of the Basel III 
measures in isolation to determine their effectiveness in improving the stability of the financial 
system. Hartlage (2012) argues that compliance with the new Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 
may lead to additional systemic risk contrary to its purpose to reinforce resilience of lending 
institutions to short-term liquidity shortages. Van den End and Kruidhof (2013) recognise the 
63 
 
potential adverse effects of the essentially micro-prudential LCR measure but demonstrate that if 
a more flexible approach is adopted it has the potential to be a useful macro-prudential instrument. 
Angelini et al. (2015) assess the potential long-term impacts of the Basel III measures, in particular 
the countercyclical buffer. The model deployed by Krug et al. (2015) aims to capture the dynamics 
between the measures to determine whether they are complimentary and cohesive. The key aim is 
to evaluate whether the design of the joint measures will motivate consistent stability-maximising 
behaviours. They coin the phrase ‘consistent collaboration’ to capture this concept of mutually 
reinforcing measures.  Krug et al. (2015) question the merits of deploying an equilibrium model 
(Example: (Angelini et al. 2015), (van den End and Kruidhof 2013)) to analyse regulatory effects 
on stability. They question the juxtaposition of modelling out-of-equilibrium crises with an 
equilibrium model. Instead, they use a stock-flow consistent (SFC) agent-based computational 
economic (ACE) model and find a positive combined effect of the microprudential instruments on 
financial stability. Further, they find that this positive effect is greater than the sum of the impact 
of each individual Basel III regulatory device. However, they find that although the capital buffers 
reduce procyclical behaviour, the macroprudential overlay of systemically important institution 
surcharges, are potentially destabilising. Their model suggests that the leverage ratio significantly 
reduces the flexibility of the regulated entities and may thus undermine their survival.  
Angelini et al. (2015) assess the long-term economic impact of Basel III with a particular focus on 
the countercyclical capital buffers, and find the effect on steady state output to be of the magnitude 
of 0.08% decline for the new liquidity regulations; 0.09% impact from the redefined capital ratio. 
They find that the Basel III reforms will reduce volatility of output. Their results are consistent 
with the long-term impact assessment carried out by the Macro Assessment Group11 which finds 
an impact of 0.03% on GDP annually following the start of implementation (Macroeconomic 
Assessment Group 2010).  
Carola (2018) extends a theoretical portfolio choice model to include heterogeneity in productivity 
(efficiency). She finds that the combination of capital requirements and the leverage ratio can have 
an impact on market structure. Her model finds the following impact on market share: In a low-
risk market, it induces a reallocation of market share from high efficiency banks to lower efficiency 
                                                 
11 The Macro Assessment Group was established by the BCBS and the Financial Stability Board 
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banks, meaning the average efficiency deteriorates; in a high-risk market, it results in an increased 
distribution among more banks, including high efficiency banks.  
FRTB, as outlined in Chapter 2, headlines the replacement of VaR by ES. However, the academic 
literature comparing the merits of the two metrics are not conclusive in their preference for ES 
over VaR. Two key advantages of ES over VaR are: firstly, and most prominently, ES meets the 
subadditivity criteria for coherent risk measures (Acerbi and Tasche 2002a; Acerbi and Tasche 
2002b; Inui and Kijima 2005); secondly, ES incorporates the tail of the distribution whereas VaR 
is a point estimate in the tail but does not incorporate information beyond that point in the 
distribution (as discussed above). Dissenting voices point out that the underlying risk forecasting 
or resolution model can be the same for both ES and VaR, therefore, many of the criticisms 
(normality or fixed distribution assumptions, historical distributions implying future outcomes, 
scaling issues, etc.) can be levelled at both measures. This does not imply that performance of 
underlying models is the same under ES and VaR. A number of empirical studies have shown that 
different underlying risk resolution models perform better under the two metrics (Harmantzis et 
al. 2006; Marinelli et al. 2007). Perhaps of more concern is the finding by Cont et al. that ES is 
more sensitive to additional data points (particularly if they occur in the tail) which is a key form 
of model uncertainty (robustness), given that the forecasting results will be more sensitive to the 
choice of calibration period (Cont et al. 2010). However, Embrechts et al. (2015) in their model 
of qualitative robustness find that for a portfolio of a large number of risks, VaR exhibits greater 
uncertainty compared to ES. Whilst in theory ES incorporates the tail of the loss distribution, if 
the distribution is assumed to have a normal distribution, there is little discernible difference 
between VaR at 99% and ES at 97.5% for conditionally normal distributions (Danielsson 2013). 
Danielsson also finds that 97.5% ES is a more volatile measure than VaR at 99%. Yamai and 
Yoshiba (2005) find that ES requires a larger sample size to VaR for the same level of accuracy.  
Empirical research into the FRTB calculative framework is limited due to the recency of its 
development. However, much attention is paid to the introduction of P&L attribution tests. 
Thompson et al. (2016) perform a statistical review of the original specifications and Mahfoudhi 
(2018) determine the relationship between the original ratios and the revised metrics with the 
conclusion that they both are derived from the same mathematical principles, however, the 
thresholds in the revised metrics offer greater opportunity to pass the tests. Considering that these 
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P&L attribution tests, together with desk-level backtests, will form a requirement for authorised 
use of internal models (regulatory VaR/ES), they warrant further analysis.  
 
3.6  VaR as an accounting measure 
 
Burchell et al. (1980) report the accepted functional form of accounting to be concerned with the 
provision of: relevant information for decision-making, rationalisation of resource allocation, 
accountability and stewardship. Clearly, the reporting role of VaR qualifies under this description. 
Woods et al. (2004) describe the inclusion of risk information in financial reports as a means of 
facilitating informed investment decision-making.  They distinguish between the reporting role of 
VaR and the internal risk management role but argue that the reported risk potentially provides 
insights into internal risk management policies and processes (accountability). However, Jorion  
expresses concern about whether the VaR disclosures are informative about the risk undertaken 
and the management of those risks. Miller et al. (2008) describe accounting as a hybrid measure 
while Miller (1998, p.605) describes accounting as being “permeable to other bodies of expertise” 
and as an “assemblage of calculative practices”. Miller et al. (2008) examine the implications of 
accounting, hybrids and risk management. They argue that the management of organisations has 
become centred on the management of risk and that therefore “the hybridising of the calculative 
practices of accounting remains one of the most influential ways of rendering uncertainty and risk 
visible” (Miller et al. 2008, p.962). Their study illustrates how this hybridisation occurs in practice, 
making the distinction between measures that are useful in practice, having adopted to needs, and 
those enshrined in regulation. They argue that this epitomises the hybridisation of accounting. This 
allows us to consider VaR, in its internal risk management role, as an accounting measure. Miller 
et al. (2008) identify the need for further investigation into how accounting practices adopt to their 
setting. Strikingly, they find a strong divergence in the formalised measures required for regulatory 
purposes and those enabling risk management in practice. Concluding in a similar vein to studies 
by Power (2007), that as the measures become formalised and standardised they become part of 
routinized process, reducing their malleable usefulness. This leads us to question whether there is 
any conflict with divergence in the specifications of the VaR metric for its three roles.  
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Hence, we have determined that it is appropriate and useful to interpret VaR as an accounting 
measure in its reporting and internal risk management role. Can we also ascribe this 
characterisation to VaR’s role in the determination of regulatory capital? Returning to Burchell’s 
accepted functional form of accounting and the rationalisation of resource allocation: this is the 
role that VaR performs when it is used to determine market risk regulatory capital (Burchell et al. 
1980). For banks with approval for their internal models, VaR is currently central to the calculation 
of market risk regulatory capital, thereby determining the allocation of capital. The term 
rationalisation causes us to consider the linkage between the VaR model and the capital 
determined. Is this linkage more intuitive than the impending calculative framework under FRTB?  
Stewardship is the remaining component in Burchell’s functional form of accounting (Burchell et 
al. 1980). Pelger (2016) discusses the determination by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in their revised joint framework, 
that valuation usefulness is the single objective of financial reporting. This excludes the role of 
stewardship, which has long been discussed as empowered by the accountability aspect of financial 
reporting (Lennard 2007). Rashad (2010) finds that stewardship differs from accountability in that 
it requires responsibility for action rather than responsibility for managing. This subtle difference 
brings us back to the nature of banking regulation and whether its underpinning philosophy is 
public interest or economic theory.  This is not overtly expressed, and must be interpreted from 
outcomes and permitted behaviours of regulated entities. 
Thus, we can see that, under each of its three key roles, VaR can be viewed as an accounting 
measure. This facilitates the exploration of the critical accounting literatures with the aim of 
developing a means of qualitatively evaluating VaR within its regulatory context. What is apparent 
in the literature thus far, is that there is a need for a situationalised examination of VaR. That is, 
taking the perceptions of practitioners to understand the usefulness of VaR in practice, and how 
that fits with the regulatory and reporting roles of VaR. Market risk measurement straddles the 
realms of finance and accounting. The organisational, reporting and regulatory roles of VaR 
warrants its evaluation as an accounting measure where its sphere of influence is recognised to 
include inter-organisational, intra-organisational, financial markets and wider society (Woods et 




3.7 Critical accounting 
 
We derive insights from the critical accounting, social studies of finance and sociology of 
quantification literature, to pursue an alternative lens for evaluating VaR. The increased attention 
on the way social and economic life is co-constituted provides a useful launch pad for evaluating 
VaR from a qualitative perspective. There is a growing field of research into valuation practices 
and specifically into the technological aspects of valuation including calculative norms that have 
become embedded in the mechanics of financial markets (Woods et al. 2008; Mikes 2011; Miller 
and Power 2013; MacKenzie and Spears 2014b). The embeddedness of the calculative norms or 
devices can be examined by employing the concept of ‘evaluation culture’. MacKenzie and Spears 
(2014b) describe evaluation culture as a shared framework of beliefs, preferences and mode of 
operation used to determine value. They use this lens in their analysis of the Gaussian copula 
formula as “The formula that killed Wall Street”. There is a perspicacity to reviewing VaR under 
this concept as it too is cited as being “The number that killed us” for its role in the 2008 financial 
crisis (Triana 2011). One key aspect of evaluation culture is the ‘performativity’ of models. This 
refers to the doing of numbers: The results from the models have an impact on their receptors. In 
the case of VaR, the loss forecasting models are recognised as not merely forecasts of financial 
market movements but also that they have an influence on portfolio management and can cause a 
reaction in financial markets. VaR’s embeddedness in the regulatory framework institutionalises 
this reactivity. Miller and Power (2013) assert that accounting is more than a technical measure 
and identify four key roles of accounting: territorialising, mediating, adjudicating and 
subjectivising. They recognise this lattice as a powerful productive force where technical 
accounting measures can affect change in behaviours of individuals, organisations and 
economising. The critical accounting literature has developed a means of appreciating the 
organisational embeddedness of accounting measures, such as the framework devised by Miller 
and Power (2013) to allow for a greater understanding of the sphere of influence.  
Hopwood (2000) promotes the need for further research into the institutional and societal reach of 
accounting measures and argues that taking different approaches (empirical, historical, 
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comparative and theoretical) has the potential to yield a more integrated understanding of the 
institutional and societal reach of accounting measures. Vollmer et al. (2009) identify the need for 
further research with observations about calculative practices, identifying the experienced realities 
review by Mackenzie et al. (2007) of the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model as a key 
contribution on the (Barnesian) performativity of quantitative measures. MacKenzie et al. 
investigate the performativity of the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) option-pricing model whereby 
market prices converge to the BSM theoretical prices. Svetlova (2012) emphasises that Black-
Scholes-Merton is a special case in its strength of performativity and that there are graduations in 
models’ performativity. She cites the importance of contextual application and resonance with 
“calculative cultures” (Mikes 2009) and argues for a nuanced view of the role of judgement-based 
and quantitative models predicated on their performativity. Mikes (2011) contrasts recipient 
organisational cultures in their enthusiasm or scepticism of quantitative risk measures. She 
contends that the growth in risk management is fed by its failures. The increased complexity of 
banking regulation since the financial crisis attests to this assertion. She argues that this growth in 
risk management may not be exclusively in risk measurement but that its coexistence with risk 
envisionment (expansion of interactional, scenario and narrative-based insights) is dependent on 
boundary work of (internal) risk experts. This concept resonates with the Knightian distinction 
between risk and uncertainty where uncertainty is “not susceptible to measurement” (Cowan 2016) 
and engagement with risk envisionment reinstates uncertainty (Mikes 2011). Miller et al. (2008) 
argues that the management of organisations is increasingly synonymous with the management of 
risk. However, they find that the natural hybridisation of organisational risk management is 
eclipsed by the formalisation of the risk management requirements for reporting and regulatory 
purposes. In other words, the experienced realities and necessities of an organisation’s 
management of risk is not fully captured in what is reported or required for regulatory purposes. 
They assert that organic hybridisation of accounting calculative practices helps to illuminate risk 
and uncertainty. 
The interviews in MacKenzie & Spears (2014b) reveal a preference for simpler models relative to 
increased spending on IT infrastructure and the cost of abandonment. Beunza and Stark (2004) 
find that traders use models ‘to gain cognitive distance’ via ‘reflexive modelling’ in which they 
utilise the models to back-out inference about other market participants’ beliefs and then contrast 
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those beliefs to their own. We investigate similar attachment with respect to VaR despite its well-
known failings. Meyer (1986) discusses the myth of accounting measures in processes of 
rationalisation arguing that these myths are important because they hold together the organisation 
and legitimise it within the external environment. This concept of legitimacy when applied to risk 
measures used for regulatory purposes is significant, as the measures are used to demonstrate 
adherence to prudential risk-taking principles. These principles underscore the interdependency of 
institutions within the financial system.  
We further investigate the narrative appeal of VaR and ES risk measures (Miller et al. 1991; Miller 
and Rose 2008) internally to banking institutions and externally through reporting, regulation and 
with financial markets. The visual image of the bell-shaped curve synonymous with VaR may have 
a place in the set of powerful visual inscriptions qualifying as a new genre of narrative discourse 
(Jordan et al. 2013). The ease with which this visual is used to explain the concept and convey the 
magnitude of VaR may be described as a ‘travel light’ discourse (Kurunmäki et al. 2011). Link’s 
inter-discourse theory teases out the role of ‘visual technologies of government’ (such as our bell-
shaped VaR diagram) in conversing between high-level policy formation and practical adaptation 
(Jordan et al. 2013). Aesthetics is another dimension of commensurability as defined in Espeland 
and Stevens (2008). Though this may seem to be an abstract dimension when we are considering 
the role of risk models in the regulatory system, the reluctance of financial institutions to adopt 
more sophisticated risk models than those underpinned by the assumption of normality, belies an 
attachment to the aesthetic characteristics of the intuitive bell-shaped curve. Reddy (1996) argues 
that the prominence of calculable and probability-based risk measures arose from the ‘scientific 
promise of calculation and control’. Boyle (2001, cited in Mikes 2011) described it as ‘tyranny of 
numbers’ exerting an appearance of control over uncertainty and complexity. Power (2004) 
dissents from this hypothesis, arguing instead that these measures present an illusion of control 
which can promote complacency in recognising uncertainty, elusive to the risk measure. Chiapello 
(2016) examines the discrepancy between aspirations and outcomes of  accounting valuation 
measures, a concept that can readily applied to the endogenous nature of risk measures wherein a 
measure’s determination can have a resultant impact on the market actors, known as a feedback 




Espeland and Stevens (2008) analyse quantification as a sociological phenomenon and their 
insights suggest a worthwhile “ethics of numbers” through an exploration of the socially 
transformative aspects of quantification. This reverberates with the performativity of calculative 
practices (Miller 2001). Beunza and Stark (2004) ask “what counts?” and identify this succinct 
question as core to the challenge for economic sociology. They assert that calculative tools count, 
and argue for further research into the entangled network of actors and instruments in the trading 
environment. Power (2007) decries the evolution of risk governance along the trajectory of 
“corporate governance of risk analysis” in preference to the development of “democratic 
engagement” (Power 2007). He determines the ambivalence of risk governance as a defensive 
policy of organisational strategy to manage public perceptions and thus maintain legitimacy and 
laments the emphasis on the assembly of the verifiable: In essence, what is countable, counts. 
MacKenzie and Spears (2014a) investigate the role of the much vilified Gaussian copulae (Models 
used to price CDOs), and argue that the model’s themselves did not have intrinsic effect but that 
they had effect in combination with the organisational processes in which they were embedded. 
They further argue that the crisis was caused by the exploitation of the “roles of models in 
governance” (MacKenzie and Spears 2014a). They evaluate Gaussian copulae under three core 
themes found in social studies of finance: attitude of participants; depiction of financial objects; 
performativity of models. Lockwood (2015) examines VaR from a sociological perspective as an 
authoritative practice that shapes financial markets. Her comprehensive study catalogues the 
apparent failings of VaR and uses documents from regulators, commentators and financial 
participants. However, the experienced realities of market participants beyond those meriting 
publication, are absent. Furthermore, as outlined in Chapter 2, VaR has three key roles, which 
serve different needs and have authoritative differences. Lockwood’s study treats the roles of VaR 
as fully integrated. However, Mehta et al. (2012) find that 50% of banks surveyed used different 





3.8 The Miller-Power framework 
 
With the aim of developing a qualitative evaluation of VaR in its economic and organisational 
performativity, interpreting VaR as a non-typical accounting measure allows for judicious mining 
of the fertile accounting evaluation literatures. The pertinence of interpreting VaR as an accounting 
metric was established by Jorion (2002), Pérignon and Smith (2010) and Elshandidy et al. (2018) 
and discussed in section 3.1.4. Through a confluence of critical accounting literature and that of 
organisational behaviour, the Miller-Power framework emerges as a relevant theoretical construct, 
broad enough to capture the peculiarities of VaR as an atypical accounting measure. Its lattice 
framework of territorialising, mediating, adjudicating and subjectivising; has the potential to 
uncover the nature of VaR’s institutional embeddedness and its position as the dominant market 
risk reporting and regulatory metric.  The Miller-Power framework recognises accounting as the 
dominant intra-organisational and inter-organisation narrative. The Miller-Power frame has 
resonance beyond traditional financial accounting, and has been used to evaluate the performative 
power and accountability of various applications of accounting (Vosselman 2014; Pelger 2016) 
and other economised settings including: sustainability (Markota Vukić et al. 2017); 
environmental impact (Doganova and Karnøe 2015); and marketing knowledge (Jacobi et al. 
2015). It has not been applied to accounting measures that function in risk management within the 
financial sector, despite the clear societal impact of these technologies. The Miller-Power 
framework has been used in Kurunmäki et al. (2016) to differentiate quantifying, economising and 
marketising in order to examine modes of governing. Heald (2018) utilises the Miller and Power 
interpretation of the role of accounting in economisation to develop a framework to investigate the 
importance of public audit. Although Heald and Hodges (2015) use the Miller and Power 
framework to investigate the impact of austerity on financial reporting they reference Miller and 
Power’s own unease about the implications of their (Miller and Power’s) analysis. However, Heald 
and Hodges (2015) conclude by commending the utilisation of the Miller and Power (2013) 
framework as a worthwhile lens for analysis of public sector  accounting.  
Miller and Power (2013) describe territorializing as the ‘recursive construction of the calculable 
spaces’. In other words, defining and making measurable the physical and the network of 
interactions. Territorialising in a market risk VaR sense, is defining what will be captured by the 
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risk models and even what qualifies as market risk. Pre-crisis liquidity risk was neither considered 
as a market risk or a credit risk with some describing it as a forgotten risk (Cipullo and Vinciguerra 
2014). In the VaR model development stage, it is typical for the bank portfolio’s significant risk 
factors to be determined and the portfolio’s sensitivity to those risk factors measured. This is 
defining the territory of what will be measured under the constraints of what can be measured. 
Mikes (2011) discusses the boundary demarcation element of risk management, which is a concept 
that defines boundaries for what is measured and what is eschewed. When we define our model 
assumptions and limitations, we are drawing a boundary for the conditions under which the model 
output is a reliable forecast. When we map to systematic risk factors to capture key contributors to 
variation we are again drawing a boundary to what is significant from a risk measurement 
perspective. In this way, risk modelling demarcates what is measurable and what must be 
interpreted. Mikes (2011) contrasts the “calculative culture with that of “envisionment” practices 
which she describes as a more porous boundary. These envisionment practices are drawn from the 
experiences and practice-based knowledge of the practitioner. She argues that these intuitions 
allow for a subjective-based expansion into the non-measurable space. Here we are in the realm of 
Knightian uncertainty where the distinction made between risk and uncertainty is determined by 
whether a measure can be applied (Svetlova 2018). We argue that, once the territory has been 
claimed by a measure it must continue to be measured. Furthermore, without a viable alternative, 
the original territorialising claim will continue its reign. In this way, the territory has been 
subjectivised by the risk measure, but the measure then exerts control. In the case of risk 
measurement, the risk measure becomes the control measure. Power (2007) discusses the 
convergence of risk calculation into risk management. When VaR became the accepted device 
(subsequently legitimised) to measure risk internally and for reporting and regulatory purposes, it 
is clear that it quickly became a device of risk control (Woods et al. 2008). However, we 
investigate if VaR’s organisational role also extended its risk control mandate. The role of 
accounting as a subjectivising practice is reflective of the insights of  Millo and MacKenzie (2009) 
into the etymology of the word management: ‘to handle’, to illustrate that it is the transformation 
of ‘knowledge of actions’ to ‘knowledge that controls these actions’. Hence, the measurement of 
risk is a mechanism used to control risk-taking. Espeland and Stevens’ investigation into  the 
sociology of quantification yields a discussion of the discipline dimension as one mode of 
commensuration (2008). They discern that numbers should not always be evaluated purely for 
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their accuracy but rather can be understood as deeds. Espeland and Stevens (2008) emphasise the 
‘doing of numbers’. One component of commensuration is identified as reactivity: “Measurement 
intervenes in the social world it depicts”. Here a powerful insight that has resonance for risk 
measurement models used within a regulatory context, is that measures initially designed to 
describe behaviour can be used to judge and control. A further dimension of a measure’s 
commensuration identified by Espeland and Stevens (2008) is authority; the associated power 
motivates a concern for the relationship between the quantification outcomes and the real world. 
This is reflective of the commentary by Rebonato that risk models should be ‘models of reality’ 
(Rebonato 2010). The question of how we evaluate the outputs from the models is core to their 
continued use in facilitating banking and market stability.  
The concept of mediating aligns with discursive theory where the instruments facilitate 
comparability and can be rationalised at various levels internal and external to the organisation. 
When risk measures are used for regulatory purposes they transcend the limits of perfunctory 
measures and become mediating devices used to communicate the bank’s portfolio risk to the 
regulatory and the market, and (under Basel II) they are used to directly determine the level of 
regulatory capital required for market risks. MacKenzie and Spears (2014) recognises the 
literature’s divergence on whether modelling is a type of knowledge generation or a 
communication device between theory and practice. We argue that risk modelling performs both 
functions. Modelling risk through VaR provides an objective quantification of the portfolio’s risk 
subject to the modelling assumptions and therefore adds knowledge while at the same time its 
usefulness as a communication device must also be valued and should be allowed to influence 
modelling choices. Writing in the context of a different element of financial modelling, the 
Gaussian copula, MacKenzie and Spears (2014) assert that the widespread adoption of no-arbitrage 
pricing was due to its ‘homology’ to financial practices. Caccoli et al. (2009) assert that the (No) 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory “enters into the functioning of the system it is describing”. It is possible 
that in a similar way, the VaR model may be homologous to trading practices, hence strengthening 
its mediating role, and that this may explain its longevity. This is a key question we explore through 
interviews.  
The organisational literature recognises the way in which accounting measures or models can 
acquire legitimacy through their adjudicating role (Miller and Power 2013). Accounting has 
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acquired legitimacy in performing this role. Arguably, VaR similarly was granted legitimacy when 
it was used as a regulatory measure. Mikes (2011) describes how the history of the growth of risk 
management in financial markets has been ‘punctuated’ with risk management failures such as 
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). Yet the philosophy of risk management has survived 
and has even accelerated post crises. Mikes argues that the validity of the measure is superseded 
by its imposed authority as indisputable and indispensable. MacKenzie (2005) examines global 
finance through a science studies approach whereby he challenges the acceptance of the’ black 
box’. This research aims to investigate the degree to which VaR was a black box measure but also 
the awareness of its institutional and market impact. We investigate the rationale for the longevity 
of VaR and whether the legitimacy it acquired through its regulatory or adjudicating role, cemented 
its significance within financial institutions and financial markets. Millo and MacKenzie (2009) 
look at the emergence of financial risk management and the role of inaccurate models. They argue 
that it is the fulfilment of an organisational role that has ensured the continued growth and 
pervasiveness of risk measures. They argue that the successful growth of financial risk 
management methods should be recognised as being due to their “communicative and 
organisational usefulness” rather than their accuracy. However, does the promotion of the 
mediation property in this philosophy, conflict with VaR’s external reporting and regulatory roles? 
This prompts the question: is there is any conflict between the various roles of VaR.  
When we reflect on the lens of the Miller-Power framework and its ability to illuminate the 
experienced realities of those working with VaR, it may, as with any theoretical frame, leave some 
elements obfuscated (O'Dwyer 2004). While conceding that theorising is a simplification of 
reality, O’Dwyer and Unerman (2016) argue the importance of theorised engagement to advance 
academic insights into (social) accounting. They highlight the strength of theorising as a means to 
analyse and understand complex issues. In that respect, the Miller-Power framework has 
established credentials through its application to evaluating non-mainstream accounting as 
described above. Miller and Power (2013) discuss how the evolving critical accounting literature 
and that of organisational behaviour merged to assert accounting as a dominant narrative on an 
intra- organisational and inter-organisational level. We investigate whether VaR models have also 
asserted dominance in the narrative of market risk in banking and financial markets. If accounting 
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practices operationalise efficiency (Miller and Power 2013), then risk measures aspire to 
operationalise stability (Caruana 2014). 
 
3.9 Literature summation 
 
We began the literature review by examining the nature of market risk banking regulation, taking 
some insights from studies examining the role of internal models for credit risk. For example, 
Blundell-Wignall et al. (2014) raise concerns about allowing internal (proprietary) models to 
determine credit risk regulatory capital because they introduce moral hazard conflict. This is 
contrary to the BCBS philosophy that allowing banks to use their internal models is essential to 
facilitate a level playing field for banks across different jurisdictions (BCBS 2006b). The BCBS 
philosophy recognises the different bank business models discussed in Chapter 2 whilst balancing 
it with the need for a globally harmonised approach to bank regulation. We examined extant 
literature on regulatory capture contrasting it with literature examining the development of 
regulatory standards. Manish and O’Reilly (2019) use an outcome focused approach to infer that 
banking regulation follows an economic theory approach, which they argue, is synonymous with 
regulatory capture. The definition of what constitutes regulatory capture is disputed in the 
literature, with  Manish and O’Reilly (2019) describing it as specialist groups exerting influence, 
to (Dal Bó 2006) defining it as the regulated manipulating the regulator. Literature on the evolution 
of regulation from aspiration to implementation (Lall 2012; Young 2012) together with literature 
examining recognition of the importance of expertise prompts scrutiny of practice-based 
knowledge and the regulatory reform of FRTB. 
We reviewed the issues associated with the use of VaR as the central metric in the determination 
of market risk capital beginning with the seminal paper by Danielsson et al. (2001). This paper 
identified a number of issues around the use of internal models in the calculation of regulatory 
capital. Three key issues relevant to market risk are risk endogeneity, poor quality risk measures 
and exacerbation of procyclicality. In Chapter 2, we described the additional measures introduced 
under Basel III to address procyclicality, most notably the countercyclical capital buffer. However, 
the other two issues remain a significant concern. Beder (1995) highlights the variability of 
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forecasts from different resolution models. A study by Hermsen (2010) examines the incentives 
under Basel II for banks to implement resolution models with superior performance indicators. 
This is an interesting area on which to build an examination of the potential impact of FRTB. Will 
FRTB provide incentives for banks to improve internal model performance?  
Artzner et al. (1999) identified four characteristics of a coherent risk measure, which lead to a 
significant literature examining VaR’s non-adherence to the subaddivity criteria (For example: 
Frey and McNeil 2002; Danielsson et al. 2005; Dowd and Blake 2006; Daníelsson et al. 2013). 
The subadditivity characteristic is viewed as analogous to Markowitz’ portfolio diversification 
principle, whereby the risk of the combined portfolio is less than the sum of the risks of the 
constituent parts. ES has been promoted by the literature as an alternative risk measure that 
possesses this property. This prompts interest in the perception of practitioners on the succession 
of VaR by ES as the central metric in the determination of market risk capital.  
We utilised the functional form of accounting described by Burchell et al. (1980) to justify the 
treatment of VaR as an accounting metric. This facilitated our perusal of the critical accounting 
literatures to explore means of qualitatively evaluating VaR within its regulatory context and 
through its various roles. Lockwood (2015) examines VaR from a sociological perspective as an 
authoritative practice that shapes financial markets. However, Mackenzie et al. (2007) highlight 
the importance of including experienced realities in sociological studies of financial measures. The 
examination by Millo and MacKenzie (2009) of the usefulness of inaccurate models holds 
resonance with the continued use of VaR in practice despite its documented inaccuracy. Exploring 
how to investigate VaR’s usefulness and persistence in risk management practice led to the 
emergence of the framework used in Miller and Power (2013) as a relevant theoretical construct, 
broad enough to capture the peculiarities of VaR as a non-standard accounting measure.  Miller 
and Power (2013) identify four key roles of accounting: territorialising, mediating, adjudicating 
and subjectivising; And they recognise this lattice as a powerful productive force. We determine 
that the Miller-Power frame is an appropriate lens through which to qualitatively evaluate VaR, its 
persistence, and latent power. 
77 
 




One of the primary aims of this thesis is to investigate the perception by banking practitioners of 
the VaR metric in its various roles and within the context of the changing regulatory environment. 
Additionally we investigate the potential impact of the implementation of the FRTB framework 
on risk management and portfolio management practice. There is a methodological challenge in 
combining a qualitative evaluation approach with a quantitative impact analysis objective. 
Ultimately, both approaches evaluate VaR; the qualitative approach uses a sociological frame to 
capture the experienced realities of VaR within the context of its application (to market risk), whilst 
the quantitative approach seeks to evaluate the potential impact of aspects of the FRTB calculative 
framework on risk management and portfolio management practice. In bringing together these two 
methodologies, we are using one set of results and outcomes to inform the other. However, note 
that each investigation has equal importance. In analysing the perspectives of banking 
practitioners, we are focusing on the perceived sphere of dependency of the VaR measure, that is, 
its social constructivism.  However, when we evaluate the VaR measure from a quantitative impact 
perspective, we are evaluating the impact of the FRTB framework on VaR resolution models and 
further impacts on risk modelling and portfolio management. Both approaches contribute to our 
knowledge of VaR. By deploying a sociological evaluation frame, the specialist knowledge and 
realism of the practitioner is brought to light. In complementing this with the quantitative impact 
analysis insights, we are critically reviewing the position of the VaR/ES model within the 
regulatory framework. The two approaches combine to yield a holistic evaluation which can 
contribute to better utilisation of VaR (and its replacement ES) and improve the regulatory 




4.2 Theoretical construct 
 
Value-at-Risk (VaR), as an accounting measure (Jorion 2002; Pérignon and Smith 2010; 
Elshandidy et al. 2018), has been central to the measurement and management of market risk for 
banks since its technical development by RiskMetrics in the 1990’s. It has a regulatory imprimatur 
through the 1996 Market Risk Amendment to the Basel Accord (BCBS 2006b) and through SEC 
approval, giving it a significant sphere of influence. It has an atypical genesis as an accounting 
measure, and unusual longevity not wholly dependent on regulatory imperatives. Miller and Power 
(2013) develop a framework to better understand the role of accounting in the interrelated 
processes of economising and organising, In this qualitative study, we utilise this framework to 
evaluate the sociological aspects of VaR’s various roles using a series of semi-structured 
interviews with relevant actors in the field. This investigates the latent power and endurance of 
VaR as an accounting measure despite its apparent shortcomings and a loosening of its regulatory 
power. The four key roles of accounting measures as determined by Miller and Power (2013) are: 
territorialising, mediating, adjudicating and subjectivising. Territorialising evokes an image of 
defining territory and subjectivising the area defined. For an evaluation device to territorialise it 
must be the dominant measure over a defined realm. The role of mediation is core to the utilisation 
of an evaluation measure: how it is communicated; the significance of that communication; and 
whether the communication requires action. The adjudicating role is demonstrated when the 
evaluation device acts as a judgement on activities, while subjectivisation is where the evaluation 
measure has a legitimate authority to evoke action. Miller and Power’s theoretical construct has a 
number of theoretical influences, with institutional theory and the sociological analysis of 
economic behaviour being two key vertices. In evaluation culture, practices, preferences and 
beliefs are used to determine value, but also facilitate the embeddedness of measuring devices 
which then feedback into this culture. Employing the concept of evaluation culture can bring to 
attention the invisible realm of influence of VaR as a technical evaluation measure. Winner (1980) 
warns of the importance of illuminating the embeddedness of all technological artefacts because 
of their ability to infer power and authority. The scientific purity of the model may lead us to 
believe that the technological measure stands apart from human agency but, as discussed in 
Espeland and Stevens (2008), the measure interacts with its territory: it both constructs and is 
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constructed. The Miller-Power frame (2013) facilitates the evaluation of calculative technologies 
across different domains, for example Heald (2015) who commend its utility in this respect. 
The quantitative approach taken is an empirical study examining the potential impacts of the FRTB 
calculative framework on risk and portfolio management practice. Jones (2011)  explains that the 
empiricist ontology prizes what is observed over what he calls the “metaphysical mysticism” or as 
described by Campbell (1984), an anti-authoritarian approach. An absolute positivist position of 
empirical analysis would take a value-free position. That is, beliefs, emotions and personal values 
are non-science qualities: the attention for an empirical study is on the observed. The basis for 
interpretivism or naturalism comes from the disciplines of anthropology and sociology, which seek 
to examine the internal logic of human action developing an understanding of the frames of 
reference out of which that behaviour arises (Creswell 2014). While there remains a perception 
that positivism and interpretivism are polar positions and represent different approaches and 
methodologies, Morgan and Smircich (1980) devise an interpretivist-positivist spectrum. They 
argue that method choice and its adequacy embodies assumptions about the nature of knowledge, 
the methods through which that knowledge can be attained, and the nature of the phenomena being 
investigated. Their schema is derived from that of Burrell and Morgan (1979) “which suggests that 
all approaches to social science are based on interrelated sets of assumptions regarding ontology, 
human nature, and epistemolology” (Morgan and Smircich 1980, p.491). Laughlin (1995) also 
uses the framework of Burrell and Morgan (1979), reframing as choices (or positioning) that have 
to be taken prior to an empirical study: theory, methodology and change. Each of these dimensions 
are viewed by Laughlin as continuums, with the choice of theory relating to the level of prior 
theorising; the choice of methodology relating to the role of the investigator and the investigative 
process; the choice in relation to ‘change’ relates to taking a position on the achievement of change 
through the investigation, that is, challenge to the status quo. He locates various ‘schools of 
thought’ or philosophical paradigms within the schema. Gallhofer et al. (2013) observe that 
“Paradigms are mutually exclusive because they are different categories of a categorisation 
schema” (p.199) but also indicate the dangers in Laughlin’s framework of “linking positivism and 
quantitative methods too strongly (p.197). In fact they note (again, p.197) that particular 
perspectives, using the example of the positivism of the Chicago School, “neither rule in nor rule 
out particular methods in research in an absolute sense”. Burrell and Morgan (2019) tempered their 
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former position and argued that philosophy of method shapes rather than prescribes method choice. 
Using the language of Laughlin (1995), I take an ontological position of interpretivist towards the 
“middle-range” of the interpretivist-positivist continuum of Morgan and Smircich (1980). I have 
applied a mixed-methods approach which affords both approaches equal credence and substance, 
whilst also yielding benefit from their coalescence.  
Llewelyn (2003) discusses five different forms of theorisation, one of which is a theory’s ‘practical 
adequacy’ which we can interpret to mean its application in practice. This is key to our 
methodological approach. Our research questions ask: how is VaR perceived in practice? What 
are the perceptions of FRTB and what impact will it have on practice? The ‘doing of numbers’ 
(Espeland and Stevens 2008) through the reactions they cause, their sphere of influence and how 
they are influenced, is not adequately captured in segregated quantitative or qualitative studies, so 
the mixed methods approach adopted here captures the social and technical aspects of VaR in its 
regulatory, reporting and internal risk management roles. 
 
4.3 Mixed Methods 
 
Holistically this research deploys a mixed methods research design to develop an understanding 
of the use of VaR. There are numerous understandings of what constitutes mixed methods research 
as discussed by Johnson et al. (2007). The combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques 
is a common attribute of mixed methods approaches. The premise of generating synergy to capture 
the benefits of both is an attractive proposition. However, it presents many challenges including 
the development of different skill-sets and navigating their relevant literatures (Bryman 2006). 
Therefore, it must be warranted by the demands of the research questions. Our research questions 
revolve around the VaR measure: We ask what is the experienced reality of VaR in its various 
roles, by bank practitioners; its role in determining regulatory capital for IMA banks; its role within 
the organisation; and its reporting role. We investigate their perception of the replacement of VaR 
with the FRTB calculative framework, which centres on ES and/or the amendments to the 
standardised approach. We ask how we can use these insights to evaluate the performance of 
competing candidate resolution models and the impact of additional qualifiers for authorised use 
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of internal models (regulatory VaR/ES) within the context of the FRTB framework. Furthermore, 
we ask how this will affect practice. The findings from these research questions could be used to 
improve regulatory policy and internal market risk management. The research questions are not 
bounded by qualitative or quantitative perspectives, but traverse both. The qualitative enquiry 
disseminates the parallel black box of how a model interacts with its social setting and is influenced 
by that setting. The mixed method approach deployed here takes the VaR model from its pristine 
lab design and examines how it performs in its real-world situation. 
4.4 Design 
 
The qualitative study uses results from semi-structured interviews in an empirical research design 
which then applies a sociological frame evaluation; the views of the interviewees are fundamental 
to understanding their experienced realities of VaR, its organisational and reporting roles and the 
regulatory policy framework. The quantitative impact study devises hypothetical portfolios and 
empirically examines their performance under criteria introduced in the revised regulatory 
framework. In this period of regulatory change, we are also interested in understanding the 
knowledge environment including the rationality of beliefs both informing perceptions in the 
qualitative study and in modelling choices in the quantitative study.  
The question of how to capitalise on a mixed methods approach is not elementary. Do the insights 
from one help to inform or formulate the design of the other? Do the findings from the two studies 
collaborate or conflict? We argue that these combined methods of investigation may better inform 
the development of future regulatory policy and the measures that underpin. We contend that the 
rationale for using a mixed methods research in this thesis is to address gaps in knowledge between 
the traditional boundaries of qualitative and quantitative evaluations of the VaR measure and to 
challenge assumed evaluation processes. Uncovering the tacit knowledge and perceptions of 
practitioners on VaR and its usefulness within organisations and the financial system is one of our 
key contributions. These perceptions, together with perceptions on the regulatory framework, help 
inform our quantitative impact study examining the impact of the changes to market risk and 
portfolio management practice through FRTB. This collocation of methods may yield more 
paradoxes than corroborations, so how is this beneficial? Greene et al.  (1989) define five key 
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categorisations of mixed method evaluation designs and their respective purposes: Triangulation 
– the convergence and/or collaboration of results; Complementarity – the elaboration of results; 
Development – the results from one study are used to inform the other; Initiation – seeks the 
discovery of paradox and contradiction; Expansion – increases the breadth and range of inquiry. 
This mixed method evaluation design has the potential to fulfil a developmental purpose. This type 
of collaboration may yield fresh insights to inform the reframing of risk management and 
regulatory policy and facilitate improvements in internal risk management. We argue that this is a 
novel approach to the examination of an accounting technology.  
VaR as an accounting measure was not designed by a standard-setting body but rather emerged 
from industry and acquired regulatory legitimacy from the SEC and Basel II (amended) (BCBS 
2006a). It has endured, despite its apparent failings, through various financial crises including 
LTCM12 and heavy criticism in the regulatory and risk modelling literatures since its inception 
(Danielsson et al. 2001). However, to focus only on a standard-setter’s intentions for an accounting 
measure may underplay its organisational and external influence13, thus the impact of regulatory 
change may be underestimated. VaR’s influence on bank risk-taking and financial stability 
warrants a contextual evaluation of VaR integrated with an impact analysis of the FRTB 
calculative framework. The societal impacts of enhanced financial stability within the banking 
sector merits the adoption of such a collaborative approach. 
  
                                                 
12 Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) was a hedge fund management firm which collapsed and required a bail-
out in the 1990s. Two of its board members were Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, recipients of the 1997 Nobel 
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for their role in the development of the Black-Scholes-Merton derivatives 
pricing model. One of their key investment strategies was convergence trading which was initially successful but led 
to significant over exposure to the 1997 Asian crisis and 1998 Russian Debt crisis. 
 
13 Pelger, C. (2016) 'Practices of standard-setting – An analysis of the IASB's and FASB's process of identifying the 
objective of financial reporting', Accounting, Organizations and Society, 50, 51-73, available: 
http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2015.10.001. discusses the determination by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in their revised joint 
framework, that valuation usefulness is the single objective of financial reporting. This excludes the role of 
stewardship which has long been discussed as empowered by the accountability aspect of financial reporting Lennard, 
A. (2007) 'Stewardship and the Objectives of Financial Statements: A Comment on IASB's Preliminary Views on an 
Improved Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: The Objective of Financial Reporting and Qualitative 








The aim of the qualitative component of the thesis is the examination of the perceptions of 
practitioners on VaR and the regulatory changes under FRTB. The primary research source used 
is in-depth interviews with expert practitioners. Additionally we use resources depicting the 
collective contemporary criticism of VaR in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis (See 
Chapter 2), which comprise of contemporary financial press sources, official government enquiries 
into the crisis and industry publications and correspondence. We combine these sources with 
insights from various academic literatures to examine the different contemporaneous perceptions 
of VaR, its role within the organisation, its impact on capital requirements, its reporting role, and 
its influence on financial markets and financial stability. The implementation of FRTB will lead 
to the demotion of VaR as the central mechanism within the market risk regulatory capital 
framework. However, VaR will continue to have a role in the FRTB framework as part of 
backtesting banks’ internal models to ensure they meet the criteria for authorised use (regulatory 
VaR). In addition, VaR’s internal and reporting roles are not automatically changed by the 
implementation of FRTB. We examine practitioners’ perspectives on VaR’s changing role and the 
wider regulatory context.   
We engaged VaR users directly through semi-structured interviews in Ireland and the UK. The 
spectrum of roles of the informants included: varying seniority of market risk analyst, quantitative 
risk analysts, traders, senior treasury managers, regulatory executives and representatives from 








RM Risk Manager/Risk Modelling 
T Trader/Treasury Management 
P Regulator/ Trade representative/ Consultancy 
Table 5.1 Participant categories 
The sample included participants from internal models (IMA) banks and standardised (SA) banks.  
An interview guide was used to ensure consistency with the predefined scope of the interview, 
though the flow of the interview determined coverage and depth. The interview questions broadly 
explored perceptions around VaR, its replacement ES, its role within the organisation, its 
relationship with trading, its relationship with regulatory capital, the regulatory changes post-
crisis, model governance, the implementation of FRTB and the resultant impact on financial 
stability. The interview content was informed by the rich literature in the area of market risk 
modelling and regulation together with literature from critical perspectives of accounting. The 
contemporaneous evolution of the FRTB framework provided interesting insights into the 
challenge of reaching an implementable regulatory framework (BCBS 2013a; BCBS 2016; BCBS 
2019). The critical cynosure of VaR, ascribed as the collective contemporary criticism, is used to 
inform the interview questions and provide context for the subsequent interview analysis.  
The nature of this type of research is value-bound, that is, influenced by values, in a number of 
ways. Schwandt et al. (2007) determine these influences to be: the values of the inquirer; the 
inquiry paradigm; the choice of theory; contextual values. For the quantitative study this means 
conducting sound quantitative methods to get the best thoughts from it. The challenge exists, 
therefore, of how to ascribe validity to the methodology and thereby infer trust in the results. 
Robustness in the positivist realm is a standard criteria applied to demonstrate the veracity of a 
model and empirical findings. Initial forays into verifying the robustness of interpretivist studies 
looked for parallel equivalents to truth-value, applicability, consistency, and neutrality. Morgan 
(1983) in his advancement of the need for reflexivity in social science, disputes the appropriateness 
of searching for parallels and asserts that the judgement of the interpretivist methodology should 
be consistent with its philosophical underpinnings. Schwandt et al. (2007) determine the Unique 
Criteria of Authentication as a basis from which this judgement mechanism can be developed. 
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These criteria include: Fairness – the responsibility to expose and explain the differing value 
systems that emerge in the study; Ontological Authentication – aim of raising consciousness, 
increased appreciation of complexities previously misunderstood; Educative Authentication – 
fostering increased understanding of expressed views; Catalytic Authentication – feedback action 
validity. In this qualitative study, I have endeavoured to apply these criteria in order to authenticate 
its interpretivist findings 
The advantage of using semi-structured interviews is that this reduces the restrictive nature of a 
prescribed set of questions and facilitates a forum whereby the informants could enlarge upon 
areas of discussion, which they deemed relevant. This potentially yields a greater appreciation for 
the sphere of influence and has the potential to identify practical factors that influence restrictions, 
rationalisations and motivations. The markets chosen were the Irish and UK banking sectors. The 
rationale for focusing on these two markets is that there is strong integration between Irish and UK 
institutions and that, culturally, lending practices, societal norms and legal frameworks in the two 
jurisdictions have strong similarities. This is discussed in Chapter 2. The interviews of the 
informants were generally carried out face-to-face with the information transcribed for further 
analysis. Where this was possible, this allowed for the development of trust between the 
interviewer and the informants. The informants were provided with assurances of confidentiality, 
non-disclosure of their name or that of their employers; secure storage of information; views 
expressed are assumed personal views rather than those of their employers; and that the research 
had been subject to ethics approval. Please see Appendix 1 for interview outline, letter of invitation 
template, and ethics approval documentation. 
5.2 Method 
Our primary data is drawn from semi-structured interviews with VaR practitioners, exploring 
perceptions around: VaR; its replacement ES; its role within the organisation; its relationship with 
trading; its relationship with regulatory capital; the regulatory changes under Basel III and FRTB; 
and the resultant impact on financial stability. Our respondents from the UK and Ireland include 
market risk analysts/ managers/ modellers (RM), traders, portfolio and treasury managers (T), 
regulatory executives, representatives from professional risk management bodies and risk 




It must be noted that there is significant overlap in the experience of practitioners from the three 
groups, in particular those involved in consultancy/ advisory or regulatory roles generally have a 
background in either trading/treasury management or the risk management area. There is less 
overlap between the trading/treasury grouping and the risk management grouping.   
The participants were selected in order to get a range of perspectives on VaR and the market risk 
regulatory framework. Initially brief background details for the participants were gathered.  
 
Table 5.2: Respondents 
The semi-structured interviews were informed by the literature. The interview questions were 
grouped into three main sections. The first section included open-ended questions relating to the 
performance of VaR, its longevity, the expanse of its roles (internal, reporting and regulatory), and 
its relationship with trading and portfolio management. The second section sought views on the 
market risk regulatory framework (Basel III and FRTB), whilst the third section elicited views on 
the wider market and societal implications of the changing regulatory regime. The interviews of 











RM1 R M Irish/UK
RM2 R F Irish/UK
RM3 R F Irish/UK
RM4 R M Irish/UK
T5 T F Irish/UK
T6 T M Irish/UK
T7 T M Irish/UK
SRM8 P M Irish
P9 P M Global
T10 T M UK/Global
TRM11 T M Irish/UK/Global
P12 P M Irish
P13 P M UK
RM14 R M UK/Global
RM15 R M UK/Global
P16 P M UK/Global
RM17 R M Irish/Global
P18 P M Irish/Global
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analysis. Where this was possible, this allowed for the development of trust between the 
interviewer and the informants. The informants were provided with assurances of confidentiality, 
non-disclosure of their name or that of their employers; secure storage of information; views 
expressed are assumed to be personal views rather than those of their employers; and that the 
research had been subject to ethics approval.  
Spears (2014a) discusses the importance of interactional expertise in gaining trust and developing 
rapport with the interviewee.  Collins et al. (2007) describe interactional expertise as “the 
possession of a sufficient amount of specialist tacit knowledge unique to that field”. The 
complexities of developing, validating and implementing market risk models, together with the 
complex nature of VaR’s organisational position, as well as its influence on market participants, 
is recognised as tacit by nature (Morgan 2012). Thus, the author’s experience working in the 
banking sector is a key benefit to this study. However, the intervening 15 years employed outside 
of the banking sector, facilitates the necessary objectivity for this study. Spears (2014) explains 
that this interactional expertise effects the interview dynamic in two key ways. First, it assures the 
interviewee that the interviewer has acquired an understanding of the mathematics underpinning 
the models, the nuances of modelling and its architecture. This enables the informant to speak at 
greater depth about the topic, free from the necessity to explain every acronym, nuance and 
contextual reference. Secondly, with banking having become a somewhat stigmatised group 
(Roulet 2015), perhaps speaking to a former peer may allay fears of a negative parti pris. The 
concept of Inquirer-Respondent relationships rejects the existence of an objective stance by the 
inquirer and suggests that the relationship is one of “mutual and simultaneous” influence but that 
this can bear fruit in the transfer of knowledge to the inquirer (Schwandt et al. 2007).  
Kuhn (1963) notes the shaping of the beliefs about good scientific practice of a new entrant to a 
field of science by being trained to reproduce exemplary results. While Svetlova (2018) describes 
her early career indoctrination into trading as a pragmatic market-based tempering of her scientific 
education. Therefore, while not approaching the research field as an outsider, the intervening 15yrs 
removed from practice and immersed in third level teaching in the discipline, arguably bestows a 
critical distance whilst retaining an interactional expertise. Providently, the period of absence from 
practice includes the period of the financial crisis. This precipitates an ability to empathise with 
the ‘othering’ of banking professionals that occurred post-crisis but yet retain a detachment 
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afforded to those outside of the stigmatised grouping (Roulet 2015). Stanley et al. (2014) 
investigated how UK-based media engaged in moral enterprise to characterise the individuals 
employed in investment banking as morally tainted rather than characterising the tasks they 
undertook. Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) find that the characterisation of ‘dirty work’ and the 
stigmatisation associated is not specific to the physical nature of the work but rather a social 
construct imputed by people which creates a distance between them and what is viewed as socially 
unacceptable work. This form of stigmatisation historically often reinforces hegemonic class 
(Campbell and Deacon 2006) however, in this case, stigmatisation is of an elite group. Stanley et 
al. (2014) describe how the characteristics of the group, in particular their perceived excessive 
wealth, is used in a rhetorical strategy to morally taint this grouping.  Prior to the financial crisis, 
Gordon Brown then Chancellor of the Exchequer, praised the London investment community for 
its employment opportunities and contribution to the economy (Stanley et al. 2014). Roulet and 
Clemente (2015) develop a theoretical model to explain how public opinion can influence 
deinstitutionalisation of a practice. Deinstitutionalisation is where practices are dropped because 
of their reduced social approval. They discuss the dilemma posed to insiders whether to align with 
public opinion or uphold the practice. We consider whether the damning hegemonic discourse 
around VaR influenced the headline replacement by ES at the centre of the revised FRTB 
calculative framework. 
Influenced by the work of MacKenzie and Spears (2014b), who  interviewed market participants 
to investigate the perception of the Gaussian copula, we are particularly interested in evidence of 
reflections that questioned the validity of VaR and its longevity, mirroring the hegemonic 
criticisms by contemporary financial commentators (Nocera 2009b; Triana 2011). However, we 
also look for an acknowledgement of the separate but related roles of VaR; in particular VaR’s 
organisational role, and whether there is a perception that this will change with the impending 
regulatory changes. Although the methodology deployed is not primarily a discourse analysis, 
some evidence of the existence of interpretive repertoires is examined. Interpretive repertoires are 
described by Reynolds and Wetherell (2003) as routine arguments, descriptions and evaluations 
that become part of the vernacular common to people working in the same field or influenced by 
the same culture and importantly, are used by people to rationalise events. We investigate whether 
VaR is a force of influence in the evaluation culture of banks and financial markets. Therefore, we 
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are interested in whether there is evidence of similar veins of thinking, common vernacular, 
accepted narratives, justification of past activities, etc. We investigate the existence of a common 
approach to rationalisation of past events such as the financial crisis and adaptation to the changing 
regulatory environment.  
The interviews were transcribed and analysed using the interlinked process protocol espoused by 
O’Dwyer (2004): data reduction; data display; and data interpretation. The categorisation of the 
transcribed interviews formulated the data reduction component. The data display component 
involved recognising themes arising from the interviews and determining the commonality and 
divergence among these themes with respect to the categories of the respondents, their educational 
background, etc. This process required repeated analysis of the interview transcripts to identify 
themes, collaborations and conflicts. The interpretation component required an objective 
rationalisation of the responses relative to the emerging themes. This required a layered approach, 
beginning with drawing insights from the critical mass on particular themes, followed by a critical 
perspectives approach where we recognise the interviews as human engagement and that therefore 
the analysis must go beyond discrete analysis of content. Absences and presumptions became 
apparent and added to the richness of the interpretation of the exchanges. O’Dwyer (2004) urges 
recognition of the “burden of inference” weighing upon the qualitative researcher. There is a need 
for the researcher to be actively aware of their own cognitive heuristics and prejudices (as 
discussed with respect to the unique criteria of authentication). The presence of positional bias is 
not uncommon in research interviews and demands reflexive self-critique. Collectively, this 










The key research questions of this thesis are to examine the perceptions of practitioners on VaR 
and the changing regulatory context, to empirically evaluate the quantitative impact of changes to 
under the FRTB market risk calculative framework. We have introduced the contextual 
background for the study including the three key roles of VaR (internal, reporting, and regulatory), 
the nature of the Irish and UK banking sector, the evolution of the BCBS market risk management 
framework, model governance initiatives, and the collective contemporary criticism of VaR. In 
our review of the literatures, we rationalise the interpretation of VaR as an accounting technology. 
We can therefore determine that Miller-Power is an appropriate lens in which to evaluate our 
empirical findings from the interviews. In Chapter 5, we outlined the methodology of the 
qualitative study.  
In this chapter, we examine the key findings from our analysis of the interviews using the Miller-
Power framework as a lens. The interview results are organised under three headings, following 
the main elements of the semi-structured interviews described in the previous chapter. First, we 
establish current attitudes to VaR among users. Secondly, we explore the context of changing 
regulation, as VaR is succeeded by ES in the new FRTB framework. Finally, we consider the 
impact of this FRTB framework on risk and portfolio management.  
Miller and Power (2013) describe accounting as a powerful lattice of the properties: 
Territorialising, Subjectivising, Mediating and Adjudicating. We find it useful to separate the four 
Miller-Power lattice components although their interrelationship is also important. We are not 
trying to further justify or find evidence of VaR’s exhibition of the four characteristics but rather, 
in identifying the characteristics we are able to augment our interpretation and understanding of 
the interview results. The lens allows us to shift our vision from the pure collation and 
categorisation of the results to contemplate why they have responded in this way, what does it say 
about the power of the VaR measure, and what are the implications? 
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We structure the chapter under the four Miller-Power accounting characteristics: Territorialising, 
Subjectification, Mediating and Adjudicating. We follow with a distillation of the key findings on 
the perspectives of VaR and the changing regulatory environment, and perspectives on the impact 
of the change to market risk regulation on risk and portfolio management practice. We will use 




The territorialising characteristic is described by Miller and Power (2013) as the ‘recursive 
construction of the calculable spaces’. Risk management is not a static practice and must evolve 
with its context (Aven 2016).  Miller et al. (2008) argue that accounting measures adopt or 
hybridise to their context to sustain their usefulness. Correspondingly, this means that they 
territorialise their context. We examine the interview results with this characteristic to the fore. 
The first phase of interview questions explored the broad perception of the performance of VaR, 
and shed light on its territorialising qualities. The participants tended to contextualise this question 
as VaR’s performance over the period of the financial crisis. This is not surprising giving the 
attribution of blame for levels of risk-taking levied at the VaR model (Nocera 2009b; Triana 2011). 
Across each of the three practitioner groups, risk managers, traders and practitioners (hereafter 
RM, T and P) the response on performance was defensive. The common theme of ‘it did what it 
was supposed to do’ emerged. For the RM cohort this was qualified by emphasising the need for 
better understanding of the limits/assumptions of the metric and underlying model. A common 
defence was around the use of the metric and the necessity to appreciate the nature of the data put 
in to the model. Note, that practitioners did not separate the VaR roles in this part of the discussion. 
Furthermore, the RMs emphasised the need to regard the result as a summary measure, subject to 
the confidence level, the assumptions and implicit data choices.  It was clear from many of the 
RMs’ responses, that VaR was now one measure in a suite of measures designed to give a more 
holistic view of market risk. The dependence of the model on the nature of the calibration period 
was recognised (primarily by RMs) as an additional communication requirement to facilitate a 
situationalised narrative. This defensiveness indicates, in Miller-Power terms, significant 
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territorialisation of the risk sphere by the VaR metric, enabling its ideological domination to be 
sustained despite the criticism of its role in the financial crisis. 
Whilst we find a defensive response to VaR as a failed risk metric from across the three practitioner 
groups, there is a subtle difference is the rationalisation of the defence. There is an elusive 
ambiguity about the VaR metric, which facilitates its appeal to both scientific rationality and 
naturalised discourse. In this, it is similar to another pervasive financial model, the Black-Scholes-
Merton option pricing model, which has been characterised as a heuristic tool that is temporally 
both quantitative and social (Svetlova, 2018). Likewise, there are two faces to the VaR device. 
One is the outward facing ease of expression, ease of communication (within the organisation) and 
illustration device that is used as a barometer of risk in discussion, for example, with board 
members. The second face involves the internal workings of VaR, the choice of resolution method, 
calibration of parameters, appropriateness of assumptions, and the accuracy and robustness of the 
forecast. The RM cohort have a deep appreciation of the scientific integrity of this second face 
together with the organisational spread of the first face. For the majority of the RM cohort, the 
metric had not failed. Rather misuse or poor interpretation and understanding of the VaR figures, 
led to poor portfolio management, but the model itself was not causal in the events of the financial 
crisis. Haslam et al. (2018) argues for the cautious interpretation of empirical findings (such as 
VaR), with particular attention required of the enclosing language. In this discussion, practitioners 
predominately refer to internal VaR. 
The idea that a model can be followed slavishly in the financial sector has been discussed in other 
contexts, notably in relation to the Gaussian copula. There is a media perception that market 
participants unquestioningly accept the outputs of models; this is contested by MacKenzie and 
Spears (2014a). Svetlova (2018) further contests this perception, noting that, outside of finance, 
the role of models is misunderstood and that the criticism come from the belief that models tell 
people what to do. Beunza and Stark (2004) characterise this as a belief in the prevalence of ‘model 
dopes’. Our interviews show some bristle at this form of criticism: “I wouldn’t say [VaR] hasn’t 
performed well, it’s totally based on the information you put into it: you put the assumptions into 
it and it gives you a number back …” (RM2); “I think VaR as a measure has an unduly bad 
reputation. It was an easy tool, most people even with a basic background [mathematically], it’s 
very intuitive, you can set it up in an excel sheet, it’s not difficult to calculate the returns of a data 
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series. So a lot of people could very quickly get a grasp of what historical VaR was.” (RM3, 2018). 
For the treasury/portfolio manager cohort, there is less bristle at the degree of criticism levelled at 
VaR, perhaps due to their role as end-users rather than ‘agents of VaR’: “My personal perception 
of VaR is that its overused a bit because, right back into the sands of time, it was designed to come 
up with a number that people could put their head around.” (T3, 2018). The nature of this narrative 
is rationalistic, justifying the use of VaR as a mechanism that had become innate. The Miller-
Power frame allows us to view this from the perspective of a territorialising device that has lost 
some of its dominance and legitimacy, with practitioners indicating a weakening of its 
subjectivising and adjudicating roles.  
Under the lens of the Miller-Power frame, we can see that the territorialising element of VaR is 
clear in practitioners’ responses. In particular, they describe an expansion of the role of VaR 
beyond its market risk monitoring, reporting, and regulatory mandate and they sometimes struggle 
to separate its integrated roles. This acquisition of additional applications is an example of the 
propensity for useful accounting measures to further extend their territorial boundary.  The 
territorialisation aspect is also relevant in examining an accounting measure’s longevity and 
persistence. VaR has been used prolifically since the 1990s. It remains central to the way in which 
market risks are measured in banks. We further explored the stickiness or persistence of the VaR 
metric by asking the participants to rationalise the longevity of VaR despite the criticism from 
academic and trade commentators (For example (Danielsson et al. 2001) and (Triana 2011) 
respectively). The common response reflected a perceived lack of alternative approach. The 
following quotations are reflective of the overall response: “I guess the concept of it is fine, at 
every stop along the line they’re trying to refine it. It’s quite a neat solution; it gives you just one 
number. I don’t really know what the alternative would be: there’s no real alternative.” (RM4); 







The mediation power of VaR came through strongly in the interviews, framed as its effectiveness 
as a communication device. This ease of communication is rationalised by the ease with which 
different stakeholders within the organisation can visualise the bell shaped curve and interpret the 
implication of the VaR number, regardless of the complexity of the mathematics used to derive 
the risk forecast. Being able to communicate market risk exposure for the organisation as a whole 
in just one number has proved a powerful attraction. The risk management practitioners (RM) 
emphasise the need for understanding of the VaR parameters in order to have a true anticipation 
of what the forecast metric projects. One risk management practitioner stated clearly the key 
conceptual issue with the use of the VaR metric as an early warning system: “On the whole I’d be 
pretty positive around it [VaR] just in terms of the information it gives you. I think the problem 
with VaR is what people expect it to do. So when you say 99% VaR, that’s saying that on 1% of 
occasions it’s going to be worse than that. It doesn’t tell you how bad that’s going to be.” (RM1). 
Through the mediating component of the Miller-Power lens, we find strong resonance with the 
power of this aspect of the VaR model reinforcing the territorialising, subjectivising and 
adjudicating elements of the lattice. If we merely translate mediating as communicating, we 
understate this component. Examining the interview responses under this lens allows us to see a 
fuller meaning of a mediation device, as VaR is viewed as a device used to bring about agreement 
and reconciliation14. Again, practitioners are not explicit in their segregation of the roles of VaR. 
However, the language used suggests an external audience (regulatory VaR) with a different 
expectation to the internal audience (internal VaR). 
There is strong evidence in the interviews (RM, T, P) under the lens of the mediating characteristic 
to support the ‘travel light’ communication device advantage of VaR as a summary measure 
(Kurunmäki et al. 2011) where the simplicity of the model and the ease of depiction reinforces its 
use as a communication device. Its aesthetic appeal and visual simplicity are cited as key reasons 
for VaR’s longevity (Espeland and Stevens 2008). The preference for simpler models to aid 
understanding for end users is also apparent from the responses of the trader/portfolio manager 
                                                 
14 Oxford English Dictionary definition: “.. bring about an agreement or reconciliation.” 
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and advocacy participants, whereas the risk manager participants viewed the advanced modelling 
techniques as a means of improving forecasts. For example, here is a response from a participant 
involved in policy development and advocacy when asked about the choice of resolution method: 
“I would prefer to use one [VaR resolution model] that is easily understood by the people using 
the number.” (P1). Whilst the simplicity in communication is recognised as central to VaR’s 
ubiquity, there was some evidence of a conflict between this and better performance of return 
forecasts, further exacerbated by system limitations, which is an inhibiting factor for banks with 
legacy systems: “The restrictions in terms of the IT solution available, communication, the 
intuitive nature of the results. There are pluses and minuses for all the [Sic. resolution] methods. 
Getting buy-in to actually using the [VaR] number, which is a big hurdle.” (RM4). The risk 
management practitioners discuss the relevance of the underpinning model and the data choices 
(RM). However, for the trader/treasury management practitioner as end-users, belief in the VaR 
number itself appears to be secondary to its use as a risk barometer, particularly in communications 
with board members (T): “VaR as a measure of risk level or certainly changes in risk level from 
period to period: absolutely fine.” (T3) This was similar to the view presented by the advocacy 
practitioner: “VaR as a model was very useful: it was simple because a lot of times you’re trying 
to get an understanding from a sometimes disinterested board in risk” (P1). The mediating property 
is viewed as central to VaR’s propagation and steadfastness, and further promotes its 
territorialisation. Its usefulness in reconciling different user groups within the organisation is 




Subjectification is also a key theme that emerged from the interview data. There is a notable 
absence of rationale that VaR’s longevity should be attributed to its strong performance despite 
having previously defended its performance. We find this lack of consistency interesting and, using 
the Miller-Power frame, relate this to the organisational subjectification by VaR. In defending 
VaR, respondents are defending their own role in the banking system, which has become 
stigmatised through the events of the financial crisis (Roulet 2015). VaR relates directly to a 
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paradigm that has become central to the operationalisation of the dominant philosophy of 
shareholder value management (Power 2007), by which return is valued with respect to the risk 
incurred. The consistency of the reported lack of alternative suggests the adoption of an 
interpretative repertoire to rationalise past dependency on VaR. There have been a number of 
alternatives to the VaR metric (For example Median Shortfall (Kerkhof and Melenberg 2004) and 
Mean Shortfall (Bertsimas et al. 2004)) discussed in the market risk modelling literature as well 
as the comparison of candidate models offering improved performance over the standard models 
preferred by industry (McNeil and Frey 2000; Alexander and Lazar 2006; McAleer et al. 2013b). 
The routinisation of VaR reflects the diminishing of Jorion’s (1997) aspirational vision if VaR as 
a disciplining rigour for risk management to Power’s “thin simplifications” (Power 2009). 
Furthermore, the adjudicating component of the Miller and Power framework leads us to examine 
whether the VaR metric as a form of self-regulation, endowed with legitimacy through the BCBS, 
SEC and various accounting standards, is only subject to scrutiny when that self-regulation fails 
(Power (2007) and Beck (1992)). Power describes VaR as the “calculative bearer(s)” of enforced 





One of the key research questions of this thesis is to develop an understanding of the perspectives 
of practitioners on VaR. A second research question focuses on practitioners’ perceptions of the 
changing context of VaR due to its diminished position with the market risk regulatory capital 
framework. This requires us to understand the authorative or adjucticating nature of VaR from 
practitioners’ perspectives. Essentially, we want to understand if VaR’s authority over risk 
management practice is due to its position within the regulatory framework and, by extension, 
whether that authority will be diminished by its reduced position in the FRTB framework. We 
want to investigate whether the collective contemporary criticism (discussed in Chapter 2) has any 
bearing on the perceived authority of VaR. Furthermore, we carry the insights from the literature 
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regarding the adaptation of technology and institutional change, to see if this provides any insights 
into the perception of practitioners’ on the authority of VaR. 
VaR’s pervasiveness throughout banking organisations and its dominance in individuals’ 
rationalisation of risk measurement augments its adjudicating role. Furthermore, the adjudicating 
role is integrated with the subjectivising role, as VaR is a measure used to judge the level of risk 
through VaR-based trading limits but also to curtail or control further risk-taking. As described in 
Power (2007), the device used to measure becomes the device used to control. Participants identify 
its role in the control of trading limits but also in the allocation of risk appetite. However, we find 
that, although traders/portfolio managers’ activity is subject to adherence to their VaR-based 
trading limits, they do not recognise a homology of trading activity with VaR. Fontes et al. (2016) 
find that homology was impart for the adoption of calculative practices.  MacKenzie and 
Spears(2014b) find that homology between the no arbitrage pricing theory and financial practices 
was important for the adoption of pricing mechanisms dependent on the principle. Using the lens 
of the adjudicating property, we are interested in uncovering why VaR achieved authority and 
continues to possess authority despite the significant level of criticism and its flagged demotion in 
the regulatory framework. If we expected to find homology between trading and the VaR measure 
as a driving force for VaR’s authority, this is soundly rejected by the treasury/portfolio manager 
practitioner group, who view VaR as a constraining measure but do not perceive an intuition 
between trading and the resulting VaR. The following quotation exemplifies the typical response: 
“VaR doesn’t give an indication on liquidity …You trade the market, VaR as constraint is the only 
way in which there is a relationship” (TRM1, 2018). Although there is recognition of the intuitive 
conceptual nature of VaR, the intuition between trading and the resulting VaR was not recognised 
as strong. The traders included in the study, spoke of how they could rationalise changes in their 
individual, desk or portfolio VaR figures using their understanding of the market conditions 
together with changes in their positions. However, the impact on their trading behaviour was only 
through adherence to the trading limits, which were VaR-based historically but are now based 
upon multiple metrics. Homology in pricing mechanisms used in both trading and risk 
measurement, was recognised by the RM cohort of the study. However, this belief was not 
reciprocated by the trading cohort who found little relationship between VaR and trading activity. 
Juxtaposing these perceptions leads us to deduce that, although portfolio characteristics and market 
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data are key inputs into the underpinning forecast model, the resultant VaR is less than intuitive 
for non-risk practitioners. Based on this evidence, we deduce that for end-users (the T practitioner 
group), although the philosophy of VaR is simple to understand and communicate, the mechanics 
remains a black-box.  
The trader takes positions based upon their portfolio management strategy using information in 
the market, under the constraints of the existing (VaR) limits, whereas the risk manager evaluates 
the risk of the portfolio based upon the ex post trading positions, the current market conditions, 
and relevant historical data. When we consider the different information sets and the differing goal 
alignment, despite commonality in the mathematical principles and overlap of data inputs, the 
homology between the two functions is not perceived to be strong by the trader/ portfolio manager 
participants. The risk manager respondents are more positive regarding the existence of a 
homology between VaR and portfolio management/trading. This may be because trading positions 
are included in their information set, and so they are more aware of the activity of the trader ex 
post and its influence on the VaR outcome. However, it is not necessary for them to be aware of 
the rationale for the trading activity situationalised in market conditions and portfolio dynamics, it 
is only the ex post positions which are relevant for their analysis. As the end-of-day trading 
snapshot is an input into the VaR, model risk managers can perceive a relationship. However, the 
trader participants only view VaR as a limiting measure beyond which it has no influence on their 
trading decisions. So the idea that there is a homologous relationship between trading and VaR is 
generally dismissed by the treasury/portfolio manager practitioner group. This implies that it is not 
the homology of VaR with trading that explains its longevity. The utility of VaR for 
treasury/portfolio management, beyond its role as a constraint, may be explained in the following 
response: “So I suppose, in a trading world, we would always have started with the BP01 or 1% 
swing measure which is a very intuitive methodology for traders – you know immediately what 
you have at risk. VaR is a lot harder to use as an individual, you don’t know where your stop-loss 
is. It’s less intuitive than BP01. Where VaR is useful is at a portfolio level and still is very useful 
at portfolio level. In aggregate for the bank, knowing how much risk is dedicated to market risk 
etc. is very useful.” (T2).  
Although we find no evidence to support the existence of a VaR-trading homology from the 
perspective of traders, its utility at portfolio level is recognised as significant. This recognised 
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usefulness at portfolio level reinforces the acceptance of VaR as an agent of the shareholder value 
philosophy but also highlights an interesting issue regarding the usefulness of inaccurate models. 
We hear from the traders/portfolio managers that VaR does not convey their world of decision-
making encompassing the complexity and sociality of markets. This is at odds with the depiction 
of the VaR model in the media, which depicts the slavish following of flawed risk models in market 
behaviour. We find here that participants believe the VaR metric does not direct their behaviour 
but rather acts to constrain what it determines to be risk-taking. This discussion focused firmly on 
the internal VaR role. Svetlova (2018) contrasts the under-calculative view whereby cultural and 
institutional norms, mimesis and heuristics take precedence over models, with the ‘not the leading 
role’ view of models, where, in the midst of uncertainty, they enable actions. If taken at face value, 
the responses from the trading/portfolio management cohort can be characterised as constraint, 
which is not synonymous with enabling. Such constrained behaviour is still an active response 
(subjectivising) in financial markets and it implies an endogenous social impact of the VaR metric. 
We find that, despite the defence of the VaR metric and the belief that VaR’s centrality to market 
risk management described above, and the fact that VaR is somewhat superseded under FRTB, 
FRTB itself is still positively perceived by the practitioner groups. Various components of the 
framework were rationalised as being necessary to address existing issues in the current framework 
for measuring and managing market risk. The ground-up reform of the fundamental building 
blocks from liquidity horizons, scaling assumptions and approaches to aggregation, were also well 
received. It is important to recognise that the interviews were carried out over a 1yr period from 
November 2017 – November 2018, and if we consider the temporal context of the interviews, we 
must note the following: Firstly, the implementation of FRTB was postponed to January 2022, 
with some components revised during the period of the interviews (Example: P&L attribution tests 
and the capital floor). Secondly, during the interview period UK banks were undergoing major 
structural reform under the Independent Commission on Banking’s (ICB) recommendation to ring-
fence retail banking in the UK from their investment banking entities (Treasury 2011) which 
required separation of investment and commercial banking activity by January 2019. Ostensibly, 
implementation of FRTB had been postponed, some uncertainty remained over various 
components, and UK banks had the more pressing issue of the ICB reform.  
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We found an acknowledgement of limitations on the level of engagement with the specifics of 
FRTB from some practitioners but a strong knowledge and appreciation of the general framework. 
Again using the concept of an accounting measure’s ability to territorialise, we find an interesting 
observation of practitioners’ belief that FRTB will have little impact on many of the organisational 
roles of VaR. This organisational stickiness is contrary to the collective contemporary criticism 
focused on the failure of the VaR metric to prevent extreme losses. What we find from practitioners 
is that this fail-safe role was not their expectation of the VaR measure. Power argues that risk-
based regulation inherently accepts the possibility of failure (Power 2007). Rothstein et al. (2006) 
purports that regulators are subject to ambivalent nature of a risk-based regulatory philosophy. 
They have a blameless protective foil via the regulatory conditionality of self-governance by 
regulated entities, but are exposed to the interface of the risk-based philosophy (which includes 
failure within its accepted event set) with the public’s intolerance of risk spillover from the 
financial sector. In examining practitioner views on FRTB through the characteristic of 
adjudicating, we find both an organisational and philosophical stickiness to the use of the VaR 
metric as an internal risk measure, with the perception that its organisational authority will persist 
post FRTB. The continued perceived usefulness of VaR indicates its continued legitimacy (though 
with reduced dominance) as an internal risk measurement and management vehicle, with 
practitioners signalling its future use in parallel with the FRTB calculative frame. The FRTB 
framework is positively perceived, with a clear recognition that FRTB addresses existing issues. 
The resource implications of implementation is a regularly cited concern from the R and T 
respondents. Thus, we find that VaR’s perceived adjudicating power is not dependent on its 
regulatory primacy, but rather due its usefulness in an organisational context (internal VaR). 
Further, we find that practitioners recognise the legitimacy of the changes to the market risk 
regulatory framework under FRTB, some noting that VaR remains an integral part of the 
framework. Importantly, we find no perceived conflict between having different approaches for 
regulatory market risk measurement and for internal market risk management, that is, regulatory 
VaR and internal VaR.  
The reporting role of VaR is nuanced because Pillar III of the Basel III framework connects the 
regulatory reporting/market disclosure component to the capital framework of Pillar I and the 
supervisory component of Pillar II. However, in addition to the BCBS reporting requirements, 
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there are accounting standards’ financial reports that include market risk reporting. The BCBS 
reporting requirements have been amended to capture the changes to the market risk capital 
framework. The accounting standards have yet to make changes to the market risk reporting 
standards. However, although the disclosure authority and purpose of the reporting standards 
differ, the information from each is disclosed to the market. In other words, it is the prerogative of 
the accounting standards authority whether they amend market risk disclosure requirements in 
alignment with FRTB capital calculations, but the revised information will be disclosed to the 
market through the banks’ Pillar III reports. The reporting of results from the standardised 
approach may lead to enhanced interpretability. How the market uses the revised information will 
have an impact on the authority of the FRTB calculative framework. Enhanced interpretability 
should enable market discipline, which may then encourage alignment between market risk 
internal risk management, regulatory capital and reporting. This presents an opportunity for further 
study following the implementation of FRTB. We can conclude that changes to the market risk 
calculative framework through FRTB as a component of Basel III, is reflected in changes to Pillar 
III reporting requirements. Therefore, VaR reporting will change in line with the changes under 
FRTB 
 
6.6 The impact of FRTB on risk management and portfolio management 
practice 
 
Given that the aim of the FRTB framework is to operationalise financial market stability and 
enhance the stability of credit institutions, it is important from a societal perspective to examine 
how practitioners feel that FRTB will affect practice. This sub-section explores the practitioner 
views on the impact of FRTB on risk behaviour. Practitioners separated the impact on regulatory 
capital with other impacts, with the widely held assumption that FRTB would lead to an increase 
in regulatory capital. The administrative and technological burden was widely lamented by the T 
and R cohorts. The impending change to ES from VaR as the named metric in the determination 
of Pillar I capital is viewed as low impact relative to other changes (Trading Book – Banking Book 
boundary, desk-level approval and P&L attribution were recognised as presenting more significant 
challenges). A number of informants pursued this further, stating that given the underpinning 
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forecast model will remain the same, this does not present a major challenge (McKinsey report: 
(Azoulay et al. 2018b)). However, there was strong evidence of a collective belief by the T and R 
cohorts, that internal risk management practices would remain largely unchanged. One risk 
manager summarises the applicability of VaR within an organisational setting versus the 
complexity of the FRTB capital calculation: “They will probably manage on VaR and calculate 
capital on whatever FRTB says, because it’s very difficult to manage positions with FRTB 
calculations”, (RM15). This quote embodies each of the Miller-Power characteristics. VaR has 
territorialised internal market risk management to the extent that practitioners desire risk 
management practice to remain subject to VaR, that is, for VaR to maintain its authority on 
practice. Highlighting the difficulty of the FRTB calculative framework to be utilised in managing 
positions, emphasises the perceived mediating power of internal VaR in effecting that task. 
Looking at the implications for risk-taking behaviour, the assumed increases in regulatory capital 
was viewed to be impactful but the changes to the risk measurement under FRTB was not believed 
to present a challenge to trading practices by IMA banks. Some concerns were raised that the 
FRTB framework disproportionately affects smaller economies as there are disincentives to hold 
domestic sovereign or municipal bonds. There was a common belief that FRTB’s asset-specific 
liquidity horizons and model governance criteria reduces the incentive for commercial banks to 
trade complex products, echoing the sentiments of Turner’s dethroning of “socially useless 
financial activities” (Turner 2010). For example, one respondent from the trading cohort: “Return 
to banking 101. Separate high street, retail from investment banks. Banks are becoming more 
regional - less systemic risk.” (T7). Irish SA banks are much more sanguine and recognise that 
FRTB represents a significant change to the mode of risk management through revisions to the SA 





6.7 Findings summary 
 
In summary, we find the widely held belief that FRTB will affect regulatory capital calculations 
only and have limited impact organisationally on (IMA) banks who will continue to use VaR for 
internal risk management, control and monitoring. Its impact on risk-taking behaviour is perceived 
to act through the regulatory capital device rather than the newly configured calculative 
framework, and as such penalises complexity. The respondents from the regulatory practitioner 
grouping affirm their focus on capital as a means of ensuring stability of the banking sector. 
Regulatory capital (rather than a risk model) is viewed as the conduit to affect behaviour and ensure 
stability. According to a survey by McKinsey (Mehta et al. 2012) 50% of banks use a different 
model for internal risk management and for regulatory capital. The concern is expressed that FRTB 
will result in a further divergence in the risk model formulation used to determine regulatory 
capital and that used on an organisational basis. Operationally this may present a challenge in the 
allocation of risk appetite which effectively translates into trading limits if allocation is on the 
basis of the current internal VaR methodology, yet risk capital is determined using the FRTB 
formulation. The alignment between trading activity at desk level and risk forecasting aspired by 
the P&L attribution tests may coerce the alignment between internal risk management (including 
risk allocation) and the risk model used for regulatory purposes. Thus, the cherished proprietary 
regulatory market risk model and mode of market risk management may be required to align with 
the FRTB risk model via an additional performance test. This would result in complete alignment 
between trading activity, internal risk management and regulatory capital, despite the belief found 
here and in the McKinsey interviews (Azoulay et al. 2018) that FRTB represents ‘a little light 
housekeeping’.  
This indicates that the accounting power of VaR - subjectivising, mediating, territorialising and 
adjudicating – has changed how practitioners conceptualise and practice risk to the extent that they 
are now unwilling to contemplate an alternative in internal risk management. We find an 
underestimation of the coercion for changes to risk and portfolio management practices implicit in 
the FRTB calculative framework. While acknowledging the powerful lattice that the four 
characteristics present (territorialising, mediating, subjectivising and adjudicating) we must also 
recognise that this power may translate into an Achilles heel: promoting intransigence, and 
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presenting a barrier to reform. Grabowski et al. (1997) identifies the potential for risks to be 
dispraised through complacency in operational systems and may require direction from 
hierarchical levels outside of the operational arena. However, Robson et al. (2007) highlights the 
centrality of legitimacy to conferring power on accounting technology to shape organisational 
structures and identities. Legitimacy is not automatically inferred by regulatory imprimatur, nor is 
this the exclusive source of legitimacy. VaR’s adjudicating role was conferred through a 
combination of its regulatory and reporting roles, but was also originally legitimised internally 
through its agency in the shareholder value philosophy (Power 2007) operationalised through its 
internal risk management role. We question whether ES and the FRTB calculative framework can 
replace VaR in all aspects and be endowed with the necessary legitimacy.  Hopwood and Miller 
in their seminal writing (1994), emphasise the need for social support for calculative measures to 
facilitate full implementation. Hence, we perceive evidence of a conflict between the accepted 
authority of the FRTB framework and full operational reform due to perceived persistent 
usefulness and legitimacy of the VaR metric. This experienced reality is not addressed in the 
reforms of FRTB. This ability for accounting technologies to become embedded and acquire power 
needs to be recognised to better understand how this may colour perceptions of, or be an 
impediment to, changing regulation or practices. 
We find that market risk reporting through Pillar III disclosure requirements will change in 
correspondence with the changes under the FRTB market risk calculative framework. Therefore, 
market participants will have access to this information. It is not yet known if financial reporting 
requirements mandated by accounting authorities will change their requirements in 
correspondence with FRTB. The Pillar III disclosures require publication of the standardised 
approach calculations in addition to the internal model capital calculations. This will result in 
greater interpretability, which facilitates enhanced market discipline (Woods and Marginson 
2004). Circuitously, this may encourage greater alignment between market risk regulatory capital 
and internal market risk management. 
The concept of performativity in relation to VaR is a theme that emerges under the Miller-Power 
frame but is not explicitly investigated. The pronounced ‘usefulness’ of internal VaR within 
banking operations is key to the persistence of its use. Svetlova highlights the need for 
investigation of this performativity arguing that financial market participants “use models for non-
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epistemic goals” (Svetlova 2018, p.48). This prompts the need for an explicit examination of the 
scientific and practice cultures of model use. Graaf  (2016) argues that financial market participants 
pursue relevance over precision. Can models used in banking organisations, which are central to 
financial markets, maintain their scientific integrity? Mikes (2011, p.240) describes how the model 
output is the “starting point for further inquiries and the exercise of judgment”. Models become 
productive through human intervention and shaping. The M-P examination of the interview results 
allows some high level insights into how internal VaR is useful in practice with a strong emphasis 
on its mediating role. We also find the existence of opposing or conflicting calculative cultures 
within the field of banking. Practitioners involved in developing the VaR models aspire to 
advanced scientific performance but end users prefer simpler, intuitive VaR models. Svetlova 
warns that performativity need not only be Barnesian but argues that practitioners understand the 
nature of their decision making as “fatefully acting sensibly” (2018, p.50). Further exploration of 
this type of performativity is beyond the scope of this research but is a rich area of potential future 
research. 
A number of the interview questions (see Appendix 1.C) prompted by the literature did not gain 
traction with the practitioners, including: regulatory capture, self-regulation, collaboration of 
regulatory changes, and conflict between Basel III and jurisdictional model risk governance 
initiatives. Each of these areas were important to include in the formation of this research and are 
worthy of future investigation.  
The findings from this qualitative study under the lens of Miller-Power develop our understanding 
of the organisational stickiness of VaR. We use the practitioners’ widely held belief that FRTB 
will have limited impact on internal risk management and portfolio management practice to shape 
the quantitative impact study. In particular, we focus on the two additional criteria introduced for 
authorised use of internal market risk models (regulatory VaR/ES): P&L attribution test and desk-
level backtests. These tests introduce additional layers of complexity and governance of risk 
modelling processes. We examine whether they will have an effect on risk and portfolio 
management practices. We outline the design of the quantitative impact analysis in Chapter 7. We 
discuss the combined findings of the qualitative evaluation of VaR and quantitative impact study 
in Chapter 9. 
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This PhD research study deploys a mixed methods research design to understand perspectives on 
the use of VaR and the impact of changing regulatory standards. The study’s research questions 
revolve around the evaluation of VaR from the perspective of practitioners, and the impact of the 
changes to the market risk regulatory framework as a mechanism used to operationalize stability 
in banks. The first part of the study involves semi-structured interviews with practitioners, which 
are examined using the Miller-Power lens. Miller and Power (2013) describe the four key 
properties of accounting: Territorialising, Subjectivising, Mediating and Adjudicating as the 
productive power of an accounting complex. This lens allows us to evaluate VaR in its various 
roles and in the context of the changing market risk regulatory framework by examining the 
experienced realities of practitioners. In this quantitative impact analysis component of the mixed 
methods evaluation study, we use the insights from the Miller-Power evaluation of VaR to inform 
and temper the quantitative study. We determine that this novel approach to the evaluation of a 
non-traditional accounting measure contributes iteratively to the literature. 
Traditional qualitative and quantitative non-overlapping boundaries of research into VaR leave the 
potential for a knowledge gap. This thesis aims to traverse these boundaries to yield integrated 
qualitative and quantitative insights into the VaR metric, grounded in the context of the changing 
regulatory setting. One of the key contributions of the study is an analysis of the potential impact 
of new elements of the FRTB framework on risk and portfolio management practice. This is 
achieved through the findings of the quantitative impact study, which has been shaped by the 
findings of the qualitative study.  
While the headline change to the market risk regulatory framework under FRTB is the replacement 
of VaR by ES, VaR remains strongly embedded in the calculative framework. In particular, VaR 
is the central metric for backtesting. One of the strongly evidenced findings of the qualitative 
component of this study is that many practitioners view the regulatory changes under FRTB as 
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merely a change of statistical metric. The 2018 McKinsey report on FRTB (Azoulay et al. 2018a) 
depicts this viewpoint of FRTB as “a little light housekeeping”. Contemporary finance media, in 
their evaluation of FRTB, have focused much of their attention on the P&L attribution tests, which 
have been revised since the original FRTB publication (Mahfoudhi 2018). However, as impact 
analyses are published (EBA 2019), the seismic shift inferred by FRTB is being recognised. 
According to the European Banking Authority Quantitative Impact study, the expected average 
impact of FRTB on Pillar 1 market risk capital is an increase of 81%, with an interquartile range 
of 32% to 140% (EBA 2019). This excludes the application of the output floor. In this study, we 
investigate empirically potential impacts of the FRTB market risk management framework on both 
ex post risk management and ex ante portfolio management. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the BCBS instigated RCAP, which found significant variation in the 
outcomes of banks’ internal models applied to a specified hypothetical portfolio (BCBS 2018b). 
Lall (2012) describes how banks view regulatory capital as a form of taxation and the incentives 
to minimise capital requirements include: lower funding costs, ability to increase leverage, and 
increased return on equity. Tunaru (2015) argues that backtesting should be used to ensure that the 
VaR resolution model is neither overly conservative nor serially underestimates the portfolio risk. 
However, Hermsen (2010) finds that Basel II incentivises the implementation of the simplest (least 
expensive) resolution models that minimise capital rather than models with superior forecasting 
performance. FRTB introduces desk-level backtesting as an additional criterion for the authorised 
use of internal models for market risk capital. Furthermore, the FRTB framework require’s desks 
to pass P&L attribution tests in order to qualify for the IMA. The P&L attribution tests act as 
backtests for the mapping of the portfolio to its risk factors. The P&L attribution tests have 
received considerable attention in the media as the original specifications had a high failure rate. 
This quantitative study builds upon the work of Hermsen (2010) by investigating whether the 
introduction of these two additional requirements will incentivise the use of superior forecasting 
models, or have other impacts on risk and portfolio management practice. 
This chapter explains the rationale for the approach taken to the quantitative impact analysis, 
describes the methodology, explains each of the resolution methods and backtests chosen, and 
explains the P&L attribution tests and alternative tests deployed for comparison purposes. The 
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findings are presented in Chapter 8 and a discussion of the combined findings of the qualitative 




The change from VaR to ES is the headline event in the changes to the determination of minimum 
capital requirements for market risk under FRTB (BCBS 2016). This change elicits a muted 
response from the practitioners interviewed in the qualitative component of the study. Commonly 
the view that this is a ‘changing of the guard’ or a ‘window-dressing’ exercise is widely held 
among the Risk Management (RM) and Trading/Portfolio management (T) cohort. Further, there 
is an acknowledgment by members of the Regulatory/Advocacy/Consultancy (P) group that the 
change from VaR to ES is a means of distancing the new framework from the publicly perceived 
failings of VaR. It is widely perceived by the practitioners in our qualitative study, that the change 
to ES is merely a change in statistical measure: VaR as a point estimate at a 99% confidence level 
and ES as an average of the left tail of the P&L distribution beyond the 97.5% confidence level. 
Daníelsson et al. (2013) finds that, for conditionally normal processes, VaR at 99% and EW at 
97.5% are equivalent. Further, they have shown that ES is less robust than VaR, exhibiting higher 
sensitivity to the presence of outliers and the choice of calibration period. Daníelsson et al. (2016a) 
find that VaR is more accurate than ES using small sample sets (note that FRTB specifies 
calibration on 1yr of data FRTB ES) but that VaR is more easily gamed due to it being a point 
estimate that does not attempt to quantify the losses in the tail. The significant concerns raised 
about the ability to backtest ES, which primarily focused on whether ES is elicitable (Gneiting and 
Raftery 2007; Acerbi and Szekely 2014; Emmer et al. 2015), have been circumvented by using 
VaR instead in the backtesting framework. Kratz et al. (2018)  argue that using multinomial VaR 
backtests implicitly backtests ES. The FRTB backtesting framework does not adopt this 
multinomial approach but instead backtests VaR at 99% and 97.5% at desk level.  
The prerogative for banks to develop their own internal model including their choice of resolution 
model, remains central to FRTB, with the BCBS arguing that this is essential to enable a level 
playing field between banks in different jurisdictions (BCBS 2019). Although FRTB has retained 
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the role of internal models in the determination of market risk regulatory capital, they have added 
further qualifications to their use. Under FRTB, the use of internal models (regulatory VaR/ES) is 
now authorised at trading desk level rather than at entity level. Authorised use of internal models 
(regulatory VaR/ES) at desk level is subject to two criteria: Desk-level backtests and P&L 
attribution tests. This study focuses on the quantitative impact of the introduction of these 
additional criteria on risk and portfolio management. 
A key concern with the continued use of internal models is the level of variation in the results from 
internal models. This led to BCBS establishing RCAP, which involves the assessment of banks’ 
internal model using a hypothetical portfolio. A number of previous academic studies found 
significant variation in the VaR forecasts from banks’ resolution models, including Beder (1995) 
who found estimates varying by a factor of 14; Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) who found 
significant variation across banks’ resolution models though characterised the models as 
conservative; and Pritsker (1997) who found noteworthy variation in the accuracy of risk model 
forecasts, their complexity and computational time. The European Banking Authority (EBA) argue 
that the continued facilitation of internal models is only feasible with the introduction of the output 
floor, which specifies that the capital requirements under the internal model approach must not be 
less than 75% of those determined under the standardised approach (EBA 2019). This output floor 
limits the reduction in capital possible through the internal model approach. This limits the 
potential for deliberate underestimation of risk, and therefore capital, using the internal model.  
A myriad of VaR resolution models have been proposed in the literature. Angelidis and 
Degiannakis (2009) provide an interesting review. They identify three main schools: Non-
parametric (Example: Historical Simulation), Parametric (Most notably the ARCH15 family of 
models) and the semi-parametric, which combines attributes from the parametric and non-
parametric models (Example: Filtered Historical Simulation, Extreme Value Theory). There have 
been numerous studies that compare the performance of these candidate models. Hansen and 
Lunde (2005), for example, examined 330 ARCH-type models and found that the GARCH16(1,1) 
was not outperformed by any of the more complex ARCH models. A special case of GARCH is 
                                                 
15 Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity is a conditional volatility model whereby lagged returns are used to 
forecast future volatility (Engle 1982). 
16 Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (Bollerslev 1987). 
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Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA), which forms the basis for the RiskMetrics 
methodology. A number of studies have included this resolution model in a VaR/ES candidate 
resolution model assessment. One example is Billio and Pelizzon (2000) who find that EWMA 
serially underestimates risk. Haas et al. (2004) proposes a Markov-switching GARCH model and 
tests its performance on exchange rate time series, where it exhibited superior performance to other 
GARCH models. McNeil and Frey (1999) incorporate Extreme Value Theory into market risk 
modelling, and cite their 1998 study in which they find it outperforms other resolution models for 
95% VaR. Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) introduce realised volatility models. Giot and Laurent 
(2004) compare the performance of realised volatility models with ARCH family model, but 
conclude that there is no significant improvement.  
Evaluating and comparing the performance of VaR resolution models typically involves 
examining the results of backtests. Backtesting VaR or ES resolution models involves comparing 
forecasted losses with realised losses. There are a number of forms of backtesting, which we 
discuss later in the chapter but one primary method is the examination of exceedances, that is, 
when the realised losses exceed the forecast losses. Tunaru (2015) argues that backtesting is 
necessary to ensure that a resolution model does not under-estimate or over-estimates risk. 
Angelidis and Degiannakis (2009) argue that an appropriate VaR is necessary to ensure the correct 
allocation of capital. This is contrary to the findings of our qualitative study, which finds a 
preference for simpler models. Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) find a preference for conservative 
models, which initially require higher than appropriate levels of capital but are unable to react 
quickly to changing market conditions, thus experience clustered exceedances. There has been 
much criticism of the limitations of the backtesting method prescribed under Basel II including its 
low power to reject poorly performing models (Christoffersen and Pelletier 2004; Alexander 2009) 
and (Campbell 2006)). Under the Basel II backtest, only the frequency and not the magnitude of 
losses or their timing is considered. This results in large losses being treated with the same gravity 
as small losses. Without considering the timing of loss events, the phenomena of loss clustering 
will be overlooked. This is recognised in the BCBS collation of Messages from the academic 
literature on risk measurement for the trading book (2011). We examine whether the changes to 
the backtesting methodology prescribed in FRTB improves their power to reject poorly performing 
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models and thus incentivise deployment of superior performing resolution models. We further 
question if this is central to achieving adequate levels of regulatory capital. 
When VaR was given its regulatory mandate, according to the hypothesis attributed to Goodhart, 
it was destined to fail. This hypothesis posits that a statistical relationship used for policy purposes 
will inevitably lead to the breakdown of the relationship (Goodhart (1975) cited in Chrystal et al. 
2003). We find reference to this destined to fail philosophy in the responses of the practitioners: 
“VaR, I feel, is still a valuable concept but there was always going to be a problem with having it 
at a regulatory level. That was our undoing really.” (SRM8 2018); and “The 10 years up to 2008 
were driven not by using VaR as the risk measure but rather by using VaR as the regulatory capital 
requirement for doing business.” (SRM8 2018). 
The key to this inevitable breakdown is that any regulatory risk metric mechanism that sends a 
common signal to market participants has the propensity to result in a homogeneous response in 
volatile markets. This homogeneous response is more pronounced and more damaging in volatile 
markets. The VaR measure has received criticism since its inception for its procyclical nature 
(Danielsson et al. 2001), where volatile markets prompt higher levels of VaR, which in turn 
prompts higher levels of capital. This incentivised homogeneity is central to the fallacy of 
composition flaw of Basel II (Danielsson et al. 2011), whereby actions taken may be reasonable 
for the sustainability of one banking entity but may not be detrimental to the banking system. 
However Angelidis and Degiannakis (2009) argue that it is VaR’s internal risk management role, 
that contributes to procyclicality, particularly where its internal role includes capital allocation and 
defining risk limits.  
There are a number of studies that examine the performance of different VaR resolution models in 
the determination of market risk capital. Burchi (2013) examines the ability of different resolution 
models to simultaneously avoid underestimation and overallocation of regulatory capital.  His 
study evaluates the resolution models with respect to the resultant capital rather than the number 
of exceedances. Burchi (2013) has a number of interesting findings. For example, he finds that for 
low risk portfolios there is an indifference with respect to capital requirements to the choice of 
resolution model. In periods of low volatility, he finds that there was limited capital benefit in 
deploying more complex (expensive) resolution models. In volatile markets, it was clear that the 
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complex models reacted quickly and led to increased capital requirements, but as volatility 
dissipated, the complex models responded with reduced capital requirements. By comparison, he 
found that the simpler models were slow to react to increased volatility and therefore slow to 
increase capital requirements. When markets stabilised, the simpler models are penalised by the 
Basel II multiplier for exceedances incurred during the volatile period. He argues that the changing 
capital requirements of a complex model contrasted with the flattened capital demands of the 
simpler model does not incentivise the deployment of complex resolution models. Interestingly, 
he finds that the presence of the multiplier nullifies the importance of the resolution model. 
Rossignolo et al. (2012) argue that the choice of resolution method underpinning VaR for 
regulatory capital purposes should be limited to models such as EVT which are capable of dealing 
with large fluctuations.  
In our qualitative study, the interview responses from the risk management and trading cohorts, 
exhibited a preference for the underlying model to adhere to an intuitive forecasting mechanism, 
that is, avoid model complexity. Under the Miller-Power lens, we find that it is the comprehensible 
nature of simpler VaR models that enables reconciliation of different stakeholder perspectives. 
Furthermore, we find that there are system and resource constraints that would prohibit the 
development of more sophisticated models. The 2011 McKinsey survey of 18 banks (Mehta 2012) 
finds that over 75% use historical simulation as the VaR resolution method. This non-parametric 
approach is arguably the simplest of the resolution model approaches. Berkowitz and O’Brien 
(2002) find the deployment of conservative models that lack the ability to respond to changing 
volatility. Pritsker (1997) discusses the conflict between model accuracy and computational time 
(which can be considered as a cost). Minimising capital requirements whilst adhering to the Basel 
II backtesting criteria were the primary rationale for the choice of resolution method according to 
Mehta (2012). McAleer et al. (2013a) examine the impact of aggressive and conservative strategies 
of risk management on capital outcomes. Their study also compared the performance of different 
resolution models across the time period 2nd January 2008 to 12th February 2009, and found that 
different resolution models performed better over different sub-periods of this crisis period. Kou 
et al. (2013) find that risk measures used for external purposes should be robust to model 
misspecification and other aspects of model risk. There is a rich emerging literature in the area of 
model risk of risk models (White 2000; Bao et al. 2006; Esposito and Cummins 2016), which is a 
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promising area for future research. Hermsen (2010) finds that Basel II does not incentivise the use 
of models with more reasonable assumptions as this leads to higher levels of capital. They find 
that banks benefit (through reduced capital requirements) from the use of inferior performing 
models, contrary to the aims of Basel II. Cuoco and Liu (2006) find that VaR-based capital 
requirements incentivise prudential bank risk-taking and that the capital requirements adequately 
reflect the risk taken. We design our quantitative impact analysis to examine if the additional 
criteria for authorised use of internal models in FRTB (desk level backtests and P&L attribution 
tests) promote the deployment of internal models with superior forecasting ability and facilitate 
appropriate levels of capital to ensure stability of the banking system. Furthermore, we examine 
whether these additional criteria affect the practice of risk and portfolio management. 
 
7.3 Quantitative Impact Method Design 
 
FRTB has retained the role of internal models in the determination of market risk regulatory 
capital; however, they have added further qualifications to their use. Under FRTB, the use of 
internal models (regulatory VaR/ES) is now authorised at trading desk level rather than at entity 
level. Authorised use of internal models (regulatory VaR/ES) at desk level is subject to two criteria: 
Desk-level backtests and P&L attribution tests. This study focuses on the quantitative impact of 
the introduction of these additional criteria on risk and portfolio management. Furthermore, 
building on the work of Hermsen (2010), we examine whether these additional criteria incentivise 
the use of resolution methods with superior forecasting performance. 
Although FRTB replaces VaR with ES for the determination of market risk regulatory capital, 
model approval (at desk level) will remain subject to the performance of VaR. Backtesting VaR 
(at entity level) was the primary mechanism for internal model validation under Basel II 
requirements (BCBS 2006b). FRTB requires backtesting daily VaR at 99% calibrated on recent 
12mth period at bank level and  backtesting 99%VaR and 97.5% VaR at desk level (BCBS 2019). 
The approach to backtesting continues to be based upon the Bernoulli counting methodology 
(1995). Criticisms of this approach include its inability to capture dependence or magnitude of the 
exceedances. Internal model approval under Basel II, was subject to a traffic light system, whereby 
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increasing number of exceedances of daily VaR at 99% were subject to increases in a weighting 
factor (multiplier) applied in the capital calculation. An internal model with a count of exceedances 
greater than 10, would (Under Basel II) be prohibited from using their internal model in the 
determination of market risk regulatory capital. This meant a fall-back to capital calculation under 
the Standardised Approach (SA) which has been described as having a cliff effect (Nicolaus 2017). 
This is where prohibiting the use of a previously approved internal model leads to a dramatic 
increase in capital requirements. A Bernoulli counting approach at entity level prevails in FRTB 
with similar tolerances though revised multipliers. At desk level, 99% and 97.5% VaR will have 
threshold number of exceedances of 12 and 30 respectively.  
Internal model approval under FRTB will also be subject to Profit and Loss Attribution Tests (PLA 
tests). The PLA tests have received considerable attention in financial media (Nield 2017). 
Essentially the PLA tests measure the similarity between the (realised) profit and loss (P&L) 
distribution of the portfolio as measured under front office pricing (Hypothetical P&L, HPL) and 
the (realised) P&L distribution as modelled under risk management models (Risk Theoretical 
P&L, RTPL). Forecasting accuracy is key to the internal model approval process according to 
Farag (2018). However, we need to be clear that the PLA test analyses the appropriateness of the 
risk mappings deployed prior to the application of the VaR or ES resolution model, that is, prior 
to risk forecasting. The original specifications of the PLA test incorporated the joint test of mean 
and variance of the RTPL and the HPL. These were revised following the publication of the impact 
analysis wherein 70% of banks tested failed the PLA tests (Mehta et al. 2012). The PLA tests focus 
on the adequacy of the data going into the risk models to reflect the portfolio held. This is where 
a bank’s mapping of their portfolio to the risk factors modelled is examined. Mehta et al. (2012) 
find that most banks use a risk factor mapping approach rather than a full revaluation (modelling 
each component in the portfolio). The Spearman’s Rank correlation test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests are explicitly defined in the FRTB documentation and deviate somewhat from standard 
formulation17 of these tests. The tests are explained below. The March 2018 BCBS FRTB 
publication (BCBS D436) retained the option of a Chi-squared distributional test in the PLA test 
but, following feedback from industry, the final document excludes this option. Risk factor 
mapping is a technique used in risk modelling to map a large complex portfolio to a manageable 
                                                 
17 Formulation defined in software MatLab (Matlab R2018a). 
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number of appropriate risk factors using sensitivities to these risk factors (and typically the 
covariance of the risk factors). For equity portfolios, the sensitivity vector is the beta, which 
captures the sensitivity of the stock to the index (risk factor) which is taken to represent the 
(domestic) market. The P&L attribution tests evaluate the relationship between the full information 
used for pricing (front office pricing) and the information used in risk modelling. The tests require 
that these data sets are sufficiently correlated through the Spearman’s Rho test, and have the same 
distributional form through the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
Spearman correlation is a technique which can be used to summarise the strength and direction 
(negative or positive) of a relationship between two variables. In this way it is a statistical measure 
of the strength of a monotonic relationship between paired data. The calculation takes the two 
variables being compared and involves ranking the two sets of observations, then finding the sum 
of the squared difference of each observation’s rank. The Spearman correlation will be high when 
observations have a similar rank, that is, the relative position or rank of the observations within 
the variable.  
 
Figure 7.1 Illustration of Spearman correlation 
Intuitively, we can understand the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test as measuring the deviation between 
one distribution and another. The following graph shows the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test measuring 





Figure 7.2 Visualisation of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
The arrow demonstrates the measurement of the deviation between the Empirical CDF and the 
Standard Normal CDF. This measurement is taken at discrete or continuous values of X, with the 
maximum deviation used to determine the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. 
As discussed above, the purpose of the study is to examine quantitatively the impact of the 
introduction of two additional qualifying criteria for the use of internal models: desk-level backtest 
and PLA test. We are interested in their impact on the incentives to deploy superior performing 
resolution models and other impacts on risk and portfolio management practice. These research 
aims shape the design of the quantitative study. 
The PLA tests are designed to backtest the mapping of the portfolio to its risk factors by measuring 
the correlation (Spearman’s Rank) and similarities in distributional form (Kolmogorov-Smirnov) 
of the HPL and RTPL. Firstly, to test the impact of the PLA tests, we design a range of portfolios 
to examine whether particular characteristics promote or impede the likelihood of passing the tests. 




















modelling (such as covariance matrices, copulae), we design portfolios that can be mapped to one 
risk factor. For equity portfolios, equity indices are typically used as risk factors. Therefore, we 
select three different indexes (FTSE 100, Euro Stoxx 50, and S&P 500) as our risk factors and 
systematically select different ranges of stocks from each index to form the portfolios. In this way, 
our experiment design tests the relevance of different portfolio characteristics on the propensity 
for the portfolio-to-risk-factor mapping to pass the PLA tests. We are interested to investigate if 
the results indicate requirements to change risk modelling practices or portfolio management 
practices. 
Secondly, we examine the desk-level backtests as prescribed under FRTB. We want to examine if 
they have improved power to reject poorly performing resolution models and thereby incentivise 
the use of superior forecasting resolution models. We design our quantitative analysis to include 
four popular resolution models, some of which have unreasonable assumptions (e.g. Normal 
Linear VaR) in the terminology of Hermsen (2010). We backtest these models under a spectrum 
of nine backtests at two confidence levels 97.5% and 99%, including the FRTB desk-level backtest 
specifications. We use the equity portfolios as described above so that we can make comparisons 
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This schematic diagram shows the desk-level backtesting framework for FRTB internal models. 
Additional tests have been added for comparison purposes. Note that the probability integral 
transform (PIT) tests are identified as a reporting requirement but do not form part of the criteria 
for internal model approval. We can also see from the diagram, that the PLA tests review the data 
being put into the resolution model and thus, are designed to act as data integrity tests. 
The following sections explain the four resolution methods chosen: Normal Linear VaR, Historical 
Simulation, Exponentially Weighted Moving Average and GARCH. These resolution methods are 
chosen as they (or a close variation) are the most popular models deployed by banks (Mehta et al. 
2012). We also explain each of the backtests and distributional tests deployed together with an 
exposition of the PLA tests. 
7.4 Resolution Methods 
 
Resolution Methods 
Normal Linear (Variance-Covariance) 
Historical Simulation 
Exponentially Weighted Moving Average 
GARCH(1,1) 
Table 7.1 VaR resolution methods 
7.4.1 Normal Linear VaR 
 
We have adopted the terminology Normal Linear VaR as promoted by Alexander (2009) but this 
resolution method may also be referenced as Variance-Covariance VaR. This resolution method 
is appropriate for portfolios whose risk factor returns are normally distributed, their joint 
distributions multivariate normal, and a covariance matrix captures the dependencies. Under these 
conditions using α as the significance level18and h as the liquidity horizon, we can formulate the 
classic expression for VaR: 
 𝑉𝑎𝑅ℎ,𝛼 = Ф
−1(1 − 𝛼)𝜎ℎ − 𝜇ℎ (7.1) 
                                                 
18 Note that 1-α is the confidence level 
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where σh is the volatility over the risk horizon h, μh is the mean over the risk horizon h, and Ф
−1is 
the inverse standard normal distribution function. 
In the multivariate case σhis replaced by the covariance matrix. In systematic VaR, the portfolio 
is mapped to its risk factors. This is a popular approach for banks with large complex portfolios 
(Mehta et al. 2012). The systematic return (i.e. the portfolio return that is explained by the risk 
factors) can be expressed: 





where Xi are the returns on risk factor i, θicapture the portfolio’s sensitivity to risk factor i, and n 
is the number of risk factors. 
We then determine the expression for Systematic (Risk-factor) Normal Linear VaR: 
 
 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼,ℎ =  Ф
−1(1 − 𝛼)√𝜃′𝛺ℎ𝜃 (7.3) 
 
where Ωhis the covariance matrix of risk factors. 
Note that Betas are used to capture the sensitivity of the portfolio to equity indices.  
The assumption of normality for financial returns time series has been disputed since the work of 
Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1965). Pafka and Kondor (2001) find that the neglecting the 
occurrence of fat tails is not significant at 95% confidence level but that for higher confidence 




7.4.2 Historical Simulation 
 
According to a survey carried out by McKinsey & Company global management consultants 
(Mehta et al. 2012), historical simulation is the VaR resolution methodology used by 75% of banks 
surveyed. The historical simulation method is an empirical approach that implicitly assumes 
historical time series observations are indicative of future observations. In terms of variable 
dependencies, historical simulation avoids a reductive dependency structure and instead assumes 
that dependencies are captured by how variables moved together contemporaneously. It’s 
attraction as a non-parametric unconditional quantile method is primarily driven by the exclusion 
of the assumption of normality, therefore it is more suited to model time series with fat tails which 
we observe in practice (Pritsker 2006). This advantage is dampened by its sensitivity to the choice 
of calibration period length (Beder 1995). Note that here, a calibration period is not used to 
determine parameters but provides the granularity of the empirical historical returns series. A long 
data series can have a dampening effect, whereby recent extreme values of returns are diminished 
by the length of the series, and for VaR these would be in the tail beyond the VaR level. A short 
calibration period can lead to very few observations in the tail. Using historical simulation for ES 
means that ES is sensitive to (new) extreme observations as it estimates the average of the losses 
in the tail. The key disadvantage of Historical Simulation is that when it derives the empirical 
cumulative distribution it assume equal weighting for each observation. This implicitly assumes 
that the returns are independently and identically distributed, and that recent returns have the same 
relevance (for forecasting) as more dated observations. Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw  
(1998) propose an alternative approach which applies an exponential weighting to historical 
returns using the exponential decay factor, λ. However, Pritsker (2006) find that HS and EW-HS 
are unable to see increases in P&L as an increase in risk (increase in volatility) as they focus on 
the left tail of the distribution and volatility is not captured in the empirical measure. Another key 
issue with historical simulation is the liquidity horizon. As an empirical measure, it takes daily 
returns to determine an empirical cumulative distribution of 1-day returns. Under Basel II, banks 
were required to determine the 10-day VaR and permitted scaling by√10. This scaling assumption 
is only mathematically sound when the underlying distribution is alpha stable. An alpha stable 
distribution is one where the linear combination of variables from the distribution have the same 
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distribution. This property is important when using daily returns observations to infer distributional 
characteristics about longer periods. This property applies to Normal, Cauchy and Frechet 
distributions (with differing power scales). Alexander (2009) demonstrates the significance of 
miscalculation of VaR using the square root scaling rule when empirically a power law scaling 
with a different exponent is more appropriate. When the appropriate scale exponent is greater than 
0.5, the square root scaling law significantly underestimates VaR. Under FRTB, the requirement 
is a base horizon of 10-days. A longer calibration period runs into the problem of incorporating 
different volatility regimes. Rohde (2015) argues that a risk measure should be sensitive to breaks 
in volatility. Using a shorter calibration period reduces the likelihood of incorporating different 
volatility regimes. An alternative would be to use overlapping 10-day periods but that introduces 
a correlation effect. A proposed solution to this is Filtered Historical Simulation. Barone-Adesi et 
al. (2002) use Filtered Historical Simulation to circumvent the issue of short calibration period 
whilst avoiding the pitfalls of resampling using traditional bootstrapping approaches which can 




Moving Average (MA) volatility models, simply take the sample standard error from a set of 
returns, whereby, as we move through time, the newest observation is added and the oldest 
observation is dropped. Empirically, this model performs badly, but is significantly improved 
when an exponential weighting is applied. The exponential aspect infers a concave distribution of 
weightings whereby the greater weights are applied to more recent (and therefore more relevant) 










  (7.4) 
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where 𝑊𝐸 is the length of the estimation window, ytis the return on day t, σ̂t is the volatility 
estimate for day t and λ is the decay factor. λ can take values between 0 and 1. However the most 
common assumption (and that originally deployed by RiskMetrics) is for λ to take the value 0.94 
for daily returns (Danielsson 2011). The fixed value of λ for all assets can sit uncomfortably for 
modelling purists but its ease of implementation makes it a popular choice of resolution model. 
 
7.4.4 GARCH (p,q) 
 
Engle (1982) addressed the issue of the implausible assumption of constant variance with the 
introduction of Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) processes. The key 
property introduced is the non-constant variance, conditional on the past. Let 𝑦𝑡 represent the series 
of returns. In this framework we assume 𝑦𝑡 can be decomposed: 
 
  𝑦𝑡 = 𝐸(𝑦𝑡|𝐼𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡  (7.5) 
 
where It−1 is the information set at time t-1 and εt is the random component. εt can be expressed 
as an ARCH process of the following form: εt = ztσt where zt is i.i.d. ~(0,1). 
Engle (1982) introduced the ARCH (q) model where the conditional variance is expressed as a 
linear combination of q lagged squared innovations: 
 
 𝜎𝑡






where 𝑎𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑎0 > 0. 
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Bollerslev (1986) introduced a generalised ARCH, (GARCH(p,q)) where conditional variance is 














The GARCH (p,q) primarily addressed the empirical observation of volatility clustering, where, 
as described by Mandelbrot (1997): large changes seem to be followed by large changes and small 
changes seem to follow small changes. 
A vast family of models with the GARCH properties have emerged in the literature. Black(1976) 
observes that returns volatility tends to increase with a negative shock (bad news) and decrease 
with a positive shock (good news). This phenomena has become known as the leverage effect and 
lead to the development of a number of extensions to the GARCH models to capture this 
asymmetric effect. For example: Exponential GARCH (E-GARCH) (Nelson 1991), GJR-GARCH 
(Glosten et al. 1993), and Asymmetric Power GARCH (AP-GARCH) (Ding et al. 1993). This lead 
to Brooks and Persand (2000) declaring that VaR models that did not capture this phenomenon 
would generate inaccurate forecasts.  To further address the issue of fat tails in the distribution, 
innovations from the Student-t distribution were used by Bollerslev (1987). Angelidis et al. (2004) 
test three different GARCH models (GARCH, TGARCH19 and EGARCH20) using five stock 
indices, a range of calibration period lengths and three different distributional forms, found that 
sample size was important, leptukurtic distributions performed better but that there was no 
consistent best performing conditional volatility model. However, they did find that an E-GARCH 
with a student-t distribution performed adequately in each market (2004).  
 
                                                 
19 Threshold GARCH or TGARCH is used to capture the leverage effect (Angelidis et al. 2004). 





When we model phenomena in order to produce a forecast of future potential values, the empirical 
philosophy provides an onus to assess the performance. The philosophical essence of empirical 
work is examining the application of the theory. For many forecast models, measuring the 
forecasted outcome against the realised outcome can be used to evaluate the performance of the 
forecast model. In market risk management, it is more typical that a distribution of outcomes is 
produced. For VaR, we take the appropriate quantile from that distribution to indicate potential 
loss at the specified confidence level. It is therefore not reasonable to measure the deviation 
between the realised P&L and the forecast VaR level as this is not a forecast of the likely P&L 
outcome but a measure of potential loss at a confidence level. Therefore, the focus of the empirical 
analysis must concentrate on the tail of the distribution where we experience losses. Backtesting 
is a key empirical approach to assessing the performance of the risk forecasting model. VaR 
backtesting has typically focused on exceedances, that is, occurrences where the observed loss has 
been higher that the VaR amount at the prescribed confidence level, noting of course, that VaR is 
a loss amount although conventionally quoted as a positive figure.  
Backtesting became a de facto model validation approach under Basel II, and the absence of 
prescribed model validation and governance measures received much criticism (Christoffersen and 
Pelletier 2004; Alexander 2009). Measures to address these shortcomings have been developed 
unilaterally by central banks, for example: TRIM, SR11-7, etc. These are discussed in Chapter 2. 
Approval for the use of a bank’s internal market risk model for the determination of regulatory 
capital was subject to its performance under the prescribed backtest (BCBS 2006b). One of the 
key motivating factors for banks to deploy an internal model in determining market risk capital 
under the Basel II regime was the significant reduction in market risk capital relative to deploying 
the standardised approach. We also find from the qualitative study that the internal constraints of 
technology, personnel resources and management ‘buy-in’, have an impact on the choice of risk 
model, with simpler, less resource-impactful models being favoured (McKinsey survey Mehta et 
al. 2012).  This led to the emergence of two key conflicting goals in evaluating the performance 
of candidate risk models: Model passes the backtests required for internal approval; Model forecast 
accuracy results in minimisation of market risk regulatory capital. With the additional constraint 
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on impact on resources and acceptance by end-users. Under the Basel II framework, the choice to 
seek approval for an internal model is due to the significant reduction in regulatory capital relative 
to the hugely conservative standardised approach. However, the incremental benefit of having a 
risk model that performs well as a forecast (and therefore further minimises market risk capital) 
does not appear to be incentivise deployment of (more complex) better performing models (Haas 
2001; Lucas 2001; Hermsen 2010). Hendricks and Hirtle (1997) warn that the benefits attributed 
to model based capital requirements are undermined by the use of poor performance models. They 
define these benefits: The alignment of capital with risk exposure; Enabling a bank’s 
understanding of changes in risk exposure; and facilitating comparison between institutions. 
Range of backtests deployed 
Test Code Bookmark 
Binomial Test BIN 7.10 
Basel II Traffic Light TL Table 7.3 
Proportion of Failures (Kupiec 1995) POF 7.11 
Time Until First Failure (Kupiec 1995) TUFF 7.14 
Independence Tests (Christoffersen 1998) CC 7.12 
Time Between Failures (Haas 2001) TBFI 7.18 
Combined POF & Independence CCI 7.13 
Combined Coverage TBF  TBF 7.19 
FRTB Desk Level 99% (12)    FRTB_99  
FRTB Desk Level 97.5% (30)   FRTB_97.5   
Table 7.2 List of Backtests performed 
 
7.5.1 Coverage and Independence backtests 
 
Backtesting tests can be grouped into three main types: unconditional coverage, independence and 
conditional coverage tests. The coverage concept comes from the expression of VaR at a particular 
significance level α, where implicitly if VaR is correct then there is α% likelihood that loss 
observations exceeding VaR will occur. We can define the Bernoulli indicator function with 𝐼𝑡 
taking the value 1 when the loss exceeds VaR and zero otherwise. The Bernoulli indicator function 
is sometimes referred to as the ‘success’ or ‘hit’ function. 
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 𝐼𝑡 = {









 where 𝑁1 is the count of It = 1 over a testing period of TP observations.   
 
According to Tunaru (2015), the appropriate range of values of VR for the VaR model to be 
considered adequate is [0.8, 1.2]. This is consistent with the first moment of the Bernoulli function, 
where the expectation equals . 𝑇𝑃 . 
An alternative approach is to transform this ratio into a value that (approximately for N≥ 250) 






Critical values at 95% confidence level are taken. 
This Bernoulli indicator function also provides the basis for the Basel II (BCBS 2010b) backtesting 
mechanism which has been dubbed the Traffic Light (TL) backtest. Here, the count of hits, where 
It = 1. is mapped to green, amber or red with a corresponding multiplier k which is used to 
translate VaR levels into market risk capital requirements. The prescribed size of the sample period 
was 250 1-day VaR estimates at 99% confidence level.  
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Basel II traffic light backtests 
 
Table 7.3 Basel II Traffic Light TL mechanism for backtests21. Source BCBS 2006 
 
FRTB desk-level backtests at 99% and 97.5% confidence levels use a Bernoulli counting 
measure also. The internal model is deemed approved (subject to the PLA tests and other risk 
governance criteria) if it does not exceed 12 (FRTB_99) exceedances under the 99%  confidence 
level and 30 (FRTB_97_5) exceedances under the 95% confidence level (BCBS 2019). 
 
Kupiec’s Proportion of Failures (POF) test provides an alternative unconditional coverage test 
(Kupiec 1995) which is also based on the number of exceedances. Exceedances can be interpreted 
as a hit or success in the Bernoulli indicator function, that is, where the observed loss exceeds the 




𝑛1 (1 − 𝜋𝑒𝑥𝑝)
𝑛0
𝜋𝑜𝑏𝑠
𝑛1 (1 − 𝜋𝑜𝑏𝑠)𝑛0
 (7.11) 
 Where: 
πexp is the expected proportion of exceedances (i.e. α), 
πobs is the observed proportion of exceedances, 
 
                                                 
21 The multiplier is used to scale capital requirements. 
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n is the sample size of the backtest, 
n1 is the observed number of exceedances, 









Escanciano and Olmo (2010) argue that the results from this (and other) backtests may be 
misleading if care is not taken with the effect of the forecasting scheme on statistical inference 
(recursive, rolling, and fixed out-of-sample). They found significant size distortions for the Kupiec 
test.  
The key criticism of these unconditional coverage tests is that they are based on a counting 
methodology that determines how many exceedances have occurred in the specified period but 
does not consider the magnitude of the exceedances, the timing of the exceedances and the 
clustering of exceedances. Clearly, exceedances of a large magnitude present a significant issue 
for banks in terms of the ability of the risk model to utilise market information to forecast 
accurately. The clustering of exceedances is referred to as the issue of independence. Clustered 
exceedances indicate an inability for the risk model to react to new information and to consider 
the conditional nature of volatility and returns.  This would indicate that the bank is underfunded 
for market risk capital events for an extended period of high volatility. Boucher et al. (2014) define 
three desirable criteria of a risk model: the number of exceedances is consistent with expectation, 
the absence of exceedance clustering and that the magnitude of exceedances be proportionate to 
the underlying distributional assumptions.  
Tests for independence formalise the belief that if exceedances are not independent, then the 
occurrence of an exceedance increases the likelihood of observing another exceedance the 
following day. That is, the expectation of an exceedance is no longer equal to α. Christoffersen 
(1998) developed the following Independence (CC22)test statistic: 
                                                 





𝑛1 (1 − 𝜋𝑜𝑏𝑠)
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Where, in addition to the Kupiec test above, 
nij is the number of returns with indicator value i followed by indicator value 
j, 
π01is the proportion of exceedances given that the last return had an indicator 
value of 0, 
π11is the proportion of exceedances given that the last return had an indicator 
value of 1, 





One key issue with this approach to independence testing is that it will only identify clustering if 
it occurs in consecutive exceedances (Alexander 2009). 
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Kupiec (1995) also proposed an alternative test, Time to first failure (TUFF) and duration-based 
tests for independence and conditional coverage. The TUFF test looks at when the first exceedance 












𝑛−1  (7.14) 
 
Where n is the number of days to the first exceedance, 





Haas (2001) developed this concept further into a Time Between Failures Independence (TBFI) 
test which is a duration-based test. These type of tests use the principle that the time between 
exceedances should be memoryless if they follow a Bernoulli i.i.d. We can express this formally: 
Let d be the time until the next exceedance occurs: 
 𝑑𝑖 = 𝜏𝑖 − 𝜏𝑖−1 (7.15) 
Where 𝜏𝑖 is the time at which the i
th exceedance occurs, 
 𝑃(𝑑 = 𝑘) = 𝑓(𝑘) = 𝜋(1 − 𝜋)𝑘−1 (7.16) 
For any positive k. We can then use the hazard function: 
 𝜆(𝑘) = 𝑃(𝑑 = 𝑘|𝑑 ≥ 𝑘) =
𝑓(𝑘)
1 − 𝐹(𝑘 − 1)
 (7.17) 
F is the cumulative distribution function of d  
f  is the probability density function of d 
This allows us to arrive at the test statistic: 
 𝐿𝑅𝑇𝐵𝐹𝐼 = ∑













 where  
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 ni is the time between exceedances. 
x is the total number of exceedances 
-2Ln(LRTBFI) is asymptotically distributed with χ
2(x). 
 
This test can be combined with the Kupiec POF to derive the combined or Conditional Coverage 
Time-Between-Failures test. 
 𝐿𝑅𝑇𝐵𝐹 = 𝐿𝑅𝑇𝐵𝐹𝐼 +  𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  (7.19) 
 
 
7.5.2 Power of Backtesting 
 
Another key criticism of the Basel II backtesting methodology is the 250 day estimation period for 
testing daily VaR results in a low power test ((Lucas 2001), (Campbell 2006), and (Røynstrand et 
al. 2012)). Campbell (2006) finds that backtests that examine several quantiles have improved 
statistical power over tests which examine one quantile only. The FRTB backtesting framework 
does require the testing of two quantiles of VaR. However, it tests these quantiles independently 
rather than requiring a joint quantile test. This is a missed opportunity to increase the power of the 
backtests. 
By the nature of their objectives, the backtests are primarily exceedance-driven. This can 
incentivise the implementation of conservative risk models that will overestimate the risk forecast. 
However, these conservative models are often not reactive to emerging events, which can then 
lead to a clustering of exceedances such as were observed during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
The Time Between Failures test is designed to capture the potential of a model to give rise to 
clustered exceedances but this would only be exhibited in a volatile test period. When the backtests 
are performed on a benign test period, model weaknesses are less likely to be revealed. The FRTB 
backtesting framework specifies using a test period of the most recent 12 months with calibration 
on the previous 12 months. However, in contrast, the calculative framework for determining 
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market risk regulatory capital requires ES calibrated on a 12 month period within the timeframe 
of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Backtesting using a stressed period would be a more rigorous 
foundation for evaluating model performance.  
Another concern regarding the specifications of the desk-level backtesting framework is the 
threshold values for both VaR at 99% and 97.5% confidence levels. These values of 12 and 30 
exceedances in a 250 day test period are in excess of the expected value of the binomial distribution 
of exceedances. At the corresponding significant levels of 1% and 2.5%, the expected number of 
exceedances is 2.5 and 6.25 with standard deviation of 1.57 and 2.47 respectively. A VaR 
exceedance of 12 at the 99% confidence level is equivalent to the expected value of 2.5 plus six 
standard deviations. A VaR exceedance of 30 at the 97.5% confidence level is equivalent to the 
expected value of 2.5 plus nine standard deviations. The rationale for permitting additional 
leniency in the desk-level backtests is not explained in the Basel documentation. The entity level 
backtest deploys a traffic light system similar to the Basel II framework but using a different 
weighting system to that deployed in Basel II as documented above.  
The FRTB documentation discusses the issue of TYPE I and TYPE II errors arising in backtesting. 
The additional leniency in the prescribed thresholds appears to be a means of reducing the 
likelihood of incurring TYPE II errors (the erroneous rejection of a sound model) but significantly 
increases the likelihood of a TYPE I error (erroneously validating an inadequate model). We can 
intuit that the ability to reject an internal models at desk level on the basis of their backtests is very 
weak. We will test this empirically by comparing the performance of various models and portfolios 




7.6 P&L Attribution Tests 
 
The arguable weak power of the FRTB desk-level backtests appears to contradict the aspirations 
of the FRTB framework to address structural shortcomings that came to light in the financial crisis, 
including an overhaul of the internal models approach. This apparent weakness is incongruous 
with the additional modelling rigour introduced through the P&L attribution tests. In general, the 
purpose of attribution tests is to assess the adequacy of the attributes used to model a phenomenon. 
Often labelled goodness-of-fit tests, whereby the modelled phenomenon are compared to the 
realised observations of the phenomenon. Backtesting was assumed to be a more appropriate 
means of assessing market risk models because they focus on the left tail (losses) and exceedances 
in particular. The attributes of importance under the PLA tests are correlation and distributional 
form. The introduction of the P&L attribution tests has received significant media attention23. The 
original terminology focused on unexplained P&L and used its mean and variance as the basis for 
the test. A 2015 BCBS interim impact analysis found that while 88% of participating banks passed 
the criteria for the mean, 75% failed to meet the criteria for the variance component (BCBS 2015). 
However, only a small number of banks participating in the overall Basel III quantitative impact 
study provide information on the PLA tests (16 out of 78). Further impact analysis and consultation 
exercises resulted in revisions to the measures used and the definition of the P&L being compared. 
The finalised FRTB documentation requires the assessment of the P&L attributes through the 
Spearman’s Rho correlation test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distribution test. We examine 
empirically the challenge of passing the P&L attribution tests and compare the results with 
alternative tests. Although the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Spearman’s correlation tests are standard 
statistical tests, FRTB has prescribed the required method of determination. The differences are 
outlined below. We compare results from the standard interpretation of the tests with the FRTB 
prescribed tests. The application of distribution tests requires pre-eminence of the fit in the left tail 
of the distribution. Therefore, we shall compare the test results under the FRTB specified 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Anderson-Darling test, which focuses on the tails of the 
distribution. 
                                                 
23 Risk Magazine: P&L test in Europe's FRTB may not work (2017) 
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The range of distributional tests deployed are: 
P&L attribution tests and alternatives 
Correlation Spearman's Rho (FRTB) 
  Spearman's Rho (standard) 
Distribution test Kolmogorov-Smirnov (FRTB) 
  Kolmogorov-Smirnov (standard) 
  Anderson-Darling 
Table 7.4 P&L attribution tests and alternatives 
 
The rationale for the PLA test is to examine the materiality of simplifications of the model through 
deviations in correlation and distributional form between the risk-theoretical P&L (RTPL24) and 
the hypothetical P&L (HPL).  Hypothetical P&L is defined in the 2019 BCBS documentation as: 
“the daily P&L produced by revaluing the positions held at the end of the previous day using the 
market data at the end of the current day.” (BCBS 2019). Risk Theoretical P&L is defined: “The 
RTPL is the daily trading desk-level P&L that is produced by the valuation engine of the trading 
desk’s risk management model.” (BCBS 2019). The final published document on FRTB 
acknowledges the potential impact of a mechanism whereby failure of the PLA test would result 
in an automatic switch to SA, therefore they have devised a graduated mechanism using traffic 
light tiering for the two components of the PLA test. 
 
7.6.1 FRTB Spearman’s Rank Correlation calculation 
 
The PLA test, carried out quarterly using 12mth data, uses two metrics, Spearman’s Rank and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Spearman’s Rank correlation (SR) measures the correlation between 
RTPL and HPL. The HPL and RTPL are ranked with the lowest value of each given the ranking 
of 1, second ranked 2, etc. These two series are named 𝑅𝐻𝑃𝐿and 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑃𝐿 respectively. The 
                                                 
24 Defined in MAR32: “The RTPL is the daily trading desk-level P&L that is produced by the valuation engine of the 
trading desk’s risk management model” (BCBS 2019, p.84). 
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Spearman’s Rank correlation and standard deviation of 𝑅𝐻𝑃𝐿and 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑃𝐿are calculated and the 





This test statistic is categorised under the following criteria: 
Green Amber Red 
S > 0.8  0.7 < S <0.8 S < 0.7 
Table 7.5 Spearman correlation 
7.6.2 Standard Spearman’s Rank Correlation 
 
The Standard Spearman’s test refers to the application of Pearson’s correlation to ranked samples 





where d is the distance between 𝑅𝐻𝑃𝐿and 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑃𝐿and n is the length of the data series. 
7.6.3 FRTB Kolmogorov-Smirnov calculation 
 
The process of computing the second component of the PLA test, the Komogorov-Smirnov (KS) 
test, is specified in the FRTB documentation. The empirical cumulative distribution of HPL is 
derived by taking each HPL observation, determining how many HPL observations are less than 
or equal to it, and multiplying 0.004 (Equates to dividing by 250). Similarly, the empirical 
cumulative distribution of RTPL is determined. The KS test metric is the largest absolute 
difference between these two empirical distributions at any P&L level. The KS test metric is 
categorised under the following criteria: 
Green Amber Red 
KS < 0.09 0.09< KS < 0.12 KS > 0.12 
Table 7.6 Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
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Tests that show the desk operates in the green zone (Spearman correlation>0.8 and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov <0.09) will be permitted to use their internal model. Desks with test results in the red 
zone will not be permitted to use their internal model. Desks with test results in the amber zone 
will be able to use their internal model but will be subject to a capital adjustment dependent on the 
scale of the performance issue across the entity (remember this test is carried out at desk level). 
7.6.4 Standard Kolmogorov-Smirnov calculation 
 
The Standard two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test measures the absolute difference between 





(|?̂?1(𝑥) − ?̂?2(𝑥)|) (7.21) 
 
where F̂1(x) is the proportion of x1 values less than x, and F̂2(x) is the proportion of x2 values less 
than x (Lilliefors 1967). 
A standard 95% critical level is deployed. 
7.6.5 Andersen-Darling Test 
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test focuses on the difference between the two distributions (realised 
and hypothetical) around the centre. However, we are typically more interested in the fit of the 
forecasted distribution in the tail. The Andersen-Darling test is a modified Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test that shifts the focus to the tails.  
Let 𝐹𝑅 and 𝐹𝐻𝑦𝑝 represent the realised and hypothetical cumulative distributions. We are testing 














Our empirical analysis involves applying the two versions of Spearman’s Rank correlation, two 
versions of Kolmogorov-Smirnov distribution test along with the Anderson-Darling test to a range 
of portfolios and a range of models. The research question we are addressing is how the FRTB 
calculative framework impacts risk modelling and portfolio management choices. We have 
selected portfolios of stocks that exhibit particular characteristics with varying degrees of 
prominence. We examine whether these characteristics increase or decrease the likelihood of 
passing the PLA tests. We question whether the FRTB prescribed PLA tests assess the attributes 
of the two P&L (Risk theoretical and hypothetical) with similar vigour to comparable tests. That 
is, whether the FRTB prescribed tests exhibit similar results to the alternative measures.  
7.7 Summation 
 
In summary, this chapter has introduced the design of the quantitative impact study. This 
quantitative study is informed and shaped by insights from the qualitative study. In particular, the 
qualitative study found that practitioners viewed the changes in FRTB as merely a change of 
statistical measure that would not impact on trading and risk management practice. Furthermore, 
the study by Hermsen (2010) finds that Basel II does not incentivise banks to deploy market risk 
resolution models with superior predictive performance. We focus on the introduction of two new 
criteria introduced for the qualified use of internal models. These additional criteria are P&L 
attribution tests and desk level backtests. We examine whether these extra criteria enhance the 
incentives for banks to deploy superior forecasting models. Furthermore, we examine if these 
added qualifiers affect the practice of risk and portfolio management.  
The P&L attribution tests are designed to measure the adequacy of the mapping of the portfolio to 
its risk factors. For equity portfolios, indexes are typically used as risk factors. To ring-fence the 
mapping relationship, we systematically select portfolios of stocks from an index with varying 
degrees of a characteristic (such as the beta of a stock). The index itself is the risk factor. We test 
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the relationship between the portfolios and the risk factors using the P&L attribution tests (and 
alternatives) to examine if the characteristic had any effect on the propensity of the portfolios 
passing the P&L attribution tests. We carry this out for three indexes: FTSE 100, EURO STOXX 
50, and S&P500. 
The desk-level backtests under FRTB use a Bernoulli counting mechanism with a tolerance of 12 
and 30 exceedances for VaR at 99% and 97.5% respectively. We test the above portfolios using 
four different VaR resolution models (HS, Normal linear VaR, EWMA, and GARCH(1,1)), under 
8 backtests at 97.5% and 99% confidence levels. We examine the results to see how the FRTB 
backtests compare to other available backtests and if the introduction of these desk-level backtests 
improve incentives for banks to deploy superior resolution models. We cross-reference the results 
from the P&L attribution tests and the backtests to examine if there are any conflicts or 
collaborations that could potentially affect risk and portfolio management practice. Our results are 
outlined in Chapter 8. They are discussed together with the results from the qualitative study in 
Chapter 9.  
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The key research question that this quantitative impact study aims to address is to investigate the 
impact of FRTB on the practice of market risk management and portfolio management. The first 
component of this PhD study is a qualitative study of VaR, which examines perspectives of 
practitioners in the banking sector. The findings of the qualitative study shape and inform the 
quantitative impact study. The introduction of FRTB changes the role of VaR within the market 
risk regulatory framework; ES succeeds VaR as the primary risk metric used to determine market 
risk capital requirements. One of the key findings from the qualitative evaluation of VaR and its 
changing role within the regulatory framework is the perception that FRTB entails a change of 
metric at the end of the risk calculation process and that FRTB will have limited impact on 
trading/portfolio management. The purpose of our quantitative impact analysis is to examine the 
potential impact of the revised market risk capital calculation framework under FRTB. In 
particular, we examine the influence of two new components of the framework, which determine 
whether a banking entity will be authorised to use their internal risk model (regulatory VaR model) 
for the calculation of market risk capital: PLA tests and desk-level backtests. We discuss the 
importance of internal model authorisation in Chapter 2. However, key to the importance (to 
banks) of internal models is their potential to reduce market risk capital requirements significantly. 
Benink and Kaufman (2008) find that the use of internal models in the determination of market 
risk capital creates perverse incentives and encourages gaming VaR to minimise market risk 
regulatory capital. Hermsen (2010) finds that Basel II does not incentivise the use of resolution 
models with superior forecasting performance. We have designed our quantitative impact analysis 
to examine whether these additional qualifiers (PLA tests and desk-level backtests) address this 
shortfall and incentivise the deployment of superior resolution models. Furthermore, our analysis 
focuses on empirically evaluating the potential for these two new components (PLA tests and desk-




Sections 8.2 and 8.3 examine the results from the PLA tests plus the alternative tests used for 
comparison purposes. Section 8.4 examines the results from the backtests in which the forecasts 
from four resolution models are subject to a range of backtests including the FRTB desk-level 
backtests. Finally, section 8.5 collaborates the findings from the PLA test study and that of the 
desk-level backtests. 
 
8.2 Quantitative impact examination of PLA tests 
 
The dual aspect of the PLA tests measure the adequacy of the data used in the risk models to 
capture the attributes of the assets held in the (desk’s) portfolio. The tests assesses the adequacy 
of the mapping to the risk factors over the test period. This complements the Risk Factor Eligibility 
Test (RFET), which assess the observability and liquidity of proposed risk factors (BCBS 2019). 
The criteria for desk designation is specified in the BCBS FRTB final documentation, where a 
clear market rationale for the desk is a key characteristic (BCBS 2019). That is, a trading desk’s 
activity cannot be designed so that it meets the requirements of the PLA tests and desk-level 
backtests. 
In order to segregate the adequacy of the risk factor mapping over the test period, we have 
systemically selected portfolios of listed stocks in an index, which map to the index as a single risk 
factor. Equity portfolios are typically mapped to their risk factors using stock betas (Alexander 
2009, p.26). Betas measure the volatility of the stock relative to the market. Market indices are 
used to represent the market. Therefore, betas typically measure the volatility of the stock relative 
to the market index. The stock portfolios are selected to exhibit varying degrees of two 
characteristics: market capitalisation and portfolio beta. Risk factor mapping is a popular means 
of modelling the risk in large bank portfolios. The alternative of a full revaluation would have 
significant system and temporal implications (Mehta et al. 2012). We choose three indexes that 
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are accepted market proxies (Banz 1981): FTSE 10025, Euro Stoxx 5026, and S&P 50027. For our 
three indices, we begin with a portfolio of twenty stocks, which we then increase in size in a 
stepwise manner through adding additional stocks in graduated way, based on market 
capitalisation or beta. For example, beginning with 1-20, then 1-40, etc. (See Figure 8.1). We also 
apply two different approaches to stock weighting: equally weighted or proportionally weighted 
relative to their weighting in the index (as per day zero of the test period)28. We download index 
prices, constituent members, free-float shares and share prices for a 2yr period from Bloomberg 
(Bloomberg 2019). See Table 8.1 below for range of stock portfolios from each index. Some data 
cleaning was required with respect to different holiday conventions for stocks and indices. The 
effect of index constituent changes, though minimal, were minimised over the test period. 
Adjustments made to index levels due to corporate actions (Example: share adjustments, initial 
public offerings, mergers and acquisitions) complicate the mapping from constituent prices and 
weightings to the index level. However, we rationalised that this enigma occurs in practice so 
sanitising this issue would be unrepresentative.  
The focus of the design of the PLA tests element of the quantitative impact study is to investigate 
whether particular characteristics (market capitalisation, stock beta) and approaches to weighting 
(proportional or equal) have an impact on the propensity for the selected stock portfolios to pass 
the PLA tests.  
                                                 
25 The FTSE 100 index is a share index of the top 100 stocks by market capitalisation on the London stock. It is 
weighted by free-float market capitalisation. Free-float refers the number of shares of a stock available on capital 
markets. The index has 100 companies but 101 share constituents due to Royal Dutch Shell Class A and Class B 
shares. The index is the sum of the free-float market capitalisations of shares in the index divided by the divisor. FTSE 
Russell describe how this divisor is determined at the origination of the index but then adjusted to control for corporate 
actions or constituent changes so that a change in the index reflects only market movements. According to the London 
Stock Exchange, the FTSE 100 is “seen as the global benchmark for blue-chip firms listed on our [sic London] 
markets. https://www.londonstockexchange.com/prices-and-markets/stocks/ftse100/londonglobalbenchmark.htm 
 
26 The EURO STOXX 50 is also a free-float market capitalisation weighted index. It has 50 constituents from 11 
Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. 
27 S&P 500 is weighted according to market capitalisation of its outstanding shares. It is regarded as “the best signle 
gauge of large-cap U.S. equities” with over 9.9Trn USD indexed or benchmarked to the index. 
http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500. 





Table 8.1 Range of portfolios 
FTSE 100 Ranked by: 
EUROSTOXX 50 
Ranked by: 
A. Market Capitalisation A. Market Capitalisation
B. Stock Beta B. Stock Beta
'1-20' '1-20' 1 - 20 61 - 80 121 - 140 181 - 200 241 - 260 361 - 380
'1-30' '1-30' 1 - 30 61 - 90 121 - 150 181 - 210 241 - 270 361 - 390
'1-40' '1-40' 1 - 40 61 - 100 121 - 160 181 - 220 241 - 280 361 - 400
'1-50' '1-50' 1 - 50 61 - 110 121 - 170 181 - 230 241 - 290 361 - 410
'1-60' '11-30' 1 - 60 61 - 120 121 - 180 181 - 240 241 - 300 361 - 420
'1-70' '11-40' 1 - 70 61 - 130 121 - 190 181 - 250 241 - 310 361 - 430
'1-80' '11-50' 1 - 80 61 - 140 121 - 200 181 - 260 241 - 320 361 - 440
'1-90' '21-40' 1 - 90 61 - 150 121 - 210 181 - 270 241 - 330 361 - 450
'1-100' '21-50' 1 - 100 61 - 160 121 - 220 181 - 280 241 - 340 361 - 460
'21-40' '31-50' 1 - 110 61 - 170 121 - 230 181 - 290 241 - 350 361 - 470
'21-50' 1 - 120 61 - 180 121 - 240 181 - 300 241 - 360 361 - 480
'21-60' 1 - 130 61 - 190 121 - 250 181 - 310 241 - 370 361 - 490
'21-70' 1 - 140 61 - 200 121 - 260 181 - 320 241 - 380 361 - 505
'21-80' 1 - 150 61 - 210 121 - 270 181 - 330 241 - 390 421 - 440
'21-90' 1 - 160 61 - 220 121 - 280 181 - 340 241 - 400 421 - 450
'21-100' 1 - 170 61 - 230 121 - 290 181 - 350 241 - 410 421 - 460
'31-50' 1 - 180 61 - 240 121 - 300 181 - 360 241 - 420 421 - 470
'31-60' 1 - 190 61 - 250 121 - 310 181 - 370 241 - 430 421 - 480
'31-70' 1 - 200 61 - 260 121 - 320 181 - 380 241 - 440 421 - 490
'31-80' 1 - 210 61 - 270 121 - 330 181 - 390 241 - 450 421 - 505
'31-90' 1 - 220 61 - 280 121 - 340 181 - 400 241 - 460 481 - 505
'31-100' 1 - 230 61 - 290 121 - 350 181 - 410 241 - 470
'41-60' 1 - 240 61 - 300 121 - 360 181 - 420 241 - 480
'41-70' 1 - 250 61 - 310 121 - 370 181 - 430 241 - 490
'41-80' 1 - 260 61 - 320 121 - 380 181 - 440 241 - 505
'41-90' 1 - 270 61 - 330 121 - 390 181 - 450 301 - 320
'41-100' 1 - 280 61 - 340 121 - 400 181 - 460 301 - 330
'51-70' 1 - 290 61 - 350 121 - 410 181 - 470 301 - 340
'51-80' 1 - 300 61 - 360 121 - 420 181 - 480 301 - 350
'51-90' 1 - 310 61 - 370 121 - 430 181 - 490 301 - 360
'51-100' 1 - 320 61 - 380 121 - 440 181 - 505 301 - 370
'61-80' 1 - 330 61 - 390 121 - 450 301 - 380
'61-90' 1 - 340 61 - 400 121 - 460 301 - 390
'61-100' 1 - 350 61 - 410 121 - 470 301 - 400
'71-90' 1 - 360 61 - 420 121 - 480 301 - 410
'71-100' 1 - 370 61 - 430 121 - 490 301 - 420
'81-100' 1 - 380 61 - 440 121 - 505 301 - 430
1 - 390 61 - 450 301 - 440
1 - 400 61 - 460 301 - 450
1 - 410 61 - 470 301 - 460
1 - 420 61 - 480 301 - 470
1 - 430 61 - 490 301 - 480
1 - 440 61 - 505 301 - 490












Figure 8.1 Schematic of portfolio characteristics 
This schema depicts the characteristics of the portfolios being tested under the PLA tests plus alternatives and the 
FRTB desk-level backtests plus alternatives. The important relationship we are testing with respect to the PLA tests 
is how particular portfolio characteristics influence the relationship of the portfolio to the risk factor and therefore 
the propensity for the portfolio to pass the PLA tests. These portfolio characteristics are the pairwise combination of 
either market capitalisation or beta together with proportional or equal weighting. 
We subject each portfolio to the two statistical tests (Spearman’s Rank test and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test) as prescribed under the BCBS PLA test documentation (BCBS 2019). For 
comparative purposes, we also perform the standardised Spearman’s Rho (correlation) test and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (distribution) tests and the Anderson-Darling distribution test. The purpose 
of using alternative specifications of the PLA tests plus an alternative distribution test is to 


















Table 8.2 Index stock portfolio characteristics 
 
We begin by examining the results of the PLA tests for the FTSE 100 portfolios. As can be seen 
in Table 8.2 there are four pair-wise characteristic combinations. Table 8.1 shows the range of 
portfolios for each index. For the FTSE 100 portfolios there are 37 portfolio ranges. We are 
interested in viewing the results to determine if the presence of characterisations: capitalisation 
and beta; and the mode of weighting applied: proportional or equal; have an impact on the results 
from the PLA tests. We are also interested in the comparative results between the correlation tests: 
standardised Spearman’s Rank (SR_ST) and the FRTB Spearman’s rank (SR_FRTB); and the 
distribution tests: standardised Kolmogorov-Smirnov (S_KS), FRTB Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
(FRTB_KS) and Andersen Darling (AD). 
 
  
FTSE 100 Capitalisation Ranked Proportionally weighted UKX_C_PW
Capitalisation Ranked Equally weighted UKX_C_EW
Beta Ranked Proportionally weighted UKX_B_PW
Beta Ranked Equally weighted UKX_B_EW
EUROSTOXX 50 Capitalisation Ranked Proportionally weighted ESX_C_PW
Capitalisation Ranked Equally weighted ESX_C_PEW
Beta Ranked Proportionally weighted ESX_B_PW
Beta Ranked Equally weighted ESX_B_EW
S&P 500 Capitalisation Ranked Proportionally weighted SPX_C_PW
Capitalisation Ranked Equally weighted SPX_C_EW
Beta Ranked Proportionally weighted SPX_B_PW
Beta Ranked Equally weighted SPX_B_EW
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8.3 FTSE 100 PLA testing results 
 
8.3.1 PLA test results: FTSE 100: Market Capitalisation ranked, proportionally weighted 
portfolios 
The results for the ‘FTSE 100: Market Capitalisation ranked, proportionally weighted 
portfolios’ PLA tests are shown in Figure 8.2. The graphs in Figure 8.3 plot the SR_FRTB and 
KS_FRTB respectively, with green and amber zones included. 
Correlation tests 
First, we review the results under the correlation tests. What we can see is that the SR_ST and 
SR_FRTB have very similar results. The boundary levels defined in the FRTB documentation for 
the SR_FRTB test are shown in Table 7.5. We apply the same boundaries to the SR_ST results 
also. The correlation test results in Figure 8.2 are colour-coded to indicate the resultant zone 
(Columns 1 and 2). Green indicates that they had passed the test (SR>0.8), Red indicates failure 
of the test (SR<0.7) and Amber (0.7<SR<0.8) indicates additional testing and capital requirements. 
FTSE stock portfolios that contain the top twenty stocks by capitalisation pass both the SSR and 
SR_FRTB. Both SR_ST and SR_FRTB statistics increase with the size of the portfolio. All 
portfolios containing the first twenty or second twenty stocks by capitalisation pass the SSR and 
SR_FRTB test. For portfolios excluding the top forty stocks (41-60, 41-70, 41-80, 41-90 and 41-
100), SR_ST and SR_FRTB tests have results in the green zone except for portfolio 41-90. For 
portfolios excluding the top fifty stocks (51-70, 51-80, 51-90 and 51-100), SR_ST and SR_FRTB 
tests have results in the green zone. For the portfolios of lower ranked by capitalisation stocks (61-
80, 61-90 61-100, 71-90 71-100, 81-100), both SR_ST and SR_FRTB tests have results in the 
amber zone. 
The first graph in Figure 8.3 exhibits the SR_FRTB test results and shows the green, amber and 
red zones. Test results above 0.8 are in the green zone. We see a trend of increasing values from 
portfolio 1-20 to portfolio 1-100. So we can determine that for market capitalisation ranked, 
proportionally weighted portfolios, when we hold the top 20 ranked stocks, adding additional 
stocks improves the SR_FRTB and SR_ST test results. There is a drop in SR_FRTB test results 
for portfolio 21-40 relative to portfolio 1-20. The SR_FRTB test results remain at a similar level 
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as stocks are added (21-60, 21-70, 21-80, 21-90, and 21-100). There is a general trend downwards 
for the remaining portfolios, where for portfolios excluding the top 60 by market capitalisation 
stocks, the portfolios are consistently in the amber zone. 
Distribution tests 
Secondly, we turn our attention to the distribution tests: KS_FRTB, KS_ST and AD. These test 
results are shown in columns 3, 4, and 5 respectively in Figure 8.2 We have colour-coded the 
results for KS_FRTB in keeping with the FRTB defined boundaries (See Table 7.6). The test 
statistics for KS_ST and AD are evaluated at a 95% critical level.  
It is immediately clear from the colour-coded results that the distribution tests are generally more 
challenging to pass than the correlation tests. Furthermore, the KS_FRTB appears to be more 
challenging to pass than the two alternative distribution tests.  
Examining the KS_FRTB test results more closely, we see that the KS_FRTB test results for 
portfolios beginning from portfolio 1-20 (red zone) improve (that is decrease) with the addition of 
further stocks reaching the amber zone for portfolio 1-60 and green for 1-70, 1-80, 1-90 and 1-100 
(See Figure 8.3). The portfolio 1-100 should be a close replication of the index and, indeed, this 
has the lowest KS_FRTB value. Furthermore, we see that when the portfolios exclude the top 20 
capitalisation stocks then they do not pass the KS_FRTB test regardless of the size of the portfolio. 
Therefore, the evidence allows us to infer that passing the KS_FRTB distribution test requires 
holding a sufficient number of the highest capitalisation stocks from the index. 
Results from the KS_ST and AD tests are broadly consistent for these portfolios. They both exhibit 
greater propensity for portfolios to pass the tests (p-values greater than the critical value of 95%) 
than the KS_FRTB test.  
Combined 
From these test results we can conclude that for market capitalisation ranked, proportionally 
weighted portfolios of stocks from the FTSE 100, holding the highest market capitalisation stocks 




Figure 8.2 FTSE, Capitalisation-Ranked, Proportionally Weighted 
SR_FRTB SR_ST KS_FRTB KS_ST_P AD
'1-20' 0.963221 0.963222 0.316 0.8796 0.847582
'1-30' 0.982412 0.98241 0.232 0.96543 0.91178
'1-40' 0.990729 0.990728 0.192 0.99639 0.939611
'1-50' 0.994553 0.994553 0.124 0.99639 0.96778
'1-60' 0.996506 0.996506 0.116 0.986641 0.972772
'1-70' 0.997539 0.997539 0.096 0.99639 0.99224
'1-80' 0.998141 0.99814 0.08 0.99639 0.994141
'1-90' 0.998206 0.998206 0.08 0.999964 1
1-100' 0.998092 0.998092 0.088 0.999964 0.999849
'21-40' 0.870805 0.870793 0.564 0.275077 0.310791
'21-50' 0.868756 0.868753 0.556 0.746484 0.558285
'21-60' 0.877933 0.877931 0.544 0.746484 0.631864
'21-70' 0.875817 0.875816 0.528 0.746484 0.747071
'21-80' 0.870292 0.870291 0.536 0.746484 0.654539
'21-90' 0.867685 0.867684 0.532 0.521009 0.694927
'21-100' 0.868812 0.868809 0.536 0.521009 0.644582
'31-50' 0.808422 0.808432 0.564 0.450892 0.532765
'31-60' 0.839725 0.83974 0.52 0.595143 0.588143
'31-70' 0.838867 0.838879 0.56 0.817264 0.676926
'31-80' 0.832045 0.832054 0.564 0.746484 0.599731
'31-90' 0.829489 0.829499 0.548 0.521009 0.707688
'31-100' 0.837147 0.837155 0.524 0.595143 0.667122
'41-60' 0.809071 0.809094 0.54 0.67125 0.59906
'41-70' 0.809548 0.809567 0.6 0.929779 0.821412
'41-80' 0.800672 0.80068 0.596 0.746484 0.684788
'41-90' 0.799214 0.799223 0.572 0.8796 0.768488
'41-100' 0.812439 0.812447 0.532 0.746484 0.671687
'51-70' 0.810221 0.810234 0.652 0.8796 0.763128
'51-80' 0.805258 0.805262 0.652 0.67125 0.60671
'51-90' 0.800523 0.800528 0.6 0.8796 0.699086
'51-100' 0.816998 0.817 0.548 0.817264 0.56405
'61-80' 0.731471 0.731467 0.656 0.67125 0.527443
'61-90' 0.742742 0.742741 0.6 0.595143 0.574182
'61-100' 0.776111 0.776109 0.56 0.521009 0.440072
'71-90' 0.718539 0.718534 0.68 0.275077 0.174174
'71-100' 0.77118 0.771172 0.6 0.189091 0.100185
'81-100' 0.767942 0.767943 0.636 0.063962 0.041023
These portfolios ‘pass’ the FRTB 





Figure 8.3 PLA Spearman's Rank and Kolmogorov-Smirnov results: FTSE 100, market capitalisation ranked, proportionally weighted 
In these graphs the green line indicates the value of the test which determines if the result is in the green zone. For the Spearman’s test, FRTB 
specifies that the result must exceed 0.8; therefore, results above the green line in graph one pass the test. The portfolios descriptors are on the x-
axis. For the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the test statistic must be lower than 0.09; therefore, results below the green line in graph two pass the test. 






































8.3.2 PLA test results: FTSE 100: Market Capitalisation ranked, equally weighted 
portfolios 
 
The results for ‘FTSE100: Market Capitalisation ranked, equally weighted portfolios’ PLA 
tests are shown in Figure 8.4. The graphs in Figure 8.5 plot the SR_FRTB and KS_FRTB 
respectively, with green and amber zones included. 
Correlation tests 
Again, we find that the two correlation measures exhibit similar results. Both the SR_ST and 
SR_FRTB tests are passed for all portfolios containing the top twenty (1-20, 1-30, 1-40, 1-50, 1-
60, 1-70, 1-80, 1-90, 1-100)  or second twenty (21-40, 21-50, 21-60, 21-70, 21-80, 21-90, 21-100) 
stocks ranked by market capitalisation. For portfolios excluding the top thirty market capital 
stocks, the SR_FRTB test requirements are met for portfolios 31-90 and 31-100. For portfolios 
excluding the top forty market capitalisation stocks, the SR_FRTB test passes for portfolio 41-
100. Similarly, for portfolios excluding the top fifty market capitalisation stocks, the SR_FRTB 
test passes for portfolio 51-100. The remaining portfolios are in the amber zone. The trend of 
increasing SR values with increasing portfolio size, observed for portfolios containing the top 
twenty stocks for proportionally weighted portfolios, is not observed for the equally weighted 
portfolios. 
Distribution tests 
The KS_FRTB test results are not in the green zone for any of the portfolios when they are 
weighted equally. It is also notable that, where a trend of decreasing values for the FRTB KS test 
statistic can be observed as additional stocks are added to the proportionally weighted portfolios, 
we do not see this trend with the equally weighted portfolios (See Figure 8.5). KS_ST test results 
exceeds the 95% critical value (that is, pass the test) for portfolios 1-50, 1-60 and 1-70. These 
portfolios passed the KS_ST test when proportionally weighted also. However, more of the 
portfolios passed the KS_ST test when they were proportionally weighted. Furthermore, none of 
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the equally weighted portfolios exceeds the critical value for the Anderson-Darling distribution 
test. 
Combined 
The weighting applied to the stocks in each portfolio is clearly an important characteristic in 
determining whether the portfolio passes the KS_FRTB test. We see that equally weighted 
portfolios fail to achieve the same distributional form as the index, thus fail the FRTB_KS test and 





Figure 8.4 FTSE, Capitalisation-Ranked, Equally Weighted
SR_FRTB SR_ST KS_FRTB KS_ST_P AD
'1-20' 0.883796 0.883805 0.456 0.521009 0.390759
'1-30' 0.932598 0.932601 0.352 0.450892 0.578594
'1-40' 0.957315 0.95732 0.268 0.8796 0.798876
'1-50' 0.941185 0.941196 0.424 0.96543 0.936244
'1-60' 0.932123 0.932134 0.388 0.96543 0.920578
'1-70' 0.922423 0.922435 0.416 0.96543 0.894544
'1-80' 0.915859 0.91587 0.42 0.67125 0.861523
'1-90' 0.908033 0.908045 0.452 0.817264 0.868164
1-100' 0.908311 0.90832 0.456 0.8796 0.818557
'21-40' 0.833268 0.833263 0.536 0.327418 0.246865
'21-50' 0.806043 0.806056 0.656 0.746484 0.52001
'21-60' 0.81935 0.819362 0.588 0.817264 0.60408
'21-70' 0.817214 0.817226 0.592 0.746484 0.641272
'21-80' 0.82078 0.820789 0.556 0.450892 0.552482
'21-90' 0.819431 0.819443 0.592 0.450892 0.583201
'21-100' 0.831321 0.83133 0.568 0.521009 0.458692
'31-50' 0.758975 0.758993 0.744 0.595143 0.491872
'31-60' 0.791319 0.791334 0.628 0.746484 0.553273
'31-70' 0.793813 0.793829 0.636 0.595143 0.593962
'31-80' 0.798663 0.798673 0.6 0.450892 0.513319
'31-90' 0.80226 0.802273 0.62 0.327418 0.549396
'31-100' 0.81836 0.818371 0.612 0.450892 0.430444
'41-60' 0.756145 0.756163 0.776 0.67125 0.403437
'41-70' 0.765 0.76502 0.748 0.67125 0.553471
'41-80' 0.779682 0.779694 0.684 0.67125 0.507966
'41-90' 0.78208 0.782094 0.692 0.450892 0.488867
'41-100' 0.805642 0.805655 0.64 0.450892 0.358753
'51-70' 0.750528 0.750543 0.74 0.229055 0.274254
'51-80' 0.775616 0.775624 0.636 0.595143 0.396826
'51-90' 0.783835 0.783846 0.664 0.67125 0.442413
'51-100' 0.813001 0.813011 0.66 0.595143 0.273533
'61-80' 0.728164 0.728171 0.712 0.327418 0.264549
'61-90' 0.7563 0.756314 0.696 0.450892 0.37285
'61-100' 0.797435 0.797444 0.688 0.386118 0.203403
'71-90' 0.713654 0.713664 0.72 0.080768 0.061645
'71-100' 0.784347 0.784352 0.7 0.080768 0.053649
'81-100' 0.78317 0.783184 0.724 0.063962 0.013233
Portfolios 1-50,1-60 and 1-70 
exceed the 95% critical p-value for 
the standard KS test but do not 
come close to the criteria for the 





Figure 8.5 PLA results FTSE 100 capitalisation-ranked, equally weighted, portfolios 
 
In these graphs the green line indicates the value of the test which determines if the result is in the green zone. For the Spearman’s test, FRTB 
specifies that the result must exceed 0.8; therefore, results above the green line in graph one pass the test. The portfolios descriptors are on the x-
axis. For the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the test statistic must be lower than 0.09; therefore, results below the green line in graph two pass the test. 





































8.3.3 PLA test results: FTSE 100: Beta ranked, proportionally weighted portfolios 
 
The results for ‘FTSE 100: Beta ranked, proportionally weighted portfolios’ PLA tests (plus 
alternatives) are shown in Figure 8.6. The graphs in Figure 8.7 plot the SR_FRTB and KS_FRTB 
respectively, with green and amber zones included. 
Correlation tests 
We can see that most portfolios pass both the SR_FRTB and SR_ST tests. Both SR test results for 
portfolio 21-40 are in the amber zone. There is a general trend of increasing values of SR statistics 
as more stocks are added to the portfolios. This is similar to the trend observed in the ranked by 
capitalisation portfolios with proportional weightings for portfolios containing the top twenty 
stocks. The general trend of increasing SR test values with portfolio size is more consistent for the 
beta ranked portfolios.  
Distribution tests 
Although we see a general trend of improving values of the KS_FRTB test statistics as more stocks 
are added (See Figure 8.7), the only portfolio that passes the test is the 1-100 portfolio (all index 
stocks).  
The alternative distribution tests: KS_ST and AD tests are passed by significantly more portfolios. 
The KS_ST and AD tests are broadly consistent.  
Furthermore, we find that Beta ranked, proportionally weighted portfolios are more likely to pass 
the KS_ST test than market capital ranked portfolios. However, this clearly does not translate into 
these portfolios passing the KS_FRTB test. 
Combined 
The portfolio betas (column labelled BAVG) which are the weighted average beta of the stocks in 
the portfolio, have a strong relationship with the portfolio’s SR test results (both FRTB and 
standardised) but do not have a strong relationship with the results from the distribution tests 
(KS_FRTB, KS_ST, or AD). Beta is a measure of the stock’s volatility relative to the market, 
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where in this case, the market is represented by the index. It is a co-movement measure so it is 
reasonable that it relates to the Spearman’s Rank correlation measures.   
This leads us to infer that portfolios selected based on their high stock betas or high portfolio betas, 





Figure 8.6 FTSE, Beta ranked, Proportionally Weighted 
 
SR_FRTB SR_ST KS_FRTB KS_ST_P AD BAVG
'1-20' 0.903286 0.903285 0.476 0.986641 0.966176 0.926
'1-30' 0.90358 0.903569 0.484 0.8796 0.929442 0.945
'1-40' 0.92179 0.921783 0.488 0.929779 0.900974 0.947
'1-50' 0.947095 0.947082 0.492 0.817264 0.910497 0.961
'1-60' 0.976331 0.976325 0.22 0.929779 0.925936 1.039
'1-70' 0.985738 0.985736 0.22 0.999437 0.979877 1.041
'1-80' 0.989421 0.98942 0.208 0.999964 0.997761 1.018
'1-90' 0.994292 0.994293 0.136 0.999437 1 0.996
1-100' 0.998092 0.998092 0.088 0.999964 1.021893 1.020
'21-40' 0.769687 0.76968 0.744 0.125648 0.206885 0.976
'21-50' 0.897827 0.89781 0.496 0.595143 0.850116 0.990
'21-60' 0.968004 0.967996 0.252 0.746484 0.830848 1.090
'21-70' 0.974369 0.974365 0.272 0.96543 0.925098 1.079
'21-80' 0.980623 0.980622 0.336 0.999437 0.985008 1.045
'21-90' 0.988093 0.988094 0.224 1 1.007799 1.013
'21-100' 0.991825 0.991826 0.172 0.986641 0.994397 1.040
'31-50' 0.886429 0.886415 0.456 0.817264 0.757598 0.995
'31-60' 0.944699 0.944695 0.324 0.817264 0.676518 1.124
'31-70' 0.961021 0.961021 0.316 0.986641 0.833306 1.100
'31-80' 0.969891 0.969894 0.388 0.986641 0.922504 1.056
'31-90' 0.981884 0.981888 0.244 0.999437 0.990078 1.017
'31-100' 0.985773 0.985777 0.192 0.999437 0.964116 1.047
'41-60' 0.927997 0.92799 0.356 0.746484 0.551065 1.145
'41-70' 0.956715 0.956713 0.292 0.929779 0.791636 1.112
'41-80' 0.968449 0.968452 0.364 0.96543 0.907137 1.063
'41-90' 0.9812 0.981203 0.244 0.999437 0.992776 1.021
'41-100' 0.986289 0.986291 0.204 0.99639 0.961428 1.051
'51-70' 0.947437 0.947442 0.348 0.746484 0.526421 1.144
'51-80' 0.959882 0.959892 0.428 0.817264 0.81268 1.076
'51-90' 0.971008 0.971015 0.28 0.986641 0.974863 1.023
'51-100' 0.980383 0.980387 0.28 0.96543 0.8931 1.057
'61-80' 0.893093 0.893109 0.616 0.96543 0.843589 0.964
'61-90' 0.927301 0.927307 0.416 0.96543 0.925043 0.928
'61-100' 0.954548 0.954556 0.348 0.929779 0.862452 0.997
'71-90' 0.834404 0.834411 0.684 0.67125 0.834155 0.854
'71-100' 0.938657 0.938661 0.38 0.67125 0.751333 0.976
'81-100' 0.931417 0.931419 0.42 0.275077 0.471981 1.027
Circled are portfolios 
which have passed the 
standard KS and/or 
Anderson-Darling but 
fail to pass the FRTB 
KS 
The only Beta ranked 
proportionally weighted 
portfolio that meets the 
FRTB KS requirement is 





Figure 8.7 PLA test results for FTSE 100 Beta ranked, proportionally weighted portfolios. (a) Spearman's Rank, (b) Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
 
In these graphs the green line indicates the value of the test which determines if the result is in the green zone. For the Spearman’s test, FRTB 
specifies that the result must exceed 0.8; therefore, results above the green line in graph one pass the test. The portfolios descriptors are on the x-
axis. For the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the test statistic must be lower than 0.09; therefore, results below the green line in graph two pass the test. 




































8.3.4 PLA test results: FTSE 100: Beta ranked, equally weighted portfolios 
 
The results for ‘FTSE 100, Beta ranked, equally weighted portfolios’ PLA tests (and 
alternatives) are shown in Figure 8.8. The graphs in Figure 8.9 plot the SR_FRTB and KS_FRTB 
respectively, with green and amber zones included. 
Correlation 
We observe similar results to the beta ranked, proportionally weighted (FRTB and standard) SR 
correlation test, with green zone results for all portfolios tested excluding 31-50 and 41-60, which 
are both in the amber zone. There is a general trend of increasing values for the SR statistics as 
more stocks are added to the portfolios (See Figure 8.9).  
Distribution 
The KS_FRTB test is not passed for any portfolio including (in contrast to the Beta ranked, 
proportionally weighted, portfolios) the 1-101 portfolio. This may be surprising as it contains all 
of the stocks from the portfolio, one may expect it to have a similar distribution to the index. 
However, the holdings are equally weightings rather than in proportion to the weighting in the 
index and therefore this portfolio does not achieve a similar distributional form. Distributional 
similarities are also rejected by the KS_ST and AD tests for each portfolio.  
Combined 
We can determine that stock weightings similar to the index are an important characteristic in 
improving the likelihood of meeting the PLA test criteria. Beta appears to have little relevance in 
affecting the propensity to meet the distributional similarity criteria. Beta’s congruence with the 








Figure 8.8 FTSE, Beta ranked, equally weighted 
SR_FRTB SR_ST KS_FRTB KS_ST_P AD BAVG
'1-20' 0.853006 0.853005 0.528 0.8796 0.928663 0.921097
'1-30' 0.863303 0.863304 0.692 0.929779 0.925183 0.939894
'1-40' 0.852164 0.852177 0.684 0.817264 0.670719 0.942362
'1-50' 0.855792 0.855803 0.604 0.67125 0.708092 0.953319
'1-60' 0.864683 0.864693 0.54 0.8796 0.795527 1.032132
'1-70' 0.871579 0.87159 0.528 0.817264 0.786546 1.034316
'1-80' 0.87949 0.879502 0.516 0.8796 0.820032 1.011483
'1-90' 0.896711 0.896722 0.504 0.595143 0.873474 0.989947
1-100' 0.908311 0.90832 0.456 0.8796 0.836604 1.015709
'21-40' 0.803642 0.803654 0.828 0.229055 0.057768 0.971941
'21-50' 0.816553 0.816567 0.72 0.67125 0.251371 0.9792
'21-60' 0.835135 0.835146 0.648 0.817264 0.427582 1.082163
'21-70' 0.849292 0.849303 0.616 0.595143 0.465371 1.072197
'21-80' 0.863377 0.863388 0.588 0.67125 0.586734 1.037646
'21-90' 0.885479 0.885491 0.536 0.67125 0.722155 1.006198
'21-100' 0.899572 0.899584 0.496 0.817264 0.706787 1.035247
'31-50' 0.78598 0.785997 0.78 0.521009 0.143566 0.981643
'31-60' 0.812674 0.812688 0.696 0.521009 0.317716 1.114957
'31-70' 0.834605 0.83462 0.636 0.595143 0.425623 1.092643
'31-80' 0.852861 0.852876 0.6 0.746484 0.585177 1.048677
'31-90' 0.878718 0.878731 0.56 0.67125 0.757677 1.010476
'31-100' 0.894864 0.894877 0.504 0.746484 0.715245 1.042443
'41-60' 0.796527 0.796533 0.668 0.450892 0.390867 1.134975
'41-70' 0.841915 0.841925 0.564 0.521009 0.543809 1.103951
'41-80' 0.860299 0.860311 0.52 0.8796 0.748641 1.054912
'41-90' 0.889821 0.88983 0.46 0.746484 0.80869 1.013199
'41-100' 0.912569 0.912577 0.428 0.595143 0.788144 1.046284
'51-70' 0.836847 0.836859 0.612 0.595143 0.40852 1.138597
'51-80' 0.853731 0.853747 0.488 0.817264 0.684104 1.070577
'51-90' 0.890309 0.890319 0.436 0.817264 0.889595 1.017434
'51-100' 0.914135 0.914144 0.344 0.67125 0.751226 1.054645
'61-80' 0.818003 0.818025 0.576 0.67125 0.478644 0.957674
'61-90' 0.869288 0.869302 0.484 0.67125 0.740287 0.92263
'61-100' 0.907784 0.907795 0.392 0.450892 0.588725 0.995551
'71-90' 0.820998 0.821006 0.544 0.189091 0.514609 0.848138
'71-100' 0.900026 0.900033 0.412 0.275077 0.489824 0.975667
'81-100' 0.905229 0.905231 0.496 0.275077 0.213147 1.029273
Even the portfolio of all stocks (1-
100) in the index does not meet the 
FRTB KS criteria, indicating that 




Figure 8.9 PLA test results for FTSE 100 Beta ranked, equally weighted portfolios. (a) Spearman's Rank, (b) Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
In these graphs the green line indicates the value of the test which determines if the result is in the green zone. For the Spearman’s test, FRTB 
specifies that the result must exceed 0.8; therefore, results above the green line in graph one pass the test. The portfolios descriptors are on the x-
axis. For the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the test statistic must be lower than 0.09; therefore, results below the green line in graph two pass the test. 













































For each of the different portfolio types the SR_ST and SR_FRTB tests have exhibited similar 
results. Any small deviations could be due to the treatment of ties in ranking which has not been 
specified in the FRTB prescription. The SR values tend to increase as more stocks are added, for 
example, from portfolio 1-20 to portfolio 1-40. The SR component of the PLA test measures the 
correlation of the portfolio to the index (risk factor). Therefore, it is intuitive that with an increased 
holding of stocks from the index that we would observe an increase in the SR value. This can be 
seen most consistently with Beta ranked portfolios. For capitalisation-ranked portfolios, those with 
lower ranking tend to fail this test. Whereas Beta ranked portfolios do not tend to fail at the lower 
ranks. 
Distribution. 
First, it is clear that the distribution tests have a lower pass rate than the correlation tests. 
Furthermore the KS_FRTB test is more difficult to pass than the alternative distribution tests: 
KS_ST and AD.  
The portfolios with the best performance under this test are those that contain the highest 
capitalisation ranked stocks at a critical mass. Further, that they must be proportionally weighted.  
None of the Beta ranked equally weighted portfolios passed the KS_FRTB test. The only Beta 
ranked proportionally weighted portfolios to pass the KS_FRT test is the portfolio containing all 
of the stocks from the index.  
Implications 
These findings presents a significant challenge to risk and portfolio management. The PLA test is 
an ex ante test on the adequacy of the portfolio to risk factor mapping. The observations on the 
FTSE 100 portfolios demonstrate that the KS component of the PLA tests is difficult to pass and 
requires a holding of the highest market capitalisation ranked stocks from the index and a mirroring 
162 
 
of the stock’s index weighting in the portfolio holdings. This type of alignment would need to 
occur at the portfolio management stage. The alternative means of securing adherence to the PLA 
test requirements would be to shift to a full revaluation mode of risk modelling. This has significant 
time and cost implications and may require reduced complexity in the portfolio holdings. It may 
also affect the functionality to perform scenario and stress testing.  
We progress our analysis to review the results from the PLA tests on stock portfolios taken from 
the Euro Stoxx 50 and S&P 500 indexes to determine if the results show consistency with the 
above findings. To avoid unnecessary repetition, we include the graphs without the supporting 
table of results for the SR_FRTB and KS_FRTB tests.   
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8.5 Euro Stoxx 50 PLA test results 
 












































































Figure 8.10 shows the test results for the KS_FRTB tests for portfolios taken from the Euro Stoxx 
50. The graphs descending from the top show KS_FRTB test results for Euro Stoxx 50 stock 
portfolios: market capitalisation ranked, proportionally weighted; market capitalisation ranked, 
equally weighted; beta ranked, proportionally weighted; beta ranked, equally weighted. 
Correlation 
The correlation test results followed similar patterns to the FTSE 100 portfolios. Again, the SR_ST 
and SR_FRTB exhibited similar results. 
Distribution 
We can see similar phenomena to the results from the FTSE 100 index, however only the portfolio 
with the full set of stocks from the index passes the KS_FRTB test. The fact that we can observe 
the same trend of improving (decreasing) values of the KS test as more stocks are added to the 
portfolio and yet it only passes when we reach 1-50 portfolio (and only for proportionally-weighted 
portfolios) leads us to infer that it is the low number of constituents that influences this result.   
This raises concern about using an index with low numbers of constituents as a risk factor. 
However, the choice of risk factor is determined by the decomposition of the portfolio (Glasserman 
et al. 2002; Alexander 2009; Sirr et al. 2011). The alternative distribution tests (KS_ST and AD) 
were again easier for the portfolios to pass. In particular, the KS_ST test was passed for 6 of the 




8.6 S&P 500 PLA test results 
 
Unlike the Euro Stoxx 50, the S&P 500 index has a comparatively large number of constituents so 
we examine the PLA tests (and alternatives) results to determine if similar patterns to the FTSE 
100 portfolios are exhibited.  
Figure 8.11 shows the test results for the KS_FRTB tests for portfolios taken from the S&P 500 
50. The graphs descending from the top show SR_FRTB and KS_FRTB test results for S&P 500 
stock portfolios: market capitalisation ranked, proportionally weighted; market capitalisation 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Across each of the different rankings and weightings, we observe consistency in the results 
between the SR_FRTB and SR_ST. 
The majority of market capitalisation ranked portfolios have SR test results in the green zone. 
Only three (different) portfolios for market capitalisation ranked, proportionally and equally 
weighted, achieve amber status for the SR tests.  
A higher number of portfolios fall outside the green zone for the SR tests for beta ranked 
portfolios, 
A general trend is observed of increasing SR test values with the addition of stocks to the 
portfolios. 
Distribution 
For market capitalisation ranked, proportionally weighted portfolios the KS_FRTB test 
exhibits values in the red zone for portfolios 1-20 to 1-190; amber for portfolios 1-200 and 1-
210; then green for all succeeding portfolios up to 1-500. For all the remaining portfolios that 
exclude the top sixty stocks (by market capitalisation) the KS_FRTB test exhibits results in the 
red zone (that is, KS_FRTB statistic exceeds 0.12).  
None of the portfolios with equal weighting passed the KS_FRTB test. 
For beta ranked, proportionally weighted portfolios the KS_FRTB test achieves green status 
for portfolios: 1-390,  … , 1-505. This pattern is similar to the occurrence of green FRTB KS 
values for portfolios from the market capitalisation ranked, proportionally weighted portfolios. 
However, the first portfolio in the green zone is larger (1-390 versus 1-230). 
We have not seen any relationship between high beta stock portfolios and passing the PLA 
tests for the other indexes. This suggests that it may be the size of the portfolio rather than the 




8.7 Summation of findings from quantitative impact examination of PLA 
tests 
 
The results from the S&P 500 portfolios are broadly consistent with the findings from the 
examination of the PLA tests on portfolios from the other two indexes.  
In relation to the correlation tests we find: SR_ST and SR_FRTB exhibit very similar results; 
a general trend of increasing test result values as stocks are added to the portfolios; a general 
trend downwards for test result values as the highest ranking stocks are excluded. 
In relation to the distribution tests, we find: The KS_FRTB test is significantly more difficult 
for portfolios to pass than the alternative KS_ST and AD tests; holding the highest market 
capitalisation stocks in critical volume with a weighting similar to its index weighting, 
increases the likelihood of pass the KS_FRTB tests.  
The number of constituents of the index has an impact on the test results, in particular the 
distribution test results. The three indexes exhibit the same trends and highlight the significance 
of the same characteristics but the limited number of constituents in the Euro Stoxx 50 
prevented the improving performance in the tests being realised. This may have to taken into 
consideration when determining the appropriate risk factors. 
We have shown that only a small proportion of the portfolios from our testing pass the 
KS_FRTB test. The two characteristics we tested were market capitalisation and beta. Market 
capitalisation is a significant characteristic in determining if a portfolio will pass the PLA tests. 
Beta is not shown to be a significant characteristic. We also tested whether the choice of stock 
weighting within the portfolio had an impact on the likelihood of the portfolio passing the test. 
We found proportional weighting to increase the propensity of passing the test, but only in 
conjunction with market capitalisation. We also found that portfolio size was an important 
characteristic, again in conjunction with market capitalisation and proportional weighting. 
These findings infer that in order for equity portfolios to pass the PLA tests they must be 
significantly aligned to the risk factors. This alignment should be on the basis of the significant 
the characteristics identified here: high market capitalisation stocks, similar weighting to index 
weighting, and critical size of portfolio.  
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These quantitative impact findings indicate that the PLA tests may influence the constitution 
of the portfolio. Applied on a system-wide basis, this may incentivise greater holdings of high 
capitalisation stocks from an index. This could potentially lead to disincentives to hold lower 
capitalisation stocks and may have an impact on their prices and liquidity. Collectively, these 
incentives may lead to the creation of systemic risk through these inadvertent incentives.    
The significant challenge of meeting the requirements of the PLA tests may prompt 
consideration of adopting a full-revaluation approach to risk modelling which will result in 
additional cost through increased computational time and system requirements. 
Using the same portfolios, we examine the FRTB desk-level backtests as the second new 
criteria introduced under FRTB for the use of internal models in determining market risk 
capital. We then combine the findings of the two quantitative impact analyses. We discuss the 
implications of these combined findings together with the findings from the qualitative study 








8.8 Quantitative impact examination of backtests 
 
Following the examination of the performance of the stock portfolios under the PLA tests, we 
now examine the results from the desk-level backtests for the same portfolios. We are interested 
in the relative power of the FRTB backtest, where the count of exceedances 12 and 30 are 
tolerated under 99% and 97.5% VaR respectively. Furthermore, we examine the performance 
of four different VaR resolution models, and whether the FRTB framework incentivises banks 
to implement better performing models.  
The backtest results under nine backtests for each of the four risk resolution models (Normal 
Linear, Historical, EWMA, GARCH), under two confidence levels (97.5% and 99%), three 
indices (FTSE 100, EURO STOXX 50, S&P 500) with 37, 10 and 225 portfolios respectively, 
selected under market  capitalisation/beta ranking AND proportionally-weighted/equally-
weighted gives 78,336 backtest results (See Figure 8.12). This can be overwhelming to view 






Schematic of backtests performed 
 
Figure 8.12 Backtesting schematic 
9 Backtests
4 Resolution Methods
Binomial Test FTSE 100 37 Capitalisation Ranked Proportionally weighted Normal Linear (Variance-Covariance)
Basel II Traffic Light EUROSTOXX 50 10 Capitalisation Ranked Equally weighted Historical Simulation
Proportion of Failures (Kupiec 1995) S&P 500 225 Beta Ranked Proportionally weighted Exponentially Weighted Moving Average
Time Until First Failure (Kupiec 1995) Total 272 Beta Ranked Equally weighted GARCH(1,1)
Independence Tests (Christoffersen 1998)
Time Between Failures (Haas 2001)
Combined POF & Independence 2 confidence levels
Combined TBF & Independence 99% Confidence level
FRTB Desk Level 99% (12)  OR 97.5% (30)
97.5% Confidence level
78,336
Number of porfolios 
from each index
4 pairwise portfolio characteristics
Total number of Backtest results
9 x 272 x 4 x 4 x 2
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8.9 Rationale of quantitative impact examination of the FRTB desk-level 
backtests  
 
One of the key purposes of the quantitative impact examination of the FRTB desk-level backtests 
is to discern how the FRTB backtests perform relative to alternative backtests using the same data 
restrictions: 250-day calibration period, 250-day backtesting period. We are interested in the FRTB 
desk-level backtests’ ability to identify and reject poorly performing resolution models. This aspect 
of the study builds on the work of Hermsen (2010). The FRTB desk-levels backtests require testing 
under two confidence levels. This has the potential to reveal more information about the forecasted 
distributions under the different resolution models. Gordy and McNeil (2018) propose a spectral 
backtest which embeds many of the commonly used conditional and unconditional backtests, 
where the kernel function chosen reflects the model performance priorities. They perceive their 
proposed approach to contribute to the development of tests of the forecast distribution rather than 
tests of the risk measure estimates. Kratz et al. (2018) assess a variety of multinomial tests to 
simultaneously assess the performance of VaR models at difference confidence levels, thereby 
implicitly formulating a framework for backtesting ES. They find that simultaneously testing at 4 
or 8 quantile levels improves the effectiveness of the test whilst balancing simplicity and power 
properties. We examine if the collaboration of two confidence levels improves the ability of the 
backtest to identify issues in risk modelling and to incentivise the deployment of superior risk 
resolution models. 
We also examine the performance of the different portfolios under the backtests. Primarily we are 
interested in whether the FRTB desk-level backtests enforce, compliment or conflict the findings 
and incentives of the PLA tests. We use the same portfolios from the framework used to examine 
the PLA tests, that is, stock portfolios exhibiting varying levels of two characteristics: beta and 
market capitalisation. In a similar approach to the PLA tests study, we apply two forms of 
weighting: proportional and equal. The aim under this study on the FRTB desk-level backtests is 
to see if these properties affect their backtest performance. It is noteworthy that we have stocks 
from three different markets, so we examine if the findings are similar across each market. 
We segregate the areas of interest for the study into four key areas: performance of FRTB desk-
level backtests relative to alternatives; impact of two confidence levels; impact of portfolio 
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characteristics on backtest performance; consistency of findings across different markets. To avoid 
being overwhelmed by all the backtesting data, we anchor our analysis initially to the FTSE 100 
stock portfolios, market capitalisation ranked and proportionally weighted. We include an 
exposition of the findings on these portfolios in the text and include comparative findings from the 
full spectrum of portfolios tested. 
8.9.1 Performance of FRTB desk-level backtests relative to alternative backtests 
 
Although our key focus here is the performance of the FRTB desk-level backtests relative to 
alternative backtests, the backtests themselves are assessing the performance of the VaR resolution 
models. We are interested in the ability of the FRTB desk-level backtests to identify and reject 
poorly performing resolution models. A primary indicator of a poorly performing VaR resolution 
model is a high number of exceedances. Exceedances are where realised losses are higher than 
those forecast under the VaR resolution model. It is important to note, however, that the number 
of exceedances is not the only factor considered in the backtests. As described in Chapter 8, the 
timing of the exceedances is also significant as clustering of exceedances may be an indicator that 
the resolution model fails to react to changing conditions.  
The number of exceedances tolerated under the FRTB desk-level Bernoulli counting backtest at 
99% and 97.5% are 12 and 30 respectively. Taking the FTSE 100 market capitalisation ranked, 
proportionally weighted, stock portfolios as our starting point, we find that the number of 
exceedances under the Normal linear VaR and EWMA VaR are consistently higher than the other 
resolution methods, indicating that they are weaker resolution methods. Using the terminology of 
Hermsen (2010), we determine that the Normal linear VaR is based upon unreasonable 
assumptions. Normal Linear VaR assumes that returns are normally distributed, a characterisation 
that has been roundly criticised (Jansen and De Vries 1991; Danielsson et al. 2005; Ibragimov and 
Walden 2007).   
Examining the backtest results by portfolio characteristic, it is clear that portfolios that contain 
progressively less high capitalisation ranked stocks perform more poorly across all the backtests. 
Thus, the highest number of exceedance occur for these portfolios. This deterioration is common 
across each of the backtests and each of the resolution models. However, the point at which the 
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backtests identify and reject the portfolios and their resolution models is at a worse point of 
deterioration for the FRTB desk-level backtests than for the alternative backtests. That is, 6 out of 
the 8 the alternative backtests (BIN, TL, POF, CC, TBF, TBFI. See Table 7.2 for acronym 
meanings) identify this deterioration in portfolio performance coupled with the poorly performing 
resolution models (Normal linear VaR and EWMA) earlier than the FRT desk-level backtests. For 
Normal linear VaR the TUFF backtest also rejects the portfolio resolution model pairing earlier 
than the FRTB desk-level backtests. For the two better performing resolution models, the backtests 
have a similar propensity to reject lower market capitalisation stock portfolios. This allows us to 
infer that the FRTB desk-level backtests are inferior to at least six of the alternative backtests 
reviewed in its ability to identify and reject inferior performing VaR resolution models.  
At the 97.5% confidence level, the results are similar. Normal linear VaR and EWMA exhibit the 
highest number of exceedances. The FRTB desk-level backtests rank in the lowest two backtests 
for exhibiting an ability to identify and reject poorly performing resolution models. 
For market capitalisation ranked, equally weighted portfolios, Normal Linear VaR and EWMA 
VaR resolution models show the highest number of exceedances. The FRTB desk-level backtests 
are among 3 or 4 backtests exhibiting the lowest ability to reject the two worst performing 
resolution models. 
For beta ranked portfolios (both forms of weighting), we see a change in the deterioration patterns 
but Normal linear VaR and EWMA VaR exhibit the highest number of exceedances. The FRTB 
desk-level backtests show weak ability to reject the poorly performing resolution models, ranking 
in the lowest 3 or 4 backtests in this regard. 
When we examine results for portfolios from the Euro Stoxx 50 and S&P 500 we observe results 
consistent with the above findings. Normal linear VaR and EWMA consistently have the highest 
exceedances. Deterioration in portfolio performance shows different variation with market 
capitalisation and beta ranking as well as the different stock weightings. However, the FRTB desk-
level backtests at both confidence levels rank among the weakest 3 or 4 backtests for rejecting 
poorly performing risk resolution models. 
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In summation we find that the FRTB desk-level backtests exhibit weak authority to identify and 
reject poorly performing models relative to most alternative backtests reviewed under the same 
data restrictions (calibration of 12 months and backtest period of 12 months).  
 
8.9.2 Effect of two confidence levels on backtest results 
 
We begin again with the anchor portfolios: FTSE 100 market capitalisation ranked, proportionally 
weighted. We examine the backtest results to determine: if there is consistency in the results 
between the two confidence levels; if they combine to give more robust results, enabling stronger 
ability to reject poorly performing VaR resolution models. 
Comparing the results under two confidence levels allows for a different perspective on risk 
resolution models. The Normal linear VaR model performs better under the 97.5% confidence 
level. However, the FRTB desk-level backtest tolerance level of 30 exceedances nullifies the 
ability for the additional confidence level test to affect any impact. There are no rejections for any 
of the FTSE portfolios across any of the resolution models at 97.5%. 
The introduction of a two-test combination for the desk-level backtests, with two different 
confidence levels was an opportunity to develop a combined test with stronger power to reject 
poorly performing VaR resolution models. Unfortunately, the high tolerance for exceedances (30) 





Figure 8.13 Excerpt from FTSE 100 Capitalisation-ranked, proportionally-weighted backtests for Historical Simulation and GARCH(1,1) at 97.5% confidence level 
This table shows the backtesting results for the Historical Simulation VaR and GARCH (1,1) VaR at 97.5% confidence level. The green Y indicates the test has 
been passed and the red N indicates it has failed. The FRTB columns show the number of exceedances. FRTB tolerates 30 exceedances at the 97.5% confidence 
level. The TL (Traffic light) column shows the firm-wide traffic light system for assessing exceedances. 
Portfolio Bin FRTB_99 TL POF TUFF CC CCI TBF TBFI Portfolio Bin FRTB_99 TL POF TUFF CC CCI TBF TBFI
'41-70' N 12 yellow Y Y Y Y N Y '41-70' N 12 yellow Y Y Y Y N Y
'41-80' Y 11 yellow Y Y Y Y Y Y '41-80' Y 11 yellow Y Y Y Y Y Y
'41-90' N 12 yellow Y Y Y Y N Y '41-90' N 12 yellow Y Y Y Y N Y
'41-100' N 12 yellow Y Y Y Y N Y '41-100' N 12 yellow Y Y Y Y N Y
'51-70' N 12 yellow Y Y Y Y N Y '51-70' N 12 yellow Y Y Y Y N Y
'51-80' Y 11 yellow Y Y Y Y Y Y '51-80' Y 11 yellow Y Y Y Y Y Y
'51-90' N 12 yellow Y Y Y Y N Y '51-90' N 12 yellow Y Y Y Y N Y
'51-100' N 12 yellow Y Y Y Y N Y '51-100' N 12 yellow Y Y Y Y N Y
'61-80' N 16 yellow N Y N Y N N '61-80' N 16 yellow N Y N Y N N
'61-90' N 17 red N Y N Y N N '61-90' N 17 red N Y N Y N N
'61-100' N 15 yellow N Y N Y N N '61-100' N 15 yellow N Y N Y N N
'71-90' N 12 yellow Y Y Y Y N Y '71-90' N 12 yellow Y Y Y Y N Y
'71-100' Y 11 yellow Y Y Y Y Y Y '71-100' Y 11 yellow Y Y Y Y Y Y
'81-100' N 13 yellow N Y N Y N N '81-100' N 13 yellow N Y N Y N N
Historical Simulation VaR, 97.5% GARCH(1,1) VaR, 97.5%
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8.9.3 Effect of portfolio characteristics on backtest results 
 
Here we examine if the portfolio characteristics have any effect on performance under the 
backtests. The portfolio characteristics are pairwise combinations of graduated levels of market 
capitalisation or beta, together with an equal or proportional weighting.  
In our observations of the number of exceedances (which are strong indicators for some of the 
backtests) for the various portfolios of stocks taken from the FTSE index we see a general trend 
of increasing exceedances as the portfolios constitute more lower capitalisation stocks. This trend 
tends to disperse as we reach portfolios taken from the lowest ranked stocks. We see this general 
trend for both FTSE 100 capitalisation-ranked proportionally weighted and equally weighted 
portfolios. This trend is not observed for Beta ranked portfolios. 
When we compare the results for FTSE 100 Capitalisation-ranked, proportionally weighted 
portfolios against capitalization-ranked, equally weighted portfolios we see very strong 
similarities in the backtest results for Normal Linear VaR at the 99% confidence level. Only four 
portfolios exhibit different results: 21-60, 21-70 and 31-50 show an increase of one exceedance; 
61-100 shows a decrease of one exceedance. The resultant backtests reflect these differences. 
Historical Simulation and GARCH (1,1) at the 99% confidence level, show the same changes when 
we shift from proportionally weighted to equally weighted with only an increase of one exceedance 
under portfolio 41-70 and a one exceedance decrease under 61-90.  At the 97.5% confidence level, 
we see five portfolios with an increase of one exceedance: 1-80, 21-50, 31-50, 31-60 and 81-100. 
EWMA exhibits three one-exceedance changes at the 99% confidence level and four one-
exceedance changes at the 97.5% confidence level. The changes are a mix of positive and negative 
and do not correspond to the same portfolios. Therefore, while we can say changing from 
proportionally weighted to equally weighted for capitalization-ranked FTSE 100 portfolios, has an 
effect on the number of exceedances and therefore on the backtesting results, the changes are 
neither consistently positive nor consistently negative. 
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We continue our analysis of the FTSE 100 portfolios by comparing results under Beta-ranking. 
We compare results of the Normal Linear VaR resolution method under the Capitalisation-ranked, 
proportionally weighted and the Beta ranked proportionally weighted. 24 out of 37 portfolios 
showed non-zero changes to the number of exceedances at both the 99% and 97.5% confidence 
level. The largest move is a decrease of 6 exceedances for portfolio 61-80. The majority of the 
changes are decreases in the number of exceedances (21 out of 37). This could be due to the 
portfolio beta being used in the VaR resolution models. For Historical Simulation at 99% there is 
a similar finding: 26 portfolios out of 37 show a non-zero change with 22 of these being a reduction 
in the number of exceedances. The largest reduction is 3 for portfolio 51-70. For Historical 
Simulation at 97.5% there are 32 out of 37 non-zero changes, 25 of which are reductions in 
exceedances. The largest reduction is 8, which occurs for three portfolios: 61-80, 61-90, 61-100. 
We see similar results for GARCH (1,1). EWMA at 99% shows 30 non-zero changes, 24 of which 
are a reduction in exceedances. The largest reduction is 5. EWMA at 97.5% shows 31 non-zero 
changes of which 26 are reductions in the number of exceedances. The largest reduction is 8. 
Then we progress to the backtesting results for the FTSE 100 Beta ranked equally weighted 
portfolios. When we compare the number of exceedances for FTSE 100 stock portfolios where the 
stocks are Beta ranked, proportionally weighted to those that are Beta ranked, equally weighted, 
there is only a small change under the Normal linear VaR model. The number of exceedances for 
portfolios 1-50 and 31-70 increase by 1 for both 99% and 97.5% confidence levels. For Historical 
VaR there is an increase of one exceedance for two portfolios under 99% confidence level and for 
four under the 97.5% confidence level. The results for GARCH(1,1) are similar. However, for 
EWMA there is an increase of one exceedance for three and six portfolios for the 99% and 97.5% 
confidence levels respectively. The changes in the number of exceedances is one or zero and it is 
not consistent which portfolios are affected. However, the direction of change is consistently an 
increase. We can assert, therefore, that under our observations of FTSE 100 Beta ranked portfolios, 
the number of exceedances for proportionally-weighted portfolios is consistently less than the 
number of exceedances for equally-weighted portfolios. 
We find that the strength of the characteristic beta ranked or market capitalization ranked impacts 
the performance of the backtests, with high market capitalization or high beta portfolios 
performing well under the backtests. Furthermore, beta ranked portfolios perform marginally 
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better in the backtests that similarly ranked market capitalization ranked portfolios. Weighting 
does not have a consistent impact on the performance of the backtests.  
8.9.4 Backtest results under different markets 
 
Here we want to examine if the above findings are consistent in different markets by examining if 
the observed trends for the FTSE 100 are similar to those observed for the Euro Stoxx 50 and the 
S&P 500.  
When we examine the backtesting results for portfolios taken from the other two indices (Euro 
Stoxx 50 and S&P 500) we see similar performance characteristics for the different resolution 
models. There are similar trend for the different portfolio characteristics (Ranking of stocks, 
weighting applied). What is interesting is the influence of the size of the index. The FTSE 100 
index has stock 101 listings, Euro Stoxx 50 has 50 listings and S&P 500 has 505 stock listings. 
The additional granularity of the S&P 500 means that lower ranked portfolios (Either 
capitalisation-ranked or Beta ranked) tend to perform poorly in the backtests, in some cases with 
exceedance counts higher than 12 or 30, the tolerated FRTB desk-level number of exceedances for 
99% and 97.5% confidence levels respectively. This is not apparent in the smaller (by count of 





8.10 Summation of findings from quantitative impact examination of backtests  
 
The dominant finding from the quantitative impact examination of the FRTB desk-level backtests 
is that the new desk-level tests have low ability to reject poorly performing resolution models 
relative to other available backtests. Furthermore, the use of two confidence levels offered an 
opportunity for a more robust combined test, but the empirical results from this quantitative impact 
study show that the high exceedance tolerances nullifies the efficacy of the combined test. This 
means that the introduction of desk-level backtests does not incentivise banks to adopt resolution 
models with superior forecasting ability. This is consistent with the findings of Hermsen (2010) 
who find that the Basel II market risk regulatory capital framework does not incentivise the use of 
resolution models with more reasonable assumptions and better forecasting performance. The 
assessment of what qualifies as reasonable assumptions should form part of the model validation 
process and the fiat of the model governance initiatives (TRIM, SR 11-7, etc. described in Chapter 
2) includes identifying model weaknesses. However, the model governance initiatives are 
jurisdictional whereas BCBS are global standard setters. This quantitative impact study shows 
empirical evidence of relative weakness of these additional measures. We combine these findings 
with those from the quantitative impact study of the PLA tests. Jointly the desk-level backtests and 
the PLA tests are two additional qualifying criteria for banks to use their internal model to 
determine market risk regulatory capital. We proceed to combine the findings from the two 




8.11 Summation of joint findings from Quantitative impact examination of 
PLA tests and backtests 
 
The purpose of the quantitative impact study is to quantitatively investigate the impact of changes 
to the market risk calculative framework under FRTB. Specifically we examine the impact of the 
introduction of two additional criteria for the qualified use of internal models in the determination 
of market risk capital. These two measures are the PLA tests and the desk-level backtests. We 
build on the work of Hermsen (2010) who finds that Basel II does not incentivise the use of 
superior (VaR) risk resolution models. We investigate whether changes under FRTB create these 
incentives. Furthermore, we investigate whether changes under FRTB have any impact on risk 
management and portfolio management practice. This quantitative impact study focused on two 
additional criteria introduced for qualified use of internal models for market risk measurement 
under FRTB. These two measures are the P&L attribution tests (PLA tests) and desk-level 
backtests.  
The PLA tests are designed to assess the adequacy of the mapping of the portfolio to its risk factors. 
Risk factor mapping is a popular means of modelling large bank portfolios. The study focuses on 
equity portfolios but the findings can be extended readily to other types of portfolios. For equity 
portfolios, indexes are typically used as the key risk factors. We select stock portfolios from stocks 
listed on an index, which are then mapped to the index as the risk factor. The selection of stocks 
is systematic to confer the portfolio with varying degrees of a particular characteristic. The two 
characteristics chosen are market capitalisation and portfolio beta. We also vary the mode of stock 
weighting within the portfolio between equally weighted and weighted proportionally. We perform 
this portfolio selection for three indexes: FTSE 100, EURO STOXX 50 and S&P 500. The aim of 
this design is to determine whether these characteristics have any effect on the propensity of the 
portfolio to pass the PLA tests.  
The PLA tests, as described in Chapter 7, comprise of two tests: the Spearman’s rank test and the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The Spearman’s rank test measures the correlation between the 
(realised) Hypothetical P&L (HPL), which is the P&L of the portfolio of stocks, and the (realised) 
Risk Theoretical P&L, which is the P&L of the risk factor(s). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
measures the similarity of distributional form of the HPL and RTPL. 
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There are a number of key findings from the PLA test study. First, we find that the FRTB 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (FRTB KS) test is much more sensitive than the Spearman test to variations 
in market capitalisation. Only portfolios that contain stocks with the highest capitalisation pass the 
FRTB KS test. Small portfolios do not pass the FRTB KS test. This trend was observed for 
portfolios from each of the three indexes chosen. However, the smaller number of stocks in the 
Euro Stoxx 50 index meant that no sub-portfolios passed the FRTB KS test (the portfolio 
containing all the stocks from the index passed). When we compared these results with the 
alternative specification of the KS test and the Anderson Darling test, the FRTB KS test proved 
significantly more challenging to pass. When we examined the internal workings of the FRTB KS 
test, we found that it was more sensitive to one-day deviations between the index and the portfolio 
than the alternative (Matlab) specification. 
These results infer that passing the PLA tests will require the trading desk’s portfolios to be 
strongly aligned to the risk factors used. Further, that they must hold the highest capitalisation 
stocks of the index plus a critical mass of such stocks and that the weighting must be proportional 
to the stock’s weighting within the index. This means that passing the PLA tests will significantly 
affect the construction of the portfolio. Alternatively, the risk management practice of using risk 
factor s to model the risk in the bank’s portfolios may need to be replaced with a full evaluation. 
The onerous nature of these options may cause banks to reconsider their use of internal models. 
The desk-level backtests introduced under FRTB are exceedance-based Bernoulli counting 
measures with a tolerance of 12 and 30 exceedances for 99% VaR and 97.5% VaR respectively. 
We examine the performance of four simple resolution models (HS, Normal linear VaR, EWMA, 
and GARCH(1,1)) under a spectrum of backtests. All of the resolution models use 250 days for 
calibration and generate 250 days of forecasts. We find that HS and GARCH(1,1) consistently 
perform better than Normal linear VaR and EWMA. Hermsen (2010) characterises the latter two 
models as having unreasonable assumptions. However, for the vast majority of portfolios tested, 
these exceedances observed under these two resolution models are within the tolerance levels of 
12 and 30 exceedances for FRTB desk-level backtests for VaR at 99% and 97.5%. Therefore, we 
find no incentive through the FRTB desk-level backtests to discontinue the use of these flawed 
models. Further, we demonstrate that the FRTB desk-level backtests have low power to reject 
poorly performing models relative to alternative backtests under the same data restrictions. 
184 
 
When we combine the findings of the PLA tests and the desk-level backtests, we find a 
deterioration in backtesting performance in line with the deterioration in performance under the 
PLA tests. This means that a portfolio with the incentivised characteristics outlined above (Holds 
critical volume of highest capitalisation stocks from the index, weighting proportional to the index) 
will also pass the backtests. We determine that the exhibited power of the PLA tests to reject a 
portfolio mapping and therefore incentivise particular portfolio characteristics shifts the emphasis 
from ex post backtesting to ex ante constitution of the portfolio (or full revaluation). That is, the 
emphasis is not on the performance of the resolution model but instead shifts to the design of the 
portfolio instead. We thus determine that the PLA tests effectively impact portfolio management 
practice. Alternatively, the difficulties in passing the PLA test may cause banks to consider full 
revaluation in market risk modelling, which is a seismic shift in risk management practice. The 
FRTB desk-level backtests, while onerous as a practical exercise, appear under this study to be 
ineffectual in rejecting poorly performing resolution models. This indicates that the choice of 
resolution model is not a priority concern in the FRTB framework. 
Hence, we conclude that the introduction of the PLA tests under the FRTB framework have the 
potential to significantly impact risk management and portfolio management practice. The desk-
level backtests do not exhibit evidence of their ability to incentivise the use of superior forecasting 
resolution models. Furthermore, their low power indicates a null effect on risk management and 
portfolio management practice. We discuss this further in Chapter 9 where we combine the 








VaR has been central to the measurement and management of market risk since the development 
of firm-wide VaR risk models by RiskMetrics in the early 1990s. The VaR model received 
significant media criticism in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis (See for example: 
Nocera 2009a; Triana 2011). A number of government and industry reviews of the events of the 
crisis found significant failings in the regulation of the banking sector and identified issues with 
the use of the VaR model (For example: Turner 2009).  The Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) made a number of key changes to the regulatory framework in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis, for example the inclusion of a Stressed-VaR and Incremental Risk Charge. 
The Basel III framework introduced a number of key changes to address issues that had become 
paramount during the crisis. However, a major overhaul of the calculative framework for 
determining market risk capital was promised. The imminent implementation of the Basel 
Committee’s final component of Basel III, FRTB, contains revisions to the calculative framework 
for the calculation of market risk regulatory capital but also to the criteria required for banks to 
use their internal risk model (proprietary VaR model) in this calculation. The headline event in the 
introduction of FRTB is the succession of VaR by ES as the metric underpinning the determination 
of market risk capital requirements. However, VaR remains central to the backtesting framework. 
Motivated by this seismic change in the role of VaR and the market risk regulatory capital 
framework, we identified five key research objectives of this thesis. First, to investigate the 
perception of VaR by different practitioner groups; Second, to evaluate the perceptions of the 
changing regulatory framework under FRTB; Third, to examine the impact of FRTB on market 
risk management and portfolio management practice; Fourth, to apply the findings to develop an 
understanding of traditional and non-traditional accounting measures; Fifth, to evaluate the 
efficacy of the Miller-Power frame in evaluating non-traditional accounting measures.  
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By extension of these five research questions, we are also interested in gaining insights into the 
future position of VaR with respect to its three current roles in internal market risk management, 
market risk reporting and in determining market risk capital (IMA banks).  
This research examines the situationalised nature of VaR through the perspectives of different 
practitioners (Risk Managers, Portfolio Managers, Traders, Regulators, Consultants, Industry 
Advocates) in both banks that use the Internal Model Approach (IMA), and those who use the 
Standardised Approach (SA) to determine their Pillar I market risk capital. We also examine their 
perspectives on the current and changing regulatory environment. We then use these insights to 
inform a quantitative impact study that focuses on the potential influence of two key components 
introduced in the new calculative framework: the desk-level backtests and the P&L attribution 
tests. These two tests are additional requirements for the qualified use of internal models. Internal 
models were retained as a central component of FRTB despite academic studies showing the wide 
variability of their results (Beder 1995; Pritsker 1997; Berkowitz and O'Brien 2002) and BCBS 
own study of the outputs from internal models using a common hypothetical portfolio (RCAP) 
(BCBS 2018b). We examine empirically, whether these two additional criteria for the permitted 
use of a bank’s internal model, have the potential to influence risk management and portfolio 
management practices. Furthermore, we build on the work of Hermsen (2010) to investigate 
whether the introduction of these internal model qualifiers improves banks’ incentives for 
deploying superior forecasting models. 
The thesis began by providing a contextual overview of the background to the study, including the 
various roles of VaR; the nature of the Irish and UK banking system; the evolution of the BCBS 
regulatory framework; model governance initiatives; collective contemporary criticism of VaR. 
The delineation of accounts is an important aspect of the understanding the societal impact of 
accounting technologies (Gallhofer et al. 2015). Our review of the literatures began with studies 
that examined bank regulation and, followed by reviewing papers that examine regulatory capture. 
Even prior to VaR’s introduction as a measure used to determine market risk regulatory capital, 
there was extensive criticism of granting VaR this regulatory imprimatur (Danielsson et al. 2001). 
Key concerns included: VaR’s procyclicality, that is, it moves with the cycle, requiring more 
capital in times of financial distress; VaR is a point estimate in the tail of the P&L (or return) 
distribution and does not provide information about the size of losses in the tail. Furthermore, as a 
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point estimate it can be more easily gamed than ES, which takes an average of the tail; VaR is not 
subadditive (Artzner et al. 1999), this means that for certain portfolio types it may over or 
understate the risk; VaR’s underpinning assumptions may be flawed, such as the assumption of a 
normal distribution of returns which underpins some simpler models. Another key issue with VaR 
in its regulatory context is that it implicitly assumes risks are exogenous, which neglects the 
integrated nature of financial markets and that some risks are created and magnified endogenously 
by the system itself (Danielsson et al. 2011b). We then progressed to literature that examined the 
changes under Basel III an FRTB. This includes empirical studies that examine the collaboration 
of macroeconomic and microeconomic measures introduced under Basel III (Krug et al. 2015).  
We rationalise the treatment of VaR as an accounting measure by examining the role of accounting 
as outlined by Burchell et al. (1980). They find the accepted functional form of accounting to be 
concerned with the provision of: relevant information for decision-making; rationalisation of 
resource allocation; accountability and stewardship. We use evidence to support VaR’s 
qualification under this functional form. Furthermore, we take inspiration from Miller (Miller 
1998; Miller et al. 2008) on the permeable and hybridising nature of accounting measures, to argue 
that VaR is a non-standard accounting measure.  
With this in our armoury, we review some of the interesting developments in critical accounting. 
In particular, we focus on the evolution of valuation practices for technologies that have become 
embedded in financial systems (Woods et al. 2008; Mikes 2011; Miller and Power 2013; 
MacKenzie and Spears 2014b). The framework of Miller and Power (2013) emerges as a relevant 
theoretical construct, broad enough to capture the peculiarities of VaR as an atypical accounting 
measure. Its lattice framework of: territorialising, mediating, adjudicating and subjectivising; has 
the potential to uncover the nature of VaR’s institutional embeddedness and its position as the 
dominant market risk reporting and regulatory metric.   
 
In Chapter 4, we outlined our mixed methods evaluation methodology. Taking a mixed methods 
approach is challenging as it requires the development of different skillsets and different 
literatures. However, traditional qualitative and quantitative non-overlapping boundaries of 
research into VaR leave the potential for a knowledge gap. The mixed method design allows us to 
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traverse these boundaries to yield integrated qualitative and quantitative insights into the VaR 
metric, grounded in the context of the changing regulatory setting. In this period of regulatory 
change, we are interested in understanding the knowledge environment including the rationality 
of beliefs both informing perceptions in the qualitative study and in modelling choices in the 
quantitative study.  
The design of the qualitative evaluation (outlined in Chapter 5) describes the use of semi-structured 
interviews with bank practitioners from Ireland and the UK to gain insights into their perspectives 
of VaR in its various roles and with the context of a changing regulatory environment. The 
importance of interactional expertise (Collins et al. 2007; MacKenzie and Spears 2014a) is 
highlighted, as is the need for critical reflection to bring awareness of the researcher’s own bias to 
interpretations. The interviews were transcribed and analysed using the interlinked process 
protocol espoused by O’Dwyer (2004): data reduction; data display; and data interpretation.  The 
findings from the qualitative study were outlined in Chapter 6. These findings were used to inform 
and shape the quantitative impact study.  
One of the key findings from the qualitative study is that there is a strong belief among practitioners 
(Risk Management and Trading cohorts) that the changes under FRTB amount to a change of 
statistical measure at the end of the risk modelling process. There is no perception that FRTB will 
have a strong influence on risk management and portfolio management practice. It is this finding 
that we decided to explore in the quantitative impact study. That is, the quantitative impact study 
is designed to examine if the changes under FRTB have the potential to influence risk management 
and portfolio management practice. Furthermore, we build on the work of Hermsen (2010) by 
investigating if additional measures brought in under FRTB (specifically the PLA tests and desk-
level backtests) influence the choice of resolution model, and more particularly, incentivise the 
deployment of superior forecasting resolution models.  
The design of the quantitative impact study is outlined in Chapter 7. Although FRTB retains the 
use of internal models in the determination of market risk capital (for IMA banks), it introduces 
two additional criteria. Under FRTB, approval for use of an internal model for regulatory capital 
will be determined at trading desk level. The two additional criteria introduced are PLA tests and 
desk-level backtests. The quantitative impact study aims to examine if these two additional 
qualifiers influence the choice of resolution model and promote the use of better models. 
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Furthermore, we determine the potential for these measures to impact risk management and 
portfolio management practice. The findings from the quantitative impact study are described in 
Chapter 8. 
This discussion and conclusion chapter brings together the findings of the qualitative and 
quantitative impact studies to answer our key research questions and inform discussions on the 
future role of VaR and the potential impact on the banking system and on society. We then outline 
our key contributions. 
 
9.2 Discussion of Findings 
 
9.2.1 Findings from Qualitative Study 
 
These first two findings relate to RQ1: What is the perception of VaR by different practitioner 
groups? 
First, the perception of the VaR metric by the practitioner groups contrasts with the critical views 
of the model in the media. Notably, the practitioner perceptions of VaR are rooted in a keen 
awareness of the model’s assumptions and limitations. That is, practitioners’ view VaR to be useful 
whilst recognising its inaccuracies (Millo and MacKenzie 2009). The Miller-Power frame 
highlights the mediating role and in particular, its ability to reconcile different practitioner groups. 
Secondly, we find both an organisational and philosophical stickiness to the use of the VaR metric 
as an internal risk measure. This is juxtaposed with a clear recognition that the FRTB regulatory 
framework addresses existing issues in market risk measurement/management in a comprehensive 
structure. The Miller-Power frame allows us to see that the authority and legitimacy of the VaR 
model is not derived from its position with the market risk regulatory framework but its usefulness 
on an organisational basis, that is, internal VaR. We find that users and practitioners are defensive 
of the measure despite widespread criticism. That is, they are attached to it at an individual and an 
organisational level even though it will no longer be the primary model at the centre of external 
regulation. However, we do not find evidence of a blind acceptance of the VaR model outputs.  
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These elements show that financial organisations are inherently social entities whose operations 
are impacted invisibly but significantly by an accounting measure. In the management of risk 
within banking organisations and externally through reporting and regulation, VaR has become 
the dominant accounting metric. The territorialising characteristic of accounting metrics identified 
by the Miller-Power frame enables us to reflect on how a measure, found to be useful to 
practitioners, extends its territory. Power (2007) describes how instruments designed for 
measurement become a means of control. In this way, extended territory becomes subjectified also. 
When a technical measure, such as VaR, has subjectified a system and achieved narrative 
dominance of risk measurement, it becomes part of the calculative cultural norms (MacKenzie and 
Spears 2014a). We find evidence of this in the commonly held belief among respondents that there 
was no alternative to VaR. The pairing of territorialising with adjudicating traverses the 
organisational measure and control function of VaR for which we have found a conceptual 
stickiness among risk managers and traders, with both cohorts reporting that they will continue to 
use internal VaR due to its conceptual usefulness. This shows that the model has become embedded 
in the way these groups think about risk; a remarkable demonstration of the latent power of 
accounting measures. 
The subjectivisation component of the Miller-Power frame challenges us to review the degree to 
which VaR prompts action on the part of users. Traders view internal VaR as a constraint because 
of its organisational control function in determining trading limits. This is the operationalisation 
of risk allocation of an entity’s risk appetite across various trading desks, or risk budgeting. 
Respondents report that internal VaR is no longer the only measure used to control trading limits 
due its procyclicality. The reduced primacy of internal VaR in this respect is not driven by 
regulatory changes under FRTB but rather a pragmatism from the experienced realities of the 
practitioners. The power of VaR as a mediating device was cited by all respondents, and 
contributes to its longevity of use in regulation, reporting and within the organisation. As discussed 
earlier, the overt simplicity of VaR belies the underlying complexity of the risk forecasting model. 
The environment in which respondents work is complex on many levels. There are indications of 
organisational struggle regarding the development of superior forecasting models due to system 
constraints and other resource implications. There is also an organisational desire for a model that 
can maintain its simplicity in order to be useful to less technical end-users such as board members. 
At the same time, this must be balanced with rigorous quantitative evaluations. The Miller-Power 
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framing of accounting measures as mediation devices (enabling reconciliation) allows us to 
understand the soft power of internal VaR, and how it relates to its duality as a complex, yet 
ostensibly simple device. We find different perceptions on this dimension by different categories 
of interviewee.  
The third finding relates to RQ2: What are the practitioners’ perceptions of the market risk 
regulatory framework and impending implementation of FRTB? 
Thirdly, and by extension to the second finding, we observe that there is a perception within the 
risk management and trading (R and T) practitioner groups of IMA banks that, while meeting the 
demands of the FRTB regulatory framework will be challenging, it will have limited impact on 
internal risk management and trading practices. That is, that whilst recognising the onerous nature 
of moving to desk-level internal model approval, in the perception of practitioners, FRTB equates 
to the move from VaR to ES. This feeds the perception that FRTB is merely a change in statistical 
measure. Practitioners are aware of the many other changes under FRTB and we find broad 
consensus for the appropriateness of these changes, but there is an anchoring to the primary metric 
(VaR or ES) leading to the diminution of the other changes to the FRTB calculative framework 
(including asset-specific liquidity horizons, stress-period calibration, weighting of diversified and 
non-diversified ES). Hence, we find the interpretation of FRTB as equating to a change in 
statistical measure at the end of the risk modelling process. 
The interviews indicate that while new regulation will involve changes to regulatory reporting and 
the determination of capital, it will not affect significantly the day-to-day measurement of risk 
beyond the changes to the statistical metric. This has clear implications for regulators aiming to 
prevent another disastrous financial crisis in the future. If an accounting measure with the appeal 
of VaR can become so rooted in the thinking of market participants that they see no need to change 
their day-to-day risk management in response to regulatory changes, then the ways in which such 
accounting elements are woven through the financial system should be examined more clearly. 
We must be cognisant that, at the time of interviews, the implementation process for FRTB was in 
its infancy. It may be that, as posited by Farag (2017), the FRTB regulation will result in greater 
focus on the accuracy of risk forecasting. The additional accountability and governance 
requirements under FRTB may diminish the self-regulation associated with operating a proprietary 
internal market risk model.  
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The following finding relates to RQ5: What can the study tell us about the efficacy of the Miller-
Power frame to evaluate a non-traditional accounting measure? 
This study shows the usefulness of the Miller-Power frame, as it has yielded insights into the power 
of VaR as an accounting measure, and its potential impact on the effectiveness of new regulation. 
This lens allows us to interpret the interviews and find that its latent power means that the VaR 
metric has become ingrained in practitioners’ conceptualisation of risk.  In turn, this affects the 
relative effectiveness of the regulatory reform of FRTB, where although it reduces VaR’s primacy, 
it is unlikely to result in VaR’s demise within risk management practice. The ability of FRTB to 
effect real change in how risk is managed is considered by practitioners to be weak. Rather, there 
is a strong belief that banks will respond to new requirements mainly through some changes to 
reporting calculations. Participants did not express a sense that their autonomy would be reduced 
under new regulation. Many intend to continue to use internal VaR on a daily basis, and see new 
regulation rather as an increased burden of compliance in reporting.  The indication in this research 
is that an accounting measure that meets the Miller-Power criteria of being able to territorialise, 
subjectivise, adjudicate and mediate can become so deeply embedded in the thinking of users as 
to weaken the impact of new regulatory reform. This has potential beyond the specific case of the 
impending implementation of FRTB. It may also be relevant for other regulatory reforms that 
involve accounting measures or calculative technologies whose use is pervasive and perhaps 
insidious. Given the significance of financial regulation to society on a range of levels, 
consideration of the latent power of accounting elements should inform future reform.  
9.2.2 Findings from Quantitative Impact Study 
 
The following findings relate to RQ3: What is the impact of FRTB on the practice of market risk 
management and portfolio management? 
The key research question that the quantitative impact study addresses is the impact of FRTB on 
the practice of market risk management and portfolio management. One of the key findings from 
the qualitative evaluation of VaR and the regulatory framework is the perception that FRTB entails 
a change of metric at the end of the risk calculation process and that it will have limited impact on 
trading/portfolio management. The quantitative impact analysis examines the potential impact of 
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the revised market risk capital calculation framework under FRTB. In particular, the quantitative 
study investigates the influence of two new components of the framework, which determine 
whether a banking entity will be authorised to use their proprietary regulatory risk model for the 
calculation of market risk capital: PLA tests and desk-level backtests. The continued role of 
internal models (bank proprietary models) in FRTB, is regarded as essential to the achievement of 
a level playing field for banks in different jurisdictions. However, there are significant concerns 
about the variability of results from different internal models (Beder 1995). Hermsen (2010) finds 
that Basel II does not incentivise the use of resolution models with superior forecasting 
performance. Our quantitative impact analysis examines these additional qualifiers (PLA tests and 
desk-level backtests) and finds that they do not address this shortfall and that they do not 
incentivise the deployment of superior resolution models. Furthermore, our analysis focuses on 
empirically evaluating the potential for these two new components (PLA tests and desk-level 
backtests) to influence the practice of risk management and/or the practice of portfolio 
management. We found that the desk-level backtests had low power to reject poorly performing 
models relative to alternative backtest measures under the same data constraints.  
We examined the potential impact of the PLA tests by focusing on the risk factor mapping aspect 
of risk modelling. We systematically selected stocks listed on an index with varying degrees of 
two characteristics: market capitalisation and beta. We also examined the impact of different 
approaches to weighting: proportionally weighted and equally weighted. We found that passing 
the PLA tests require the trading desk’s portfolios to be strongly aligned to the risk factors used. 
Further, that they must hold the highest capitalisation stocks of the index plus a critical mass of 
such stocks. This means that passing the PLA tests will affect the construction of the portfolio. It 
may also cause herding towards holding stocks, bonds, futures, etc. that are highly aligned to the 
typical risk factors. This may cause systemic risk and skew market liquidity through incentivising 
risk-factor-aligned portfolio holdings. Alternatively, the risk management practice of using risk 
factors to model the risk in the bank’s portfolios may need to be replaced with a full evaluation. 
The onerous nature of these options may cause banks to reconsider their use of internal models. 
Concerning the reporting role of VaR, Basel III Pillar III disclosure requirements are aligned to 
the changes under FRTB (BCBS 2018a). These requirements include disclosure of market risk 
under the standardised approach as well as the internal model approach for IMA banks. The 
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disclosures of the results from SA offer an opportunity for greater interpretability. This potentially 
empowers greater market discipline. Circuitously, this may encourage alignment between internal 
market risk management, regulatory capital and reporting.  
 
9.2.3 Interaction of Qualitative and Quantitative Findings 
 
We argue that the findings from the quantitative impact study represents a change in priorities for 
supervising risk management practices, with the emphasis being placed on the trading or risk-
taking aspect rather than the risk modelling component. The P&L attribution tests are ex ante tests 
whereas the backtests are ex post meaning that they influence different aspects of the portfolio and 
risk management practice. The quantitative impact analysis of the PLA tests find that portfolios 
fail if they are not strongly aligned to the risk factor(s). The quantitative impact analysis of the 
desk-level backtests find they have low power to reject poorly performing models relative to 
alternative backtests. This contrast suggests a change of emphasis from ex post risk modelling to 
ex ante portfolio management. FRTB introduces the P&L attribution tests and desk-level backtests 
as additional criteria for the authorised use of a bank’s internal risk model (regulatory VaR/ES) in 
the calculation of Pillar 1 market risk capital requirements. This change of focus suggests that, in 
order for banks to retain/gain permission to use their internal models for regulatory capital 
purposes they must make changes to how they manage their portfolio. The alternative is for banks 
to deploy a full revaluation mode for risk modelling which would have hugely onerous system 
requirements and would have computational time considerations. Either pathway is significantly 
different to the ‘light housekeeping’ or mere change of statistical measure at the end of the 
modelling process (Azoulay et al. 2018b). This closes the loop in terms of the mixed methods 
approach. The findings from the qualitative study are used to inform and shape the quantitative 
study. Then the findings from the quantitative study are fed back to critically review the insights 
from the qualitative study. This change of emphasis indicates a significant challenge for both 
portfolio management practice and risk management practice. The underwhelming impact of the 
FRTB desk-level backtests on the choice of resolution model builds on the findings of Hermsen 
(2010) who found that superior risk resolution models are not incentivised under Basel II. We find 
that the opportunity to incorporate these incentives has not been utilised in FRTB. Reflecting on 
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the findings of Burchi (2013), who find that the presence of a multiplier nullifies the performance 
of the resolution model, it’s a rational extension that the additional layer of calculations under 
FRTB (asset-specific liquidity horizons, crisis period calibration, weighted diversified and non-
diversified ES) together with the continued use of an exceedance-based multiplier at entity level, 
dampens the effect of the chosen resolution model. When we also consider the output floor, the 
significance of the choice of resolution model (and its ability to realise reductions in market risk 
regulatory capital) is diminished further. Testing this on a commercial bank portfolio would be an 
interesting area for future research. 
RQ4: Can we apply the findings from the study to develop understanding of both traditional and 
non-traditional accounting metrics? 
The generalisability of the findings to other accounting measures, traditional and non-traditional 
must centre on the efficacy of the Miller-Power frame to reveal insights into the positions of power 
and influence accounting measures can acquire. However, we cannot be assured that all accounting 
measures will have that latent power. What we can project is the usefulness of investigating 
accounting measures in this way if they are subject to change, where that change is being imposed 
rather than evolving from practice. Fontes et al. (2016) study stakeholder perceptions of financial 
reporting change and recognise that practitioner knowledge and values can have a significant 
influence on organisational change and adaptation of new procedures or policies. Thus, where 
practitioner knowledge appears to be at odds with the change being implemented, a qualitative 
evaluation akin to this study’s may be useful. The Miller-Power frame causes us to question the 
less visible roles of accounting measures. Do they reconcile different user groups? Do they ease 
understanding for non-technical or non-expert groups? Is there a resolute reliance and belief in the 
measure? How did the measure gain its authority? Is the experienced reality different from that 
assumed? Furthermore, the collaboration of qualitative and quantitative studies may also be fruitful 
(as in this study) in developing insights into traditional and non-traditional accounting measures. 
9.3 Contributions 
 
Our key contributions can be separated into policy, practice and theoretical contributions. In 
addition, we highlight the application of a novel approach. 
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9.3.1 Contribution to policy 
 
Our first research question requires us to solicit the perspectives of practitioners that interact with 
VaR to develop insights into their experienced realities. We find that their perspectives conflict 
with the collective contemporary criticism that VaR failed in its role to demand sufficient capital 
to cover potential losses. The practitioners interviewed outline that the fail-safe theory was not 
their expectation of VaR. VaR has become innate in how practitioners view risk. The Miller-Power 
frame helps us to determine that the mediation role is key in VaR’s propagation, underlining that 
a device that reconciles different perspectives has a usefulness beyond its perceived inaccuracy. 
The Miller-Power frame also enables us to perceive that the adjudicating power of the VaR metric 
is predominantly through its internal risk management role. The Miller-Power lens enables us to 
recognise the social dimension of the power of VaR as an accounting measure. This contributes to 
regulatory policy formation by demonstrating that any review of modelling regimes needs to 
investigate the social dimension of an embedded accounting measure to understand how it affects 
behaviour. This study contributes to the understanding of the power of VaR and accounting 
measures more generally. (Contribution #1 - Policy). 
We find a general acknowledgement by practitioners that the FRTB framework comprehensively 
addresses shortfalls exposed in the market risk regulatory framework. However, despite 
acknowledging the significant additional developmental, monitoring and reporting requirements 
under the FRTB framework, we found a collective belief by practitioners that it would have a 
limited effect on portfolio and risk management practice. This learning contributes to regulatory 
reform policy, highlighting that it is not sufficient to achieve buy-in for the reforms, it is important 
to gain insights into the perceived impact of the reforms. Furthermore, subjectification by existing 
measures may lead to reticence to yield territory. Proposals to reform accounting practices can 
experience tokenistic approval that conceals a belief that day-to-day practice will continue as 
before. This study demonstrates the need to examine perceived impact of the reforms (Contribution 
#2 - practice). This is an important insight from a practice perspective and highlights the need for 
an understanding of practitioners’ perspectives to inform regulatory reform. We use this key 
finding to inform and shape our quantitative impact study. 
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9.3.2 Novel Approach 
 
The collaboration between the qualitative and quantitative impact studies requires the development 
of different methodological skill-sets and literacies. I have applied a mixed-methods approach 
which affords both approaches equal credence and substance, whilst also yielding benefit from 
their coalescence. I use the findings from the qualitative study to inform and shape the quantitative 
impact study. This traverses the traditional boundaries between qualitative and quantitative studies 
of accounting measures. We determine that this study demonstrates the veracity of this novel 
approach. (Novel Approach).  
 
9.3.3 Contribution to practice 
 
The key contributions from the quantitative impact study are: the desk-level backtests have low 
power to reject a poorly performing model; the P&L attribution tests are challenging to pass and 
will require significant alignment between the risk factors and the portfolio. This represents a 
significant impact to risk management and portfolio management practice. We argue that this 
outcome indicates a change of emphasis from the performance of the internal model to the 
construction of the portfolio. This may prompt debate about whether modelling risk should require 
a full revaluation rather than a risk factor approach (Khwaja 2016). The prohibitive cost of 
adopting a full revaluation approach may undermine the benefits of an internal model approach. 
The interview question on whether there was active discussions on cost-benefit received a muted 
response. We rationalise that this may be due to the timing of the interviews and the priority of 
other significant organisational priorities (Such as the Independent Commission on Banking in the 
UK). Obitz and Boisen (2019) question the feasibility of market risk internal models surviving the 
implementation of FRTB. They express the concern that the maximum saving on regulatory 
capital, dictated by the output floor, will be absorbed by credit risk models. Burchi (2013) argues 
that the presence of multipliers nullify the importance of the resolution model. We argue that the 
multiplier approach, still deployed at entity level under FRTB, together with a number of 
additional calculative layers will collectively diminish the impact of the choice of resolution 
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model. Hermsen (2010) finds that Basel II does not incentivise the use of resolution models with 
strong forecasting performance. Benink and Kaufman (2008) find that Basel II introduces perverse 
incentives and encourages the gaming of VaR to minimise market risk regulatory capital. This 
study finds that the introduction of desk-level backtests as a criterion for the use of internal models 
under FRTB, do nothing to incentivise better resolution models. We infer that the changes to the 
calculative framework dampen the importance of the choice of resolution model and therefore 
limit the ability for IMA banks to reduce their market risk capital requirements. Should they wish 
to continue to use internal models, passing the PLA tests will affect portfolio construction and/or 
risk modelling practices. (Contribution #3 - practice).  
Self-regulation through the use of internal models for regulatory capital was a central component 
of Basel II to enable the level playing field principle (BCBS 2010b). This principle has been 
preserved in the FRTB framework (BCBS 2019). This study questioned whether practitioners 
perceived a reduction in self-regulation through the additional granular specifications and 
conditions of the FRTB calculative framework (Example, limits on diversification benefits, desk-
level approval requirements). We find limited recognition of the existence of self-regulation via 
internal models for regulatory capital purposes. This may be due to modelling autonomy existing 
at entity rather than individual level.  
This study has implications for financial stability, specifically addressing the relationship between 
banking regulation, capital, risk behaviour and financial stability. The study highlights the conflict 
between the shareholder value theory deployment of VaR (Power 2007) internally in capital 
allocation and the fail-safe public expectations of bank regulations over which, VaR currently 
presides (Rothstein et al. 2006). This study finds that practitioners expect the FRTB framework to 
result in a divergence between the FRTB calculative framework for determining market risk capital 
and the use of the VaR model for internal market risk management. We find a consensus from 
participants that capital, rather than the risk model, is the conduit for influencing behaviour through 
the FRTB framework. This reduced influence of either VaR or ES on the determination of market 
risk capital may act as a means of detachment (Millo et al. 2005) of the capital calculation from 
the model used internally to manage market risk. Further study post implementation of FRTB is 
warranted to determine if the framework effect discussed in Borio and Zhu (2012) causes a 
realignment between models used internally for market risk management and those used for capital 
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calculation. This study contributes to practice by examining the potential for further divergence 
between internal risk management practice and the calculation of market risk regulatory capital. 
(Contribution #4 - practice). 
9.3.4 Contribution to theory 
 
The usefulness of the Miller-Power frame as a lens to examine accounting metrics in their lived 
realities is strongly evidenced in this study. The Miller-Power frame enables us to look beyond the 
collation of practitioner responses and to consider why they have responded in this way and what 
does it say about the VaR model. The stickiness of the VaR measure becomes rational when we 
consider its ability to reconcile and its ease of communication (mediation). Viewing VaR through 
that lens alone, justifies its dominance, but also promotes its propagation. The defensiveness 
exhibited together with practitioners’ reluctance to consider alternatives are manifestations of 
territorialisation and subjectification. Perhaps, the most powerful insight from using the Miller-
Power frame is the source of its adjudicating power. Contrary to the belief that VaR was bestowed 
with this authority through its position within the regulatory frame, the dominant adjudicating 
power comes from its internal risk management role. These insights into practitioners’ perspectives 
were made possible through using the Miller-Power frame. We argue that its efficacy in revealing 
the ontologies and epistemologies around VaR that are not easily visible, is testament to its 
usefulness as a theoretical frame for examining traditional and non-traditional accounting 
measures. (Contribution #4 – Theory). This adhesion to theory (O'Dwyer and Unerman 2016) 
means this study contributes to the rigour of the evolving literature on the interdependencies of 




VaR has been the primary measure used for the measurement and management of market risk since 
the 1990’s and RiskMetrics development of an entity-wide approach. It has been the focus of 
significant criticism in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis for its perceived failure to 
adequately forecast potential losses and ensure banks had sufficient capital to withstand those 
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losses. Cannata and Quagliarello (2009) argue that this criticism cannot be justified because VaR 
as a market risk regulatory capital measure only became operational in  Europe in 2008. McAleer 
et al. (2010) also argue this point, furthermore they highlight that VaR was not being used to 
determine market risk capital requirements in the US at the time of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
However, the primacy of VaR in market risk management practice is recognised in an IMF Global 
Stability Report (IMF 2007). We find a key aspect in some of the criticism is the assumption that 
VaR is one specific model, and that the same model performs each of the roles (internal risk 
management, reporting and regulatory capital) cohesively. This highlights the need for greater 
clarity around the position and influence of VaR within organisations, in financial markets and 
within the changing regulatory capital framework. 
The key criticisms of VaR include: its procyclicality (Danielsson et al. 2001; Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen 2009; Borio and Zhu 2012; Repullo and Suarez 2013); its failure to meet the subaddivity 
criteria (Artzner et al. 1999; Danielsson et al. 2005; Cont et al. 2010; Daníelsson et al. 2013); it 
assumes risks are exogenous (Danı́elsson 2002; Danielsson et al. 2011b; Pasztor 2013); it is a point 
estimate, allowing it to be easily gamed (Woods et al. 2008; Danielsson and Zhou 2016b); the 
variability of results (Beder 1995; Boucher et al. 2014). ES is promoted in the literature because it 
meets the subadditivity criteria and is a measure of the average loss in the tail so is less easily 
gamed (Yamai and Yoshiba 2002; Yamai and Yoshiba 2005). However, concerns are expressed 
about the robustness of ES, and its ability to be backtested (Cont et al. 2010; Chen 2014). 
The scale of the losses in the financial sector and their socialisation following the 2007-2009 
financial crisis prompted the need for significant reform of banking regulation. In the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis the BCBS introduced Stressed VaR,  Incremental Risk Charge and a 
Comprehensive Risk Measure (Barth and Miller 2017). These measures were introduced to 
increase market risk regulatory capital requirements and address some areas of market risk that 
had become apparent as weaknesses through the events of the crisis, for example, the impact on 
prices of credit migration. However, BCBS promised a major overhaul of the market risk 
regulatory framework.  
BCBS  produced a consultative paper on the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB) in 
2016 (BCBS 2016), with a finalised document published in 2019; It will come into effect January 
2022. The headline change under FRTB is the succession of VaR by ES as the central measure in 
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the determination of market risk capital (BCBS 2019). However, this change does not infer that 
VaR will also lose its role in internal market risk management. Other significant changes to the 
market risk calculative framework under FRTB include: asset-specific liquidity horizons; 
weighted diversified and non-diversified ES; calibration on stress period; output floor at 75% of 
SA. 
The changing market risk regulatory framework and significant criticism of the VaR measure in 
contemporary financial media and both government and industry reviews of the financial crisis, 
signals the need for an evaluation of VaR that traverses traditional qualitative and quantitative 
boundaries. The mixed methodology approach brings together a sociological perspective and 
quantitative impact analysis. The first phase is the qualitative study which brings to the fore the 
experienced realities of bank practitioners, unveiling their perception of VaR in its various roles 
and within the context of the changing regulatory environment. Examining these perspectives 
under the Miller-Power frame (Miller and Power 2013) allows us to understand the characteristics 
of this non-traditional accounting measure in its various roles, and why it remains useful to 
practitioners for internal market risk management. Miller and Power (2013) describe accounting 
as a powerful lattice of the properties: Territorialising, Subjectivising, Mediating and 
Adjudicating. The Miller-Power frame enables us to see how VaR’s embodiment of these 
characteristics means VaR has become innate to how practitioners conceptualise and practice risk 
to the extent that they are reticent to concede territory and contemplate changes in internal risk 
management. Furthermore, this frame allows to us to see that the adjudicating power of VaR is not 
dependent on its position within the market risk regulatory framework but is derived from its 
usefulness on an organisational basis. This is important from a practice perspective as it shows the 
importance of evaluating accounting practices from the perspective of practitioners. It also 
demonstrates the applicability of the Miller-Power frame in evaluating standard and non-standard 
accounting measures. 
The insights from the qualitative study inform and shape the quantitative impact study. One of the 
key findings from the qualitative study is the belief by practitioners that FRTB equates to a change 
of statistical measure and will have limited impact on market risk management or portfolio 
management practice. Our quantitative study is designed to examine whether two of the additional 
measures under FRTB have any impact on risk and portfolio management practice. The PLA tests 
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and desk-level backtests are introduced as additional criteria for the use of internal (proprietary) 
risk models. We contrast the finding that the PLA tests present a significant challenge to risk 
management and portfolio management, with the finding that the desk-level backtests exhibit low 
power to influence the performance of risk modelling. Worryingly, this may result in incentivising 
herding behaviour to ensure alignment of portfolio holdings to common risk factors. Moreover, 
the contrasting power to influence of the two measures infers a change of emphasis from ex post 
backtesting to ex ante constitution of the portfolio. This covert change of emphasis is consistent 
with the nullification of the impact of risk resolution models discussed in Burchi (2013). This 
causes us to question whether detachment (Millo et al. 2005) of the regulatory capital calculation 
and the methodology used for internal market risk management is implicit in the multitude of 
layers introduced in the FRTB framework. Furthermore, this idea of detachment is consistent with 
the findings from the qualitative study that capital is the conduit to manage bank risk-taking rather 
than either the VaR or the ES model. Our quantitative study builds on the work of Hermsen (2010) 
who find that Basel II does not incentivise banks to use VaR resolution models with better 
forecasting performance. We find that the FRTB backtests have comparably low power to reject 
poorly performing resolution models and thus, infer no incentive to deploy superior models. This 
upholds the findings from the qualitative study of a preference for simpler models that facilitate 
mediation between different practitioner groups. 
With respect to the reporting role of VaR, we find that Basel III Pillar III disclosure requirements 
are consistent with the changes under the FRTB market risk regulatory capital framework. 
Although it is not yet clear whether accounting bodies will change their requirements to be 
consistent with the revised regulatory calculations, the markets will have access to this information 
through the Pillar III disclosures. The Pillar III disclosures require that the SA capital calculations 
be reported. These standardised calculations will facilitate greater interpretability and thus enable 
enhanced market discipline (Woods and Marginson 2004). Circuitously, this may incentivise 
alignment between market risk regulatory capital and internal market risk management practice. 
It remains to be seen whether the divergence between use of VaR in banks’ internal risk 
management and the capital-based FRTB regulatory framework is sustainable post implementation 
of FRTB. Thus, like the ever-elusive nature of uncertainty and endeavours to impose management 
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of risk, we have addressed the identified research questions and simultaneously generated further 




Appendix 1 Interviews 
A. KBS research ethics approval 
 
 
UNIVERSITY of LIMERICK 
O  L  L  S  C  O   I  L     L  U  I  M  I  N  I  G  H  
 




The completion of this form is only necessary where the proposed research involves working 
with human subjects.29 
 
Faculty and PhD Research Students (please note that your answers must be typed) 
 
Name:       Orla McCullagh 
E-mail Address:   orla.mccullagh@ul.ie 
Date:       4/10/17 
Title of Project (please do not use acronyms):    Investigating the perception of market risk 
expert practitioners on the proposed regulatory changes under the Fundamental Review of the 
Trading Book   
                                                 
29 Examples of research involving human subjects include (but are not limited to): carrying out interviews; 




Names of other researchers involved: Prof Sheila Killian, Prof Mark Cummins 
PART A 
 
Research Purpose: (50-100 words) The regulatory changes proposed under the FRTB present 
more than a technical change. The change from use of internal models to determine market risk 
regulatory capital to a dominance of a standardised model potentially changes the dynamic of 
regulation. The purpose of the interviews is to discuss the effectiveness of the current 
regulatory system with practitioners and their perception of the potential impact of the proposed 
changes.  
Research Methodology: (100-150 words) 
The research methodology underpinning this component of the analysis of the potential impact 
of the proposed regulatory changes is a qualitative approach, where semi-structured interviews, 
focus groups and/or surveys/ questionnaires will be conducted with market risk expert 
practitioners. The results will be analysed using Nvivo and using discourse analysis. 
1. Human Subjects 
  Does the research proposal involve: 
  (a) Any person under the age of 18?             No⁭ 
(b) Adult patients?                 No⁭ 
(c) Adults with psychological impairments?            No⁭ 
(d) Adults with learning difficulties?              No⁭  
(e) Adults under the protection/ control/influence 
  of others (e.g., in care/ in prison)?                             No⁭     
(f) Relatives of ill people  
(e.g., parents of sick children)?               No⁭ 
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(g) People whose comprehension of the research  
and its requirements might be compromised by  
their linguistic competence? (e.g. individuals whose  
mother tongue is another language, who are being  
asked to participate in research in English)               No     ⁭ 
  
2. Subject Matter 
 
Does the research proposal involve: 
 
(a) Sensitive personal issues? (e.g., suicide, bereavement, 
gender identity, sexuality, fertility, abortion,  
gambling)?                     No⁭ 
(b) Illegal activities, illicit drug taking, substance abuse  
or the self reporting of criminal behaviour?     No⁭ 
(c) Any act that might diminish self-respect or cause  
shame, embarrassment or regret?      No⁭ 
(d) Research into politically and/or racially/ethically  
sensitive areas?        No⁭ 
 
 
3. Procedures  
Does the proposal involve: 
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(a) Use of personal or company records without consent? No⁭ 
(b) Deception of participants?       No⁭ 
(c) The offer of disproportionately large inducements 
 to participate?         No⁭ 
(d) Audio or visual recording without consent?     No⁭ 
(e) Invasive physical interventions or treatments?    No⁭ 
  (f) Research which might put researchers or  
   participants at risk?        No⁭ 
 
 
4. (a) Who will your informants be? 
Market risk expert practitioners, for example market risk managers, analysts and 
modellers, traders, regulatory analysts etc. 
(b) Do you have a pre-existing relationship with the informants and, if so, what is 
the nature of that relationship? 
 I have worked with a number of the informants when I worked in Financial Services. 
(c) How do you plan to gain access to /contact/approach potential  
informants? 
 
Potential informants will receive an email inviting them to participate in the research 
interviews with an explanation regarding the nature of the interview and the 
confidentiality of their answers. 
Please indicate by ticking the following box if you agree to the following conditions: I 
confirm that I will inform all participants that this research is being conducted as part 
of a UL project. Y 
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(d) What arrangements have you made for anonymity and  
confidentiality? 
Interviews may be recorded and transcribed and will be stored using a coding system 
that will not identify the participant or their company/financial institution. 
(e) What, if any, is the particular vulnerability of your informants? 
There are no concerns regarding the vulnerability of the potential informants.  
Please indicate by ticking the following box if you agree to the following conditions: I 
confirm that no individuals who directly report to me will be asked to participate in this 
research Y 
(f) What arrangements are in place to ensure that informants know the  
purpose of the research and what they are going to inform about? 
The informants will receive an email outlining the purpose of the research and the key 
aims of the research interviews. 
(g) How will you ensure that informants are aware of their right to refuse  
to participate or withdraw at any time? 





(h) How would you handle any unforeseen safety issues should they arise? 
Any safety issues will be dealt with in accordance with the operational procedures 
pertaining to the location of the interview. 




The information will be stored using a coding system and will be password protected. 
Please indicate by ticking the following box if you agree to the following conditions: I 
confirm that all the electronic data will be stored in password protected files, and all 
hard copies of the data collected will be stored in a locked storage unit only accessible 
to authorised researchers Y 
If you have answered YES to any of the questions in PART A, sections 1-3, you will also need 
to comply with the requirements of PART B of this form. 
If you have answered NO to all of the questions in PART A, sections 1-3 above, please ignore 
PART B of the form. 
All applicants must complete the relevant KBSREC research ethics application form (either 
the Faculty and PhD students’ form or the FYP and taught postgraduate students’ form). All 
questions on this form must be answered. All answers must be typed – handwritten applications 
cannot be processed. Forms must be signed by the principal investigator and faculty supervisor 
where relevant. KBSREC is only accepting electronic submissions of research ethics 
application forms. Signatures can be added to forms in one of two ways. First, applicants may 
print out a typed form, sign it, and then scan the signed form and submit this signed version. 
Alternatively, applicants may insert electronic signatures into the form directly.  
Forms should emailed to KBSResearchEthics@ul.ie. You will receive an acknowledgement of 
your application at this point. This form must be submitted before the research begins.  
Signature of principle investigator:__________________ Date: ______________ 




Insurance cover is required for all research carried out by UL employees.  Principal 
Investigators/Supervisors  should  carefully  view  the  University’s  ‘Insurance Guidelines  for  
Researchers’  document  and  the  University’s  Insurance  cover  to  
ascertain  if  their  proposed  research  is covered. These documents  are  available  at  
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http://www.ul.ie/insurance.   
Where  any  query  arises  about  whether  or  not  proposed  research  is  covered  by  
insurance,  the  Principal  Investigator/Supervisor  must  contact  the  University’s  Insurance  
Administrator  at  insurance@ul.ie  to  confirm  that  the  required  level  of insurance cover is 
in place.    
Please  indicate  by  way  of  signature  that  the  research  project  is  covered  by  UL's  





This part of the application form is only relevant where researchers have answered ‘YES’ to 
any of the questions in sections 1-3 of PART A. 
Please attach a report to this application addressing the following questions with a maximum 
of 300 words per question. 
You must answer the following questions: 
1.  What are the ethical issues involved in your research? 
2.  Explain why the use of human participants is essential to your research project.  
3.  How will you ensure that informed consent is freely given by human participants? 
Answer the following questions where relevant to your research project and after consultation 
with your supervisor (where relevant) and a member of the KBS Research Ethics Committee: 
4.  How will you protect human participants if your research deals with sensitive issues? 
5.  How will you ensure that vulnerable research participants are protected? (Please state clearly 
if you abide by the Child Protection Guidelines and/or have Garda Clearance where necessary) 
6.  How will you protect human participants if your research deals with sensitive research 
procedures? 
7.  Outline how you intend to comply with any established procedures which have been 
approved by ULREG for your research. 




B. Invitation to engage 
 
 
UNIVERSITY of LIMERICK 
O  L  L  S  C  O   I  L     L  U  I  M  I  N  I  G  H 
 
Invitation to engage in research collaboration 
 
Orla McCullagh, PhD Candidate, Kemmy Business School, University of Limerick 




My name is Orla McCullagh, I am a full-time Lecturer in Risk Management and Insurance 
with the Kemmy Business School, University of Limerick, and I am in the process of 
completing my programme of doctoral studies. The key tenet of my PhD is to address the 
growing impetus to quantitatively and qualitatively evaluate the implicit model risk of market 
risk forecasting models.  
 
Model risk of market risk models has gained prominence as an immensely significant issue 
for central banks and supervisory authorities. There has been a substantial drive to improve 
oversight and governance of internal models (For example, the ECB’s Targeted Review of 
Internal Models and the Federal Reserve’s Guidance on model risk management, SR11-7, 
etc.) coalescing with the BCBS’ Fundamental Review of the Trading Book which introduces 
significant restrictions and qualified use of internal models for calculating regulatory capital 
for the trading book. Hence I am contacting you to request your participation. 
 
My current research seeks to contribute to the existing literature through developing an 
appreciation of expert practitioner’s perception of the regulatory changes proposed under the 
Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB). I am hoping to interview a spectrum of 
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expert practitioners involved in the management, measurement and modelling of market risk. 
The focus of the research will be both micro and macro. I hope to investigate the perceived 
impact on the individual bank’s activity and also the perceived impact on financial market 
stability. 
 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics Committee of The 
Kemmy Business School, University of Limerick. The information collected will be used for 
educational or research purposes, including publication. Any opinions expressed will be 
assumed to be those of the individual and not their organisation. The interview will be 
recorded using an electronic recording device and then transcribed into an electronic 
document. To keep your interview anonymous, the audio recording and the interview 
transcription will be allocated a unique ‘identifier code’ so that your name will not be directly 
associated with them. The audio recording and the interview transcription will be password 
protected and stored securely. Any information or data obtained from you during this study 
which can be identified with you will be treated confidentially. 
 







Cummins, M., McCullagh, O. and Murphy, B. (2016) Model Risk in Financial Markets: 
From Financial Engineering to Risk Management by Tunaru, R., reviewed in Quantitative 









(RQ) Literature  
1 
Could you explain your current role and your engagement with the VaR model and the market risk 
regulatory framework? 
Interviewee 
background Brinkman & Kvale (2015) 
2 How would you describe the role(s) of VaR? RQ1 Woods et al (2008) 
3 What is your perception of the VaR measure? What are the reasons for its longevity? RQ1 
Crawford Spence, MacKenzie and 
Spears (2014b) 
4 Do you think there is any conflict between the various roles of VaR? RQ1 Millo and MacKenzie (2009) 
5 How do you perceive the change from VaR to ES under the regulatory changes proposed by BCBS? RQ1, RQ2, RQ3 Danielsson et al (2013) 
6 
Do you think the change from VaR to ES as the measure underpinning Pillar 1 market risk capital 
requirements and regulatory reporting will lead to VaR being replaced by ES etc. in its other roles? Is it 
necessary for the same model to be used across these functions? RQ1, RQ2, RQ3 Borio and Zhu (2012) 
7 What is your perception of the relationship between trading/portfolio management and VaR? RQ1 
MacKenzie and Spears (2014a), 
Caccioli et al (2009) 
8 
Do you consider that the criticisms of VaR in financial media etc. have influenced its replacement by ES in 
the FRTB framework? RQ1, RQ2, RQ3 Roulet and Clemente (2015) 
9 
What is your perception of the changes to market risk capital regulation introduced since the 2007-2009 
financial crisis? (Basel II.5 and Basel III including impending changes under FRTB)  RQ1, RQ2, RQ3 Danielsson et al (2001) 
10 
Do you think these changes are consistent with views from RM/T/P on necessary reforms post-crisis? Do 









(RQ) Literature  
11 
Do you consider the use of internal models as a form of self-regulation? Is that eroded under the 
regulatory changes? RQ1, RQ2, RQ3 
Power (2007), O'Regan and Killian 
(2014) 
12 
Do you think that the changing requirements under FRTB will lead to IMA banks weighing up the cost-
benefits of continuing with their internal model for market risk? Are Central banks encouraging more 
technical banks to persist with IMA? RQ2, RQ3 Pritsker (1997) 
13 Do you think that the implementation of the Basel III standards will lead to regulatory harmonisation? RQ2, RQ3 Lall (2012) 
14 Do you think that the BCBS development of Basel III included adequate consultation? RQ2, RQ3 Power (2007) 
15 
Do you think the regulatory changes introduced under Basel III (including FRTB) will improve the stability 
of the banking sector? RQ2, RQ3 Goodhart (2012) 
16 
Do you think the regulatory changes introduced under Basel III (including FRTB) will improve the 
alignment of the banking system with the needs of society? RQ2, RQ3 Turner (2016) 
17 
Do you think the regulatory changes introduced under Basel III (including FRTB) will have any impact on 
the interpretability of disclosures? RQ1, RQ2, RQ3 Perignon and Smith (2010) 
18 
Do you think the regulatory changes introduced under Basel III (including FRTB) have the potential to 
shift risk (and capital) from the banking sector to less regulated sectors? RQ2, RQ3 de Roure et al. (2018)  
19 
Do you think the regulatory changes introduced under Basel III (including FRTB) impact trading? And will 
they inhibit provision of services? RQ2, RQ3 
Brunnermeier and Sannikov  
(2014)  
20 
Do you think the unilateral approaches to model governance (TRIM, SR 11-7, etc.) collaborate with the 
Basel III measures?  RQ2, RQ3 Blundell-Wignall et al. (2014) 
  
Interview questions, research questions and informing literature. Interview approach was semi-structured so this template was used as a guide and not a fixed structure.  
216 
 
Appendix 2 FRTB specifications 





B. Liquidity Horizons 
 
C. FRTB backtesting, P&L attribution testing and risk model validation 
 
Basel II.5 backtesting required a Bernoulli counting measure and traffic light system. 
Authorisation for IMA banks to use their internal risk model (proprietary VaR model) required 
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that the measure passed through a defined traffic light system which defined a multiplier on the 
basis of the number of exceedances to a maximum of 10, beyond which their market risk regulatory 
capital would be determined using the standardized approach (SA). The significant increase in 
regulatory capital required under SA versus the requirements under IMA (together with the loss of 
reputation) were referred to as the regulatory cliff effect with regulators anecdotally unwilling to 
subject banks to this default to SA. The newly defined FRTB SA is risk-based and with the 
introduction of the regulatory floor which effectively caps the benefits of IMA versus SA to 27.5%, 
this cliff effect has been significantly diminished.  
FRTB backtesting requirements: 
Backtesting is based on comparing each desk’s 1-day VaR at 99% and 97.5%, calibrated to the 
most recent 12mths of data (equally weighted), using at least 1yr of data. 
1-day actual P&L defined: 
1-day hypothetical P&L defined: 
A traffic light mechanism is again deployed to assess performance under the backtest, however 




The language of the original FRTB documentation suggests a number of additional model 
validation points that could be included in backtesting. 
Test VaR at 99%, 97.5% and ES at 97.5% over 3yrs of forecasting.  
Testing of internal model assumptions. 
These include determining the p-value of the daily P&L, that is, the probability of observing a 
profit less than or a loss greater than that forecast by the underlying risk model. 
Testing at both desks and entity level  
Arguably this is a missed opportunity for introducing specified robust backtesting beyond a 
Bernoulli counting measure. This has received significant attention in the market risk modelling 
literature. The language of ‘could’ is also weak and the introduction of p-values, though 




D. ES formulation 
ES calculated daily on Bank-wide and Desk basis at 97.5 th percentile 
The liquidity horizons are defined in paragraph 181(k) but must be scaled from a base liquidity 
horizon of 10days using the following formula: 






Where T is the base risk horizon, 10 
Where P represents portfolio positions (pi)  
𝐸𝑆𝑇(𝑃) is ES at horizon T of positions P with respect to all risk factors. 
𝐸𝑆𝑇(𝑃, 𝑗)is ES at horizon T with respect to shocks for each position pi in a subset of risk factors 
Q(pi,j) 
Q(pi, j) is the subset of risk factors whose liquidity horizons for the desk where pi is booked are at 
least as long as LHj 
Scaling from shorter horizons than T is not permitted. 
ES is calibrated to a stress period 
The method of calibrating is referred to as an ‘indirect’ method whereby a reduced set of risk 
factors are determined which must capture 75% of the variation of a full ES (on average over the 
preceding 12week period). 
ES using the reduced risk factors is calibrated to the most severe 12mth period and is then scaled 





Where 𝐸𝑆𝑅,𝑆 is ES calibrated using a reduced set of risk factors on the stress period 
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and 𝐸𝑆𝑅,𝐶 is ES calibrated using a reduced set of risk factors on the current period 
and 𝐸𝑆𝐹,𝐶 is ES calibrated using a full set of risk factors on the current period 
(ratio is floored to 1). 
In volatile periods 𝐸𝑆𝐹,𝐶 may, on the request of the supervisor, be calibrated on shorter periods but 
not less than 6mths. 
Stress period observations must be equally weighted. Banks must determine the 12mths for which 
the portfolio experiences the largest back by scanning through 12mth periods back to 2007. 
ES is calculated bank wide on an unconstrained bases IMCC(C) 
Then ES is calculated across the five risk regulatory classes (interest rate risk, equity risk, foreign 
exchange risk, commodity risk and credit spread risk), referred to as partial, non-diversifiable 
(constrained) ES, IMCC(Ci) which can then be aggregated. 
Then an average of the constrained and unconstrained ES is determined using: 




The following expression shows the aggregate capital charge for approved desks: 
𝐶𝐴 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐼𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑐. 𝐼𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑔 + 𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑔) 
Where CA is the regulatory capital charge 
𝐼𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑡−1 is the previous day ES, 𝐼𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑔is the average of the last 60days 
SES is the aggregate regulatory capital measure for K risk factors in model-eligible desks that are 
non-modellable. 
The multiplication factor mc will be a minimum of 1.5 with an additional ‘plus’ which will be 
determined from backtesting results. 
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The Aggregate charge for market risk is: 
𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝐴 + 𝐷𝑅𝐶 +  𝐶𝑈 
Where CA is the capital charge for model-eligible desks, Cu is the capital charge for non-eligible 
desks and DRC is the Default Risk Charge. 
 
E. Probability Integral Transform (PIT) 
Berkowitz (2001) develops a test that compares the realised P&L with the entire forecasted 
distribution. Let us define the forecasted distribution as 𝐹𝐻𝑌𝑃𝑖as the i
th hypothetical distribution. 
 




𝑦𝑖 is the realised return at time i 
𝑝𝑖 is the probability of the occurrence of 𝑦𝑖 under the hypothetical cumulative distribution 𝐹𝐻𝑌𝑃𝑖 
This transformation comes from Rosenblatt (1952) who showed that if the forecast is adequate 
then these PIT values will be i.i.d. and  uniformly distributed. Hence we can test the null: 
 
𝐻0: 𝑝𝑖~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑.  𝑈(0,1) 
 
 
However Berkowitz argues that it can be problematic to test the standard uniform distribution so 
proposes to transform the PIT values 𝑝𝑖 to a standard normal variable: 
 
























T is the test sample size, 
?̂? is the sample mean of 𝑧𝑡 
?̂? is the sample standard deviation of 𝑧𝑡 
-2Ln(𝐿𝑅𝑃𝐼𝑇) is asymptotically distributed with 𝜒
2(𝑥). 
 
If the forecast distribution is non parametric the following alternative is proposed in the FRTB 
consultation document joint submission by International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA), the Global Financial Markets Association (GFMA), and The Institute of International 
Finance (IIF) (ISDA GFMA & IIF 2012): 
 







Sims is the number of Monte Carlo or Historical Simulations. 
Rank() is the rank of the (ordered) scenario closest to 𝑦𝑖, where the most negative scenario is 1 and 




Appendix 3 Backtesting 
A. Backtesting results 
These graphs can be interpreted as count of the number of exceedances for each stock portfolio 
over the 12 month test period. An exceedance occurs when the realised loss exceeds the forecasted 
loss. The graphs also show the tolerable level of exceedances under FRTB at the 99% confidence 
level:12 and at the 97.5% confidence level: 30. This is shown by the blow horizontal line. The 
legends underneath the graphs show the colour of results corresponding to each resolution method. 
1. Backtest FTSE 100 portfolios,  




Index Ranked Weighting 
1 99% FTSE 100 Capitalisation Proportionally 
2 97.50% FTSE 100 Capitalisation Proportionally 
3 99% FTSE 100 Capitalisation Equally 
4 97.50% FTSE 100 Capitalisation Equally 
5 99% FTSE 100 Beta Proportionally 
6 97.50% FTSE 100 Beta Proportionally 
7 99% FTSE 100 Beta Equally 
8 97.50% FTSE 100 Beta Equally 
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VaR 99% Exceedances, FTSE 100, Capitalisation-
ranked, proportionally-weighted portfolios 

















VaR 97.5% Exceedances, FTSE 100, Capitalisation-
ranked, proportionally-weighted portfolios 

















97.5% VaR Exceedances, FTSE 100, Capitalisation-
ranked, Equally-weighted portfolios 

















99% VaR Exceedances, FTSE 100, Capitalisation-
ranked, Equally-weighted portfolios 






















VaR 99% Exceedances, Beta-ranked, Proportionally-
weighted portfolios

















VaR 99% Exceedances, Beta-ranked, Proportionally-
weighted portfolios

















VaR 99% Exceedances, Beta-ranked, Equally-
weighted portfolios














VaR 99% Exceedances, Beta-ranked, Equally-
weighted portfolios
NL VaR HS VaR GARCH(1,1) VaR EWMA VaR FRTB 97.5%
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2. EURO STOXX 50 portfolios backtest results 
 




Index Ranked Weighting 
1 99% Euro Stoxx 50 Capitalisation Proportionally 
2 97.50% Euro Stoxx 50 Capitalisation Proportionally 
3 99% Euro Stoxx 50 Capitalisation Equally 
4 97.50% Euro Stoxx 50 Capitalisation Equally 
5 99% Euro Stoxx 50 Beta Proportionally 
6 97.50% Euro Stoxx 50 Beta Proportionally 
7 99% Euro Stoxx 50 Beta Equally 
8 97.50% Euro Stoxx 50 Beta Equally 
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Number of VaR 99% Exceedances: Eurostoxx 50, Capitalisation ranked, 
Proportionally weighted portfolios. 

























Number of VaR 97.5%Exceedances: Eurostoxx 50, Capitalisation ranked, 
Proportionallyweighted portfolios

























Number of VaR 99% Exceedances: Eurostoxx 50, Capitalisation ranked, 
Equally weighted portfolios

























Number of 97.5% VaR Exceedances: Eurostoxx 50, Capitalisation ranked, 
Equally weighted portfolios
NL VaR 97.5% HS 97.5% GARCH(1,1) 97.5% EWMA 97.5% FRTB 97.5%
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Number of VaR 99% Exceedances: Eurostoxx 50, Beta ranked, 
Proportionally weighted portfolios

























Number of VaR 97.5% Exceedances: Eurostoxx 50, Beta ranked, 
Proportionally weighted portfolios

























Number of VaR 99% Exceedances: Eurostoxx 50, Beta ranked, Equally 
weighted portfolios

























Number of VaR 97.5% Exceedances: Eurostoxx 50, Beta ranked, Equally 
weighted portfolios
NL VaR 97.5% HS 97.5% GARCH(1,1) 97.5% EWMA 97.5% FRTB 97.5%
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3. S&P500 portfolios backtest results 
 




Index Ranked Weighting 
1 99% S&P 500 Capitalisation Proportionally 
2 97.50% S&P 500 Capitalisation Proportionally 
3 99% S&P 500 Capitalisation Equally 
4 97.50% S&P 500 Capitalisation Equally 
5 99% S&P 500 Beta Proportionally 
6 97.50% S&P 500 Beta Proportionally 
7 99% S&P 500 Beta Equally 
8 97.50% S&P 500 Beta Equally 
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99% VaR Exceedances, Capitalisation-ranked, Proportionally-weighted portfolios









































































































































































































































































97.5% VaR Exceedances, Capitalisation-ranked, Proportionally-weighted portfolios
NL HS GARCH(1,1) EWMA FRTB 97.5%
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99% VaR Exceedances, S&P 500, Capitalisation--ranked, Equally-weighted, portfolios









































































































































































































































































97.5% VaR Exceedances, S&P 500, Capitalisation-ranked, Equally-weighted, portfolios
NL HS GARCH(1,1) EWMA FRTB 97.5%
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VaR 99% Exceedances, S&P 500, Beta-ranked, proportionally-weighted portfolios












































































































































































































































































VaR 97.5% Exceedances, S&P 500, Beta-ranked, proportionally-weighted portfolios
NL HS GARCH(1,1) EWMA FRTB 97.5%
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VaR 99% Exceedances, S&P 500 Beta-ranked, Equally-weighted portfolios












































































































































































































































































VaR 97.5% Exceedances, S&P 500 Beta-ranked, Equally-weighted portfolios
NL HS GARCH(1,1) EWMA FRTB 97.5%
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Appendix 4 Matlab code 
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